People v. Murata
| Decision Date | 18 June 1958 |
| Citation | 161 Cal.App.2d 369,326 P.2d 947 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Public Works, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kenji MURATA, Takeo Murata, Daisaku Murata, Ume Murata, Augustus B. McDavid, also known as Augustus Bone McDavid, Guy Utley McDavid, Anna K. Stoll, Standard Oil Company of California, a corporation, Shell Oil Company, a corporation, Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, a corporation, as Trustee, Doe One to Doe Fifty, Defendants. Kenji Murata, Takeo Murata, Daisaku Murata and Ume Murata, Respondents. Civ. 22978. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
George C. Hadley, Hugh R. Williams, Richard G. Rypinski and Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellant.
Hodge L. Dolle and J. Marion Wright, Los Angeles, for respondents.
This condemnation case went to the jury on June 17, 1957, just for days before the Supreme Court filed its opinion in County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal.2d 672, 312 P.2d 680. The state appeals from the judgment on the verdict awarding defendants a total of $610,763 for nine parcels of real property totalling approximately fifty-three acres. The property was taken for the Harbor Freeway right of way. The date of valuation was January 4, 1956. At that time the land was being used for agricultural purposes. Apparently there was substantial agreement that the highest and best use to which most of the land was adaptable was for residential subdivision. However, defendants point to evidence that the staff of the County Regional Planning Commission had recommended a change of zone to permit commercial uses with respect to certain portions of the property fronting on Florence Avenue. Defendants contended that these portions would be adaptable to commercial development.
The state's first assignment of error is based on the refusal of the trial court to give substantially the same cautionary instructions (relative to prices paid by governmental agencies in purchases of other properties) the refusal of which was held to be reversible error in County of Los Angeles v. Faus, supra, 48 Cal.2d 672, 675-676, 312 P.2d 680. We have concluded that the application of the law as enunciated in the Faus decision requires a reversal of the judgment at bar. This conclusion is fortified by the pressence in the record of other prejudicial errors hereinafter discussed.
In the instant case, none of the expert witnesses professed to rely upon purchase prices paid by governmental agencies for any specific parcels of property in arriving at their opinions as to the value of the subject property. However, counsel for defendants, in cross-examining one of the state's experts, brought to the attention of the jury the amount which the state had paid for an adjacent parcel of land referred to as the 'Stoll' property. The Stoll property was needed for the same freeway project, and, indeed, at the time it was purchased was one of the several parcels under condemnation in the instant action.
The following testimony was given by the state's valuation expert Baker under cross-examination, after he had identified a Mr. Thomason as an appraiser for the state:
'Q. So when you exchanged ideas and information and data with Mr. Thomason, Mr. Thomason undoubtedly told you two appraisers that he had in 1955 for the State of California Division of Highways appraised the Stoll property which is the two orange groves just next to the Murata property, didn't he? A. Yes, I understood he made an appraisal of that property.
'Q. He told you he appraised it for approximately $15,000.00 an acre in 1955? A. It may be overall; it varied.
'Q. Yes. A. Overall the piece north and--the piece north of Florence.
Q. Overall, $15,000.00? A. I think that is approximately right, but I am not--I don't have his appraisal here.
'Mr. Dolle: It is proper under the City of Los Angeles----
'The Court: Objection overruled.
'Mr. Dolle: He talked to Mr. Stoll and he so testified.
'Mr. Hadley: Let's have the question.
'Mr. Dolle: I will reframe the question.
'
'Mr. Hadley: That is objected to as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
'The Court: Overruled.
Subsequently, in the cross-examination of the same witness, counsel for defendants elicited the following testimony with reference to the acquisition of 12.64 acres of land by the school district referred to as the 'Paddison School site':
'
'
'The Court: If this witness knows.
'Mr. Hadley: It is the same type of question--I would like to have the further objection to any and all sales with respect to sales that are between private individuals and public agencies as not representing the market value, Your Honor, and we would request at this time in advance of any jury instructions at the conclusion of the case that the purpose of this line of examination is to test the knowledge and credibility of the witness, and that any sale which is referred to which involves an agency of the Government which has the power of eminent domain is not a fair criterion of the value.
'Mr. Wright: Your Honor,----
'The Court: I will instruct the jury at the proper time in these matters.
'Mr. Dolle: Your Honor, may I point out to the court----
'The Court: Proceed with your question, counsel.
'Mr. Hadley: My objection may go to this?
'The Court: Overruled.'
It was later developed that the price of $9,710 per acre paid by the school district was actually paid pursuant to a judgment in a condemnation action. The matter of the school district acquisition terminated with the following colloquy between court and counsel:
'The Court: Actually there wasn't a purchase then?
'Mr. Hadley: That is right.
'Mr. Dolle: Under the City of Los Angeles v. Cole I am permitted on cross examination to inquire into acquisition by a public agency, particularly so when the witness under direct examination said he considered them.
Counsel for appellant correctly states that the record does not indicate that the witness had relied upon these particular transactions in arriving at the opinions expressed by him on direct examination.
During their arguments addressed to the trial judge with reference to the propriety of these questions concerning prices paid by the governmental agencies for other acquisitions, counsel on both sides made repeated references to the decision in City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, 170 P.2d 928. The cautionary instructions requested by the state and refused by the trial court were as follows:
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