People v. Moses

• Decision Date: 03 April 1995
• Citation: 214 A.D.2d 587,625 N.Y.S.2d 72
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Leslie MOSES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 72

625 N.Y.S.2d 72

214 A.D.2d 587

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Leslie MOSES, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

April 3, 1995.

Daniel L. Greenberg, New York City (Tigran W. Eldred, of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Steven J. Chananie, Gary Fidel, and Christopher P. Gladd, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MILLER, J.P., and O'BRIEN, KRAUSMAN and FLORIO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), both rendered May 11, 1993, convicting him of (1) robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and grand larceny in the third degree under Indictment No. 1677/92, upon a jury verdict, and (2) robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, under Indictment No. 1791/92, and imposing sentences. The appeals bring up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant's contention that his guilt under Indictment No. 1677/92 was not proven by legally sufficient evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05[2]. In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt under Indictment No. 1677/92 was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5].

Although the circumstances of the defendant's arrest could have been more fully developed at the hearing, the testimony presented was nonetheless sufficient to establish that the arrest was supported by probable cause. That the information leading to the defendant's arrest was supplied by an arrestee who was himself a suspect, having been found in possession of the stolen car, does not make the information inherently unreliable (see, People v. Nunez, 186 A.D.2d 764, 589 N.Y.S.2d 64). On the contrary, an informant in custody and facing charges has a strong motivation to tell the truth, since misleading the police would worsen his predicament (see, People v. Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d 725, 727, 476 N.Y.S.2d 815, 465 N.E.2d 354; People v. Rodriguez, 52 N.Y.2d 483, 490, 438 N.Y.S.2d 754, 420 N.E.2d 946).

Here, the informant's reliability was demonstrated since the police, by accompanying the informant to the rendezvous with the defendant, corroborated by their own investigation and personal...