People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 April 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 284585.
• Citation: 288 Mich.App. 67,792 N.W.2d 384
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

288 Mich.App. 67
792 N.W.2d 384

PEOPLE
v.
WILLIAMS.

Docket No. 284585.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Aug. 5, 2009, at Grand Rapids.
Decided April 8, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.

792 N.W.2d 385

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, Tony Tague, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles F. Justian, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.

Peter Ellenson, Royal Oak, for defendant.

Before: OWENS, P.J., and TALBOT and GLEICHER, JJ.

TALBOT, J.

288 Mich.App. 69

We granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal ¹ the trial court's denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea to a charge of armed robbery. MCL 750.529. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 24 to 40 years' imprisonment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was initially charged with two separate armed robberies, which occurred on consecutive days at different locations involving a Clark gas station and an Admiral tobacco shop. As part of a "package" deal, defendant pleaded nolo contendere with regard to the Clark gas station charge and guilty with regard to the Admiral tobacco shop charge. Difficulties were encountered when the trial court tried to establish a factual

288 Mich.App. 70

basis for defendant's pleas. In this appeal, we are interested solely in defendant's plea in the Admiral tobacco shop case.

With regard to the Admiral tobacco shop, defendant acknowledged that his intent, upon entering the store, was to steal

792 N.W.2d 386

money. Defendant also admitted that he had placed his hand "up under" his coat, suggesting the possession of a weapon, and told the clerk, "[Y]ou know what this is, just give me what I want." The trial court accepted the plea finding it "to be knowing, voluntary, understanding, and accurate." Subsequently, defendant was sentenced to 24 to 40 years' imprisonment for that armed robbery.

Approximately one year after the pleas were accepted and six months after being sentenced, defendant filed a motion seeking to withdraw his pleas. Defendant argued that his plea in the Admiral tobacco shop case was deficient because there was no demonstration or showing that defendant actually took any property from the store. Following the submission of additional briefs, the trial court issued a written opinion and order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue before this Court can be summarized as whether a completed larceny is necessary to sustain a conviction for armed robbery, pursuant to MCL 750.529. Consequently, the outcome of this appeal is completely dependent on the statutory language comprising MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.530. It is well recognized:

"[T]he interpretation and application of statutes is a question of law that is reviewed de novo." People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998). The primary goal

288 Mich.App. 71

of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Williams, 475 Mich. 245, 250, 716 N.W.2d 208 (2006). The objective of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the Legislature from the plain language of the statute. People v. Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich. 687, 694-695, 625 N.W.2d 764 (2001). "We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). In doing so, we must be mindful that "[i]t is the role of the judiciary to interpret, not write, the law." People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 430-431, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005), clarified in part on other grounds People v. Derror, 475 Mich. 316, 320 [715 N.W.2d 822] (2006). [ People v. Barrera, 278 Mich.App. 730, 735-736, 752 N.W.2d 485 (2008).]

This Court also reviews de novo as a question of law whether specific conduct falls within the prohibitions of a statute. People v. Adkins, 272 Mich.App. 37, 39, 724 N.W.2d 710 (2006). Relevant to this appeal, we would further note that there exists no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, which decision is within the trial court's discretion. People v. Ovalle, 222 Mich.App. 463, 465, 564 N.W.2d 147 (1997).

III. ANALYSIS

The four statutes pertaining to robbery are contained within Chapter LXXVIII of the Michigan Penal Code.² In this appeal, we are concerned with the statutes pertaining to robbery and unarmed robbery following their legislative revision in 2004 PA 128. Specifically, MCL 750.529, defining armed robbery, currently provides:

792 N.W.2d 387, 288 Mich.App. 72

A person who engages in conduct proscribed under section 530 and who in the course of engaging in that conduct, possesses a dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present to reasonably believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who represents orally or otherwise that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term of years. If an aggravated assault or serious injury is inflicted by any person while violating this section, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years.
Robbery is defined within MCL 750.530, which states:
(1) A person who, in the course of committing a larceny of any money or other property that may be the subject of larceny, uses force or violence against any person who is present, or who assaults or puts the person in fear, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing a larceny" includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny, or during commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted flight after the commission of the larceny, or in an attempt to retain possession of the property.

It must be determined, on the basis of these recent revisions, whether a perpetrator must actually commit a completed larceny to be convicted of an armed robbery.³ Specifically, with reference to the issue on appeal, we must address whether the trial court erred by accepting defendant's guilty plea to the offense of armed robbery when there was no proof or evidence of a completed larceny. We find that the statutory language

288 Mich.App. 73

now encompasses attempts and that, as a result, a completed larceny is no longer required for a conviction of armed robbery.⁴

It is undisputed that MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.530 must be read together because armed robbery requires that a person be "engage[d] in conduct proscribed under [MCL 750.530]." MCL 750.529. In addition, for a robbery to rise to the level of an armed robbery, MCL 750.529 requires that the individual "possess[ ] a dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person ... to reasonably believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who represents orally or otherwise that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon...." Notably, defendant acknowledged during his plea hearing that he acted in a manner to suggest to the store clerk that he possessed a weapon. Hence, the issue before us is restricted solely to whether a larceny must be completed for defendant's armed robbery conviction to stand.

Clearly, other than separately requiring the existence or representation of the presence of a weapon, the crime of armed robbery is restricted to the "conduct proscribed under section 530...." MCL 750.529. In turn, MCL 750.530 indicates that the conduct "proscribed" is the use of "force or violence" while "in the course of committing a larceny of any money or other property that may be the subject of larceny...." Our analysis must focus on the definition, contained in MCL 750.530(2), of the phrase "in the course of

792 N.W.2d 388

committing a larceny," which "includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny, or during the commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted flight after the commission of the larceny, or in an attempt to retain

288 Mich.App. 74

possession of the property." ⁵ (Emphasis added.) This Court has no alternative but to strictly adhere to the language used by the Legislature in revising this statute and not seek to attribute either motive or reasoning beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the wording chosen for use. As such, the crime of armed robbery now also encompasses attempts to commit that offense.

"Where, as here, a statute supplies its own glossary, courts may not import any other interpretation, but must apply the meaning of the terms as expressly defined." Detroit v. Muzzin & Vincenti, Inc., 74 Mich.App. 634, 639, 254 N.W.2d 599 (1977). When dealing with statutory language, it is a well-defined precept that,

[w]hile courts may decide the validity of statutes and ordinances and construe laws in order to determine the actual legislative intent, the duty of the courts, both with respect to city ordinances and with respect to enactments of the legislature, is merely to interpret and apply the law as it is found to be. They cannot, under the guise of construction, redraft, or change the plain phrasing of the legislative fiat. They may not legislate, nor undertake to compel legislative bodies to do so. [1 Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed.) § 2:28, pp. 125-127.]

In other words,

when a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls. Therefore, a statutory definition supersedes a commonly accepted dictionary or judicial definition of a term. [22 Michigan Civil Jurisprudence (2005 revision), § 202, p. 731.]

288 Mich.App. 75

The legislative definition of "in the course of committing a larceny" specifically "includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny...." The term "attempt," which is not defined within the statute, is recognized to mean:

1. The act or an instance of

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