Smith v. Dugger

• Decision Date: 28 October 1925
• Docket Number: No. 16797.,16797.
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. DUGGER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

318 Ill. 215

149 N.E. 227

SMITH et al.

v.DUGGER.

No. 16797.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1925.

Bill by Martha M. Smith and others against Ethan A. Dugger. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Macoupin County; Frank W. Burton, judge.

Jesse Peebles, of Carlinville, and Harry De Frates, of Palmyra (Don M. Peebles, of Carlinville, of counsel), for appellants.

Murphy & Hemphill, of Carlinville, for appellee.

DUNN, C. J.

The decree from which this appeal is taken must be reversed for the failure of the circuit court to follow the directions of the opinion and mandate of this court upon the reversal of an earlier decree on a former appeal, which is reported in 310 Ill. 624, 142 N. E. 243.

A bill was filed by the vendors for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The defense was that the vendors did not have a title in fee simple to a part of the land, and were therefore unable to convey the title required by the contract. The cause was heard in the circuit court of Macoupin county, and a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity. Upon appeal this decree was reversed and the cause was remanded, with directions to grant the relief prayed in the bill. Upon reinstatement of the cause in the circuit court, that court, instead of following the mandate, permitted a supplemental answer to be filed to which the complainants filed a replication. The court sustained a general demurrer to the replication, and again entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, and the complainants have again appealed.

Where a decree is reversed and the cause is remanded with specific directions as to the action to be taken by the trial court, it is the duty of that court to follow those directions, and a decree entered in accordance with such directions cannot be erroneous, however erroneous the directions may be. Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315, 22 Am. Rep. 77;Windett v. Ruggles, 151 Ill. 184, 37 N. E. 1021;Roby v. Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock Co., 154 Ill. 190, 40 N. E. 293;Blackaby v. Blackaby, 189 Ill. 342, 59 N. E. 602;Noble v. Tipton, 222 Ill. 639, 78 N. E. 927;Manternach v. Stadt, 240 Ill. 464, 88 N. E. 1000;Trustees of Schools v. Hoyt (No. 16382) 318 Ill. 60, 148 N. E. 867. Where a decree has been reversed and the cause remanded, with specific directions for the entry of a decree, on an appeal from the decree so entered the only question presented is: Was the decree in accordance with the mandate and directions of this court? Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. National Hollow Brake-Beam Co., 239 Ill. 111, 87 N. E. 872;People v. Day, 279 Ill. 148, 116 N. E. 729.

A decree entered by a trial court in accordance with the mandate of this court must be regarded as free from error. It is, in fact, the judgment of this court promulgated through the trial court, and is final and conclusive upon all the parties. People v. Gilmer, 5 Gilman, 242. This court may in any case, either at law or in equity, enter final judgment as provided by section 110 of the Practice Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 110), or in case of a...