People v. Morrison

• Decision Date: 14 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-3545.,1-04-3545.
• Citation: 874 N.E.2d 896
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip MORRISON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

874 N.E.2d 896

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip MORRISON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-04-3545.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

August 14, 2007.

Patrick F. Cassidy, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Kathryn Schierl, Paula Borg, Sean J. O'Callaghan, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from the conviction of defendant, Phillip Morrison, of possession of a controlled substance following a bench trial. Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison and ordered to pay $1,274 in various fees and fines.¹

The testimony presented at trial was brief. Officer Prieto testified that on the evening of April 12, 2004, he was on routine patrol in a marked police vehicle in the vicinity of 6844 South Ada Street. Around 10:40 p.m., he observed defendant engaged in an argument with another man in the middle of the street. He approached defendant for a field interview and learned his name. Officer Prieto ran a name check from his police car, discovered an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest on a conditional discharge violation, and placed him under arrest. He performed a custodial search at the scene and recovered a plastic pill bottle containing suspected crack cocaine, which he inventoried. On cross-examination, he denied defendant voluntarily surrendered the bottle.

The parties entered into a stipulation as to the chain of custody of the pill bottle inventoried by Officer Prieto and that it contained less than 0.1 grams of cocaine.

Defendant testified that before his arrest he had been on a Chicago Transit Authority bus where he found a pill capsule bottle. He did not know what was inside the bottle and never opened it. After exiting the bus, he walked about a half a block before being approached by Officer Prieto. At that time, he gave the pill bottle to Officer Prieto.

In rebuttal, the State introduced evidence of defendant's three prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance.

The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced him to two years in prison. The trial court entered a separate order "assessing fines, fees, and costs" with the following boxes marked:

"Costs and Fees

Felony Complaint Filed-Clerk—* * * $190

Felony Complaint Conviction—State's Attorney * * * $60

Preliminary Hearing—State's Attorney * * * $20

* * *

State DNA ID System—Felony Offenses Only * * * $200

Violent Crime Victim Assistance * * * $20

* * *

Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge-Additional Penalty * * * $4

Automation—Clerk—* * * $5

Document Storage—Clerk—* * * $5

Court Services—Sheriff—* * * $15 * * *

Controlled Substance/Cannabis/Hypodermic Needles Offenses

* * *

Assessment Controlled Substance * * * $500

* * *

Crime Lab Drug Analysis—State * * * $100

* * *

Trauma Fund * * * $100

Trauma Fund Spinal Cord * * * $5

* * *

Fees

Per Day of Trial—State's Attorney * * * $50

Total $1274"

Defendant has raised the following issues for our review: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; (2) whether he was denied a fair trial because there was no indication in the record that he waived his constitutional right to confrontation before his attorney stipulated to the chain of custody; (3) whether the statute mandating that persons convicted of a drug-related offense be assessed a $5 fee for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund violated his substantive due process rights; and (4) whether the trial court failed to award him proper presentence credit for the fines he was ordered to pay, improperly imposed a fine for the Violent Crimes Victims Assistance Fund, and failed to consider his financial status before ordering him to pay.

We first consider defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant argues that even if Officer Prieto's observation of the disturbance was enough to constitute the reasonable suspicion required for a brief investigatory stop, there was no basis to prolong the detention by asking him to identify himself and running a name check.

Under the two-part test for judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the shortcomings of counsel were so severe as to deprive defendant of a fair trial; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v. Rodriguez, 312 Ill. App.3d 920, 925, 245 Ill.Dec. 613, 728 N.E.2d 695 (2000), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). When considering an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court must look to counsel's total performance and not focus solely on isolated acts. People v. Williams, 305 Ill.App.3d 517, 529, 238 Ill. Dec. 779, 712 N.E.2d 883 (1999).

The decision whether to bring a motion to quash arrest or to suppress evidence is considered to be a matter of trial strategy, and defense counsel enjoys the strong presumption that the failure to challenge the validity of the defendant's arrest or to move to suppress evidence was proper. Rodriguez, 312 Ill.App.3d at 925, 245 Ill.Dec. 613, 728 N.E.2d 695. "`Only the most egregious of tactical or strategic blunders may provide a basis for a violation of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.'" People v. Penrod, 316 Ill.App.3d 713, 724, 249 Ill.Dec. 951, 737 N.E.2d 341 (2000), quoting People v. Davis, 228 Ill.App.3d 123, 127, 170 Ill.Dec. 28, 592 N.E.2d 464 (1992). In order to prevail on a claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence, defendant bears the burden of showing that there was a reasonable probability that the motion would have been granted and, with respect to the suppression of evidence, that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. People v. Kelley, 304 Ill.App.3d 628, 636, 237 Ill.Dec. 740, 710 N.E.2d 163 (1999). The failure to satisfy either the deficient performance prong or the prejudice prong of Strickland precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 438, 299 Ill.Dec. 157, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005).

The fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. "The central inquiry under the fourth amendment is `"the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security."'" People v. Conner, 358 Ill.App.3d 945, 949, 295 Ill.Dec. 291, 832 N.E.2d 442 (2005), quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2593 n. 11, 69 L.Ed.2d 340, 348 n. 11 (1981), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904 (1968).

The United States Supreme Court provided for a limited exception in Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, where it held that a police officer, under appropriate circumstances, could detain a person for investigatory purposes. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d 257, 262, 227 Ill.Dec. 933, 688 N.E.2d 626 (1997). Under a Terry stop, a police officer may stop a person briefly for temporary questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906-07. "To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer's actions must be `"justified at its inception, and ... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' [Citations.]" Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L.Ed.2d 292, 302 (2004).

The Illinois Supreme Court "has recognized that police-citizen encounters can be divided into three tiers: (1) the arrest of a citizen, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) a `Terry stop,' which must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity [citation]; and (3) a `community caretaking function,' which need not be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion." People v. White, 221 Ill.2d 1, 21, 302 Ill.Dec. 614, 849 N.E.2d 406 (2006).

We disagree with defendant's apparent belief that Officer Prieto was exercising a community caretaking function when he approached him, learned his name, and ran the name check. Officer Prieto testified that while on routine patrol he observed a disturbance around 10:40 p.m. in the middle of a city street involving defendant and another man. See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2004) ("a person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly * * * [d]oes any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace"). We find the circumstances of this case were sufficient to warrant a Terry stop. See People v. DeHoyos, 172 Ill. App.3d 1087, 1092, 122 Ill.Dec. 821, 527 N.E.2d 319 (1988) (where a police officer who was called to investigate a street disturbance while on routine patrol, who was not given any description of the individuals involved in the disturbance, and who later observed the defendant exit an alley, and then turn back into the alley, was justified in conducting a brief investigatory stop to determine the defendant's identification and why he was in the alley).

It is unclear exactly how...