People v. Morris

• Decision Date: 02 October 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2731
• Citation: 285 N.W.2d 446,92 Mich.App. 747
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joann MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant. 92 Mich.App. 747, 285 N.W.2d 446
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 446

285 N.W.2d 446

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joann MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-2731.

92 Mich.App. 747, 285 N.W.2d 446

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 2, 1979.

Released for Publication Nov. 29, 1979.

[92 MICHAPP 749] Joseph S. Scorsone, Saginaw, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert L. Kaczmarek, Pros. Atty., Patrick M. Meter, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CAVANAGH, P. J., and BASHARA and HOLBROOK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was tried by jury for the offense of first-degree murder. M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. She was convicted, sentenced to life imprisonment and appeals by right, raising six issues, three of which merit comment and require reversal for a new trial.

Reversible error was committed when the trial court instructed the jury prior to their deliberations on the definition of legal insanity and the corresponding definition of legal sanity. The erroneous charge that was given twice was that, "The person is legally sane if despite the mental illness that person possesses substantial capacity Either to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct Or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law". (Emphasis added.) In Michigan a criminal defendant is legally sane if she is shown to satisfy Both of the two requirements, Viz., whether she knew what she was doing was right or wrong And if she did, then did she have the power to resist the contemplated action? People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 418, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971). The prosecutor argues that despite this improper charge, the jury was properly instructed before any proofs were presented and that a supplemental charge during deliberations stated the definition correctly [92 MICHAPP 750] and resolved any possible ambiguities. Defense counsel objected to the predeliberation charge, noting the error; nevertheless, the trial court elected to "leave the instructions as they stand". Approximately three hours after commencing deliberations the jury requested another recital of the insanity instructions. At that time the charge was delivered correctly, however, the previous improper definition was not retracted. We have previously held that where conflicting instructions are given, one erroneous and the other without error, it may be presumed that the jury followed the instruction that was erroneous. People v. Bargy, 71 Mich.App. 609, 616, 248 N.W.2d 636 (1976).

Another instance of reversible error concerned defendant's In limine motion to exclude any reference to the fact that defendant had had legal abortions prior to the charged crime. A report prepared by defendant's psychiatrist included the information that defendant and the victim had quarreled over the abortions, therefore, because the trial court felt that this information was relevant to the issue of defendant's sanity, the pretrial motion was denied. Defense counsel then offered to make a separate record to establish that the psychiatrist considered the abortions immaterial to his diagnosis. When the trial court refused that offer, defense counsel felt obliged to question all prospective jurors on voir dire about their attitudes concerning abortions, thereby effectively informing the jury of defendant's abortions. We find that these rulings by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion. People v. Triplett, 68 Mich.App. 531, 536, 243 N.W.2d 665 (1976), Lv. den. 397 Mich. 842 (1976).

MRE 401 and 402 define relevant evidence and direct that it be admissible except where otherwise [92 MICHAPP 751] provided by constitution or court rule. The only possible relevancy the defendant's abortions may have had to the issue of her sanity is the strife which they may have occasioned between herself and her victim. If this were so, the abortions themselves would not be the relevant evidence. But more than this, it would have been a relatively easy matter for the trial court to determine whether or not the psychiatrist had relied upon the abortions in diagnosing defendant, in which case the abortions or the arguments generated by them would be relevant. Despite the possibility that this evidence was relevant, MRE 403 further requires that it be more probative than prejudicial. The existing strong and opposing attitudes concerning the issue of abortion clearly make any reference thereto potentially very prejudicial. In fact, one prospective juror at defendant's trial was peremptorily challenged, a challenge for cause having been denied, for having affirmed that she would "go into trial with the attitude that (defendant has) already committed a murder" by virtue of her abortions. Notwithstanding the deference with which a reviewing court must...