People v. Moseley

• Citation: 94 Mich.App. 461,290 N.W.2d 39
• Decision Date: 27 July 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-3390
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Douglas MOSELEY, Defendant-Appellant. 94 Mich.App. 461, 290 N.W.2d 39
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 39

290 N.W.2d 39

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Douglas MOSELEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-3390.

94 Mich.App. 461, 290 N.W.2d 39

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 27, 1979.

Released for Publication April 4, 1980.

[94 MICHAPP 463] Douglas J. Callahan, Fenton, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert Leonard, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, and T. M. BURNS and MAHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right from his jury trial conviction for larceny of property with a value in excess of $100. M.C.L. § 750.356; M.S.A. § 28.588. The only issue raised concerns the prosecution's use of defendant's prior convictions to impeach his trial testimony.

Before defendant took the stand, the prosecutor announced his intention to show three prior larceny convictions for impeachment purposes. Defense counsel argued that to allow impeachment by evidence of convictions for the same crime for which defendant was on trial would be more prejudicial than probative. Defendant's view was that it would be impossible for the jury not to infer from the evidence of prior convictions that defendant was more likely to have committed the present offense, an inference which is impermissible as a matter of law. The trial court ruled in favor of the prosecution, and the prosecutor inquired about two of the prior convictions in cross-examination. ¹ The trial court gave the standard instruction on impeachment[94 MICHAPP 464] by prior convictions in its charge to the jury. CJI 3:1:08.

Although impeachment through showing a prior conviction for the same type of crime as that for which defendant is on trial is not absolutely prohibited, People v. Townsend, 60 Mich.App. 204, 230 N.W.2d 378 (1975), this type of evidence presents special problems, and trial courts must be sensitive to them. A failure to properly consider the dangers to the fact finding process has caused reversal in several recent cases.

In People v. Baldwin, 405 Mich. 550, 275 N.W.2d 253 (1979), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the trial court weighed the similarity of the prior conviction and the charged offense as a factor in support of admission of this evidence, rather than as a factor pointing to exclusion. In People v. Bennett, 85 Mich.App. 68, 270 N.W.2d 709 (1978), a majority of the panel found a reversible abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed impeachment by evidence of two similar prior offenses when impeachment by other nonsimilar crimes was thought to be sufficient. In People v. Crawford, 83 Mich.App. 35, 268 N.W.2d 275 (1978), this Court reversed because the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to suppress evidence of prior convictions where the trial court recognized that its decision would result in the prohibited inference or in a decision by defendant not to take the stand.

Based on these authorities, we have no doubt that it was error to allow the prosecution to present evidence as to the two prior convictions for essentially the same conduct for which defendant was on trial. Other, less prejudicial, alternatives existed, such as: showing only one conviction, or showing only that defendant had previous felony convictions of an unspecified nature.

[94 MICHAPP 465] In this case, however, the error was harmless. See People v. Stein, 90 Mich.App. 159, 282 N.W.2d 269 (1979). Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, we cannot envision a single juror voting to acquit even if the error had not occurred. Defendant was...