People v. Moss
Citation | 61 Cal.Rptr. 107,253 Cal.App.2d 248 |
Decision Date | 04 August 1967 |
Docket Number | Cr. 333 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnnie Richard MOSS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Roland Vernon Howard, Merced, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack R. Winkler, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.
Defendant was charged with armed robbery. A deputy public defender represented him at the preliminary hearing and in all matters up to the time of trial. The first day of trial was spent selecting a jury, the next day was a legal holiday, and on the following day when the trial was to resume a hearing was held in chambers, out of the presence of the jury. Defendant's counsel said:
The court then asked defendant if he intended to represent himself and he said that he did; the court advised him of the seriousness of the charge, the consequences of a conviction, and what would be expected of him if he undertook to represent himself. There followed this dialogue:
We think the court's categorical denial that a lawyer was available, without making any inquiry on the point, together with the flat statement that no continuance would be granted, deprived defendant of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel, and brings the case within the ambit of People v. Crovedi, 65 A.C. 197, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.
In Crovedi the defendant's attorney suffered a heart attack during trial and was unable to proceed. The court refused a continuance for a couple of months until the attorney's expected return to trial work, and appointed the disabled attorney's law partner as defense counsel, over the objection of both Crovedi and the partner. Under these circumstances, the trial was resumed in about three weeks. The Supreme Court held that defendant was denied his right to an attorney of his choice.
Respondent purports to distinguish Crovedi upon the ground the defendant there wanted a continuance in order to hire paid counsel of his choice, while here defendant is an indigent with appointed counsel. The distinction between an opportunity to obtain counsel of one's choice and the right to a continuance to obtain assigned counsel is said to be found in cases that follow the reasoning of People v. O'Neill, 78 Cal.App.2d 888, 179 P.2d 10. There the defendant sought to change assigned counsel, for no valid reason, and waited until the day of trial to make the request. The facts are clearly dissimilar.
In People v. Massie, 66 A.C. 937, 948, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 741, 428 P.2d 869, 877, the court held there was no error in denying a continuance where the defendant Massie sought a change of attorneys and the 'Appointment of some Private counsel.' The court pointed out that an indigent defendant has the right to assigned counsel but no right to have a Particular attorney appointed, and made the additional observation that
'Massie alleged no specific reason why the public defender could not adequately defend him.'
This points up the most critical distinction between the O'Neill and Massie line of cases and this case, namely, that in the cited cases the defendant had no reason for trying to jettison the appointed attorney. Here, the attorney and defendant reached an impasse on a crucial issue: whether to call defendant's chief alibi witness. They deemed the difference so fundamental that both advised the judge the attorney should be relieved of the duty to represent defendant. The deputy public defender told the judge that he had learned of the circumstance 'within the last hour.' Thus it is clear that defendant did not contrive a reason for change of counsel in order to get a continuance or, for that matter, to obtain a different attorney.
We believe the basic right to representation by counsel, made so clear by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, encompasses the right to the appointment of different counsel when a legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel as to a fundamental trial tactic. When this occurs, the defendant is entitled to a reasonable continuance in order to effectuate a change of attorneys and obtain the representation by counsel he is entitled to have under the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court recently said, in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149:
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People v. Bigelow
...Bigelow to determine his competency to waive counsel, repeatedly stated that he would not permit a continuance. In People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248, 61 Cal.Rptr. 107, the Court of Appeal held that a failure to grant a continuance under similar circumstances was a denial of due proce......
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People v. Floyd
...51 Cal.2d 777, 789, 336 P.2d 937; People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540, 554--555, 297 P.2d 999.) Milton's reliance on People v. Moss, 253 Cal.App.2d 248, 250, 61 Cal.Rptr. 107, The record makes crystal clear that the only substantial 'conflict' between Milton and his attorney was that Milton ......
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People v. Williams
...as to trial tactics indigents would be in a better position than such nonindigents. Defendant relies upon People v. Moss, 253 Cal.App.2d 248, 251, 61 Cal.Rptr. 107, 110, wherein the court stated, 'We believe the basic right to representation by counsel made so clear by Gideon v. Wainwright,......
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People v. Clark
...the right to represent himself was entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for trial if necessary. (See also People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248, 61 Cal.Rptr. 107.) These cases are distinguishable. Although a necessary continuance must be granted if a motion for self-representation is......