People v. Morson
| Decision Date | 30 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 124083, Calendar No. 13.,124083, Calendar No. 13. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Latasha Genise MORSON, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Danielle DeJong, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gary L. Rogers) for the defendant.
Defendant Latasha Morson waited in a car while her friend, Iesha Northington, robbed Deborah Sevakis of her purse at gunpoint, using a gun obtained from defendant. As Northington fled the scene, she shot James Bish, who tried to stop her and recover Sevakis's purse. Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery,1 conspiracy to commit armed robbery,2 and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.3 She was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight to thirty years for the armed robbery and conspiracy convictions,4 to be served consecutively to the mandatory two-year sentence for felony-firearm.
The first issue to be addressed is how many points defendant could be properly assessed at sentencing under offense variables (OV) 1 and 3. OV 1, which considers aggravated use of a weapon, and OV 3, which considers physical injury to the victim, require both that the highest number of points be assessed and that multiple offenders be assessed the same number of points for these variables. When Iesha Northington's armed robbery conviction was scored on, she was assessed fifteen points for OV 1 and zero points for OV 3. But when defendant's armed robbery conviction was scored on December 10, 2001, the sentencing court assessed defendant twenty-five points for OV 1 and twenty-five points for OV 3. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the sentencing court on this issue, concluding that the multiple offender provision required that defendant's scores on OV 1 and OV 3 be the same as those previously assessed to Iesha Northington for OV 1 and OV 3.
The second issue that must be decided is how many points defendant could be properly assessed under OV 9, which considers the number of victims. The sentencing court assessed ten points under this variable, concluding that there were two victims. The Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that defendant should be assessed zero points because there was one victim.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, defendant should have been assessed the same scores for OV 1 and OV 3 that Iesha Northington was assessed. But the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that under OV 9, defendant should have been assessed zero points because there was only one victim. Pursuant to the language of the guidelines, two people were placed in danger. Consequently, the sentencing court properly assessed defendant ten points under OV 9. We remand this case to the circuit court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Deborah Sevakis was robbed of her purse at gunpoint by Iesha Northington as Sevakis was walking down Nine Mile Road in Ferndale at about on May 29, 1999. Sevakis testified that someone tapped her on the shoulder and demanded her purse. When Sevakis initially refused to give up her purse, Northington pointed a gun at her. As Northington ran off with the purse, Sevakis yelled, Immediately, James Bish, who was standing nearby and had witnessed the robbery, ran after Northington. When Bish told Northington to drop the purse, Northington shot him.
In her written statement to the police, defendant stated that as she and Northington were driving down Nine Mile Road, they observed a lady walking with her purse and discussed robbing her. Northington got out of the car while defendant drove to a gas station. Defendant next observed Northington running toward the car, carrying a black purse. She also saw a man running and holding his chest; Northington told her that she thought she had shot the man. Defendant admitted that she had given Northington the gun that Jermaine Calloway had given her. Defendant stated that she and Northington stopped to get gas, then went to a Kmart store, where they tried unsuccessfully to use Sevakis's credit card.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and two counts of felony-firearm.5 Before defendant's sentencing, Northington, who was sentenced on May 10, 2000, was assessed fifteen points on OV 1 and zero points on OV 3. At defendant's sentencing on December 10, 2001, she asserted that she should be assessed the same number of points as Ms. Northington on OV 1 and OV 3 when defendant's armed robbery conviction was scored. But the court assessed defendant twenty-five points on OV 1 and twenty-five points on OV 3 when scoring defendant's armed robbery conviction. The trial court also assessed defendant ten points on OV 9. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing.6 The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant should have been assessed the same scores as Northington on OV 1 and OV 3 for the armed robbery conviction. Additionally, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant should have been assessed zero points on OV 9 because there was only one victim, not two.
This Court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal.7
The issues in this case concern the proper interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.11 et seq., which are legal questions that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Perkins, 468 Mich. 448, 452, 662 N.W.2d 727 (2003). When construing a statute, this Court's primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. We begin by construing the language of the statute itself. Where the language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain meaning and apply the statute as written. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999).
Generally, to determine a minimum sentence range under the legislative sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court must first determine the offense category. MCL 777.21(1)(a). The sentencing court must then determine which offense variables (OV) are applicable, score those variables, and total the points to determine the offender's offense variable level. Id. The sentencing court also scores all prior record variables. MCL 777.21(1)(b). The offender's offense variables score and prior record variables score are then used with the sentencing grids to determine the recommended minimum sentence range under the guidelines. MCL 777.21(1)(c).
In this case, the sentencing issues presented arise out of defendant's armed robbery conviction, MCL 750.529. Under the guidelines, armed robbery is categorized as a crime against a person. MCL 777.16y. MCL 777.22(1), 2002 PA 143, provided:
For all crimes against a person, score offense variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, and 20. Score offense variables 5 and 6 for homicide, attempted homicide, conspiracy or solicitation to commit a homicide, or assault with intent to commit murder. Score offense variable 16 under this subsection for a violation or attempted violation of ... MCL 750.110a. Score offense variables 17 and 18 if an element of the offense or attempted offense involves the operation of a vehicle, vessel, ORV, snowmobile, aircraft, or locomotive.
At issue are defendant's scores for OV 1, OV 3, and OV 9.
OV 1 assesses points for the aggravated use of a weapon, MCL 777.31, and OV 3 assesses points for physical injury to a victim, MCL 777.33. This case concerns how these two variables are to be scored in cases involving multiple offenders. MCL 777.31 provides in part:
MCL 777.33 provides in part:
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