People v. Murray
| Decision Date | 10 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4-22-0330 |
| Citation | 2023 IL App (4th) 220330 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEONTAE X. MURRAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County No. 13CF86 Honorable C. Robert Tobin III, Judge Presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart and Sarah G. Lucey, of State Appellate Defender's Office of Springfield, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Tricia L. Smith, State's Attorney, of Belvidere (Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel (Kavi Modi, law student)), for the People.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Deontae X. Murray, appeals the order of the circuit court of Boone County summarily dismissing his postconviction petition at the first stage. Defendant contends that he stated the gist of a constitutional argument where he alleged that he was sentenced pursuant to a statute our supreme court had previously found to be unconstitutional. In imposing the sentence, however, the circuit court executed the mandate of our supreme court. Because we must regard the mandate of the supreme court to be free from error, we affirm.
¶ 3 A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) (West 2012)), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Richard J. Herman in Belvidere. The trial court merged the conviction of AUUW into the conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member and sentenced defendant to an aggregate of 60 years' imprisonment. The Second District affirmed the convictions in People v. Murray, 2017 IL App (2d) 150599, ¶ 98. Our supreme court reversed the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member. People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶¶ 53-54. The supreme court then remanded the matter to the circuit court for sentencing on the AUUW conviction. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 53. Defendant did not seek a rehearing.
¶ 4 On October 18, 2019, the supreme court's mandate issued. The mandate stated that the appellate court's judgment was reversed in part and that the matter was "remanded with directions." On November 30, 2020, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing in accordance with the supreme court's mandate.
¶ 5 At the sentencing hearing, the dilemma facing the trial court and the parties was the unconstitutionality of the AUUW offense for which defendant was about to be sentenced. Defendant was convicted of violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2012). In People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, our supreme court held that section of the AUUW statute unconstitutional as infringing on the right to keep and bear arms. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the State recommended sentencing defendant in accordance with the supreme court's mandate. The State also recommended sentencing defendant on a lesser included offense, which survived constitutional scrutiny. Defendant argued that the court was required to follow the supreme court's mandate. Doing so, he noted, would result in an unconstitutional sentence. Therefore, defendant recommended that the court vacate defendant's conviction for AUUW. The court ruled that it was prohibited from "straying" from the supreme court's mandate. Consequently, the court sentenced defendant to six years' incarceration, to be served consecutively to the sentence for first degree murder. Defendant appealed but then dismissed the appeal.
¶ 6 On March 23, 2022, defendant, through counsel, filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). Defendant, inter alia, argued that his AUUW conviction should be vacated because the statute under which he was convicted was found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar. On March 24, 2022, the trial court issued a written memorandum of decision and dismissed the petition. The court found defendant's constitutional argument meritless. The court noted that, in remanding for sentencing, the supreme court appeared to have decided that the offense of AUUW-"as charged and supported by the evidence" in defendant's case-was constitutional. Otherwise, the court stated, the supreme court would have vacated defendant's conviction.
¶ 7 This timely appeal followed.
¶ 9 The Act provides a method for persons under criminal sentence to assert that their convictions resulted from constitutional infirmities. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 9 (2009). A postconviction proceeding consists of three stages. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10. At the first stage, the trial court, within 90 days of the filing of the petition, independently reviews the petition, taking the allegations as true, and then determines whether the petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10. If the trial court determines that the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, the court must dismiss the petition in a written order. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10. At the first stage, a defendant need only make a claim that is arguably constitutional to invoke the Act. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 9. The only requirement at this stage is that the pleading state the "gist" of a constitutional claim. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 9. However, if the court does not dismiss the petition, then the petition advances to the second stage, where counsel may be appointed and the State can move to dismiss the petition. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10-11. If the petition survives the second stage, the case advances to the third stage, where the court receives evidence and weighs the petition's merits to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 22. Our review of a first-stage dismissal is de novo. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 9.
¶ 10 Defendant contends that his postconviction petition should not have been dismissed at the first stage because he stated the gist of a constitutional argument. Defendant argues that the supreme court likely overlooked that it had previously held unconstitutional the statute under which it ordered defendant to be sentenced. Defendant also asserts that the only remedy is to vacate the conviction, citing People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 24 (). Thus, defendant argues that we must remand for second-stage proceedings for the trial court to vacate his conviction of AUUW. However, in arguing that his conviction must be vacated, defendant necessarily assumes that the trial court was free to ignore the supreme court's mandate. The State maintains that the trial court properly dismissed defendant's petition, as the court had no discretion to deviate from the mandate. We agree with the State.
¶ 11 As early as 1862, our supreme court held that when it reverses and remands a cause to the trial court with directions, the trial court "has no discretion, but must pursue the mandate of the appellate court." Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294, 302-03 (1862). The court was also clear that "[i]f such instructions were not observed, it would be error, for which the second decree would be reversed on appeal." Chickering, 29 Ill. at 303. Since Chickering, our supreme court has persisted in this view. See, e.g., Winchester v. Grosvenor, 48 Ill. 515, 516 (1868); Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315, 316 (1873) (); Fisher v. Burks, 285 Ill. 290, 293 (1918) (); Smith v. Dugger, 318 Ill. 215, 217 (1925); PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill.2d 291, 305 (1981) (); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 117687, ¶ 49 ().
¶ 12 Defendant argues that the doctrine established in the above cases does not apply here, because the supreme court issued an "unconstitutional" mandate when it directed the trial court to sentence defendant on his AUUW conviction. There is no question that the offense for which defendant was sentenced was held unconstitutional in Aguilar. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. Nevertheless, two principles apply: (1) even where the supreme court's mandate is erroneous, the circuit court has no discretion but to enter an order conforming to the mandate (Winchester, 48 Ill. at 516-17) and (2) when the supreme court reverses or vacates the judgment of the circuit court and remands to the circuit court with specific directions, the order entered upon remand is the judgment of the supreme court, not the judgment of the trial court (People v. Brown, 2022 IL 127201, ¶ 24). This means (1) the trial court in our case had no discretion to do anything other than sentence defendant in conformity with the supreme court's mandate and (2) this court has no authority to review-much less...
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