People v. Morton
Citation | 104 A.D.2d 569,479 N.Y.S.2d 275 |
Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Darryl MORTON, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 04 September 1984 |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (William Schrager, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for appellant.
Fishman & Kudisch, Kew Gardens (Alan E. Kudisch, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent.
Before TITONE, J.P., and LAZER, MANGANO and O'CONNOR, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated May 12, 1982, which, upon reargument, inter alia, granted defendant's motion to suppress certain statements.
Order reversed, on the law, defendant's motion to suppress denied, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings.
On the morning of March 12, 1981, four New York City detectives, including Detectives Miele and Drucker, arrested the defendant in Pemberton, New Jersey for the murder of one Bernard Stanley. Stanley's murder had occurred on May 23, 1980 in Queens County, New York and was being investigated by Miele. The detectives took the defendant to the local police station in Pemberton, where he was read his Miranda rights. He was then transported to the Burlington County's prosecutor's office where he was again given his Miranda rights. Later that day, at approximately 3 P.M., defendant was produced before a Judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey where he waived his right to extradition and agreed to return voluntarily to New York. Specifically, the following colloquy occurred between the New Jersey court and the defendant:
Defendant was immediately taken back to the 112th Precinct in Queens County to be processed on the Stanley murder and arrived there around 7 P.M. He was again given his Miranda rights which he again waived. Defendant thereafter requested to speak with his father, and after doing so, offered to, and did in fact, make inculpatory statements with regard to the unrelated murder of one Donald Lennon. Lennon's murder had occurred on January 6, 1981, in Queens County, and was being investigated by Detective Drucker.
By notice of motion dated April 30, 1981, defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress his statements on the grounds that (1) his arrest in New Jersey was illegal and violated his Fourth Amendment rights and (2) his statements were involuntary, and violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
After a hearing, Criminal Term orally denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. Thereafter, by notice of motion dated April 2, 1982, defendant moved to reargue Criminal Term's decision. In a supporting affirmation, defendant's counsel argued that (1) "the proceedings in New Jersey constituted a critical stage of the criminal charges and case against the defendant", (2) "as a result * * * the defendant's right to counsel had 'indelibly attached' " and (3) "no waiver of the right to counsel for 'statement' purposes could be made except in the presence of counsel".
In granting defendant's motion to reargue, and, upon reargument, granting his motion to suppress, Criminal Term held, inter alia, that:
(1) in New York, the constitutional right to counsel attaches not only upon the commencement of formal criminal proceedings, but even at "an earlier stage if there has been significant judicial activity",
(2) the hearing before the New Jersey Superior Court and its order "directing that the defendant, Darryl Morton, be delivered to the State of New York" was "in fact and in law the actual commencement of criminal prosecution" or at least had to be "viewed as * * * 'significant' judicial intervention", and
(3) the defendant's constitutional right to counsel not only attached by reason of the court...
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...been "significant judicial activity" (People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344, supra; People v. Morton, 104 A.D.2d 569, 479 N.Y.S.2d 275). An example of this is when a court order directs that a defendant appear in a lineup (People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222,......
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...stage where there is sufficient judicial activity. (People v. Williams, 112 A.D.2d 259, 491 N.Y.S.2d 706; see also, People v. Morton, 104 A.D.2d 569, 479 N.Y.S.2d 275.) The issuance of an arrest warrant or a court-ordered removal of a defendant, from custody to a crime scene, who is the tar......
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