People v. N. Shore Design, Inc.

• Citation: 28 N.Y.S.3d 650 (Table)
• Decision Date: 31 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–1612 S CR.,2014–1612 S CR.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. NORTH SHORE DESIGN, INC., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

28 N.Y.S.3d 650 (Table)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
NORTH SHORE DESIGN, INC., Appellant.

No. 2014–1612 S CR.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York, 9th and 10th Judicial Districts.

Dec. 31, 2015.

Appeal from 15 judgments of the District Court of Suffolk County, Sixth District (David A. Morris, J.), rendered May 1, 2014. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of four charges of violating § 16–3(A) (denominated by the District Court as counts 1, 2, 3 and 4), eight charges of violating § 16–4(A) (denominated as counts 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15), two charges of violating § 82–3(F) (denominated as counts 32 and 33) and one charge of violating § 82–3(H) (denominated as count 43) of the Brookhaven Town Code. The appeal brings up for review the denial of the branches of defendant's omnibus motion which sought the dismissal of the accusatory instruments relating to the aforementioned charges, and the suppression of evidence.

ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of violating Brookhaven Town Code § 16–3(A) (charges denominated as counts 1, 2, 3 and 4), § 16–4(A) (charges denominated as counts 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15) and § 82–3(F) (charges denominated as counts 32 and 33) are affirmed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment convicting defendant of violating Brookhaven Town Code § 82–3(H) (charge denominated as count 43) is reversed, on the law, the accusatory instrument charging this offense is dismissed, and the fine, surcharge and administrative fee, if paid, are remitted.

Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant was charged, in regard to its ownership of the premises located on Christian Avenue, Stony Brook, Town of Brookhaven, NY, with violating Brookhaven Town Code § 16–3(A) (Permit required) (charges 1, 2, 3 and 4),¹ Brookhaven Town Code § 16–4(A) (Certificates of occupancy) (charges 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15), Brookhaven Town Code § 82–3(F) (Neighborhood preservation requirements [health & safety] ) (charges 32 and 33), and Brookhaven Town Code § 82–3(H) (Neighborhood preservation requirements [sanitary facilities] ) (charge 43). Defendant moved for, among other things, suppression of all evidence obtained attendant to the execution of a search warrant, and for the dismissal of the accusatory instruments charging the aforementioned offenses on the ground that they were facially insufficient. By order dated January 15, 2013, the District Court denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking suppression, upon finding that defendant lacked standing to bring the motion, and, in any event, that the factual allegations in support of the motion were deficient. The branch of defendant's motion seeking the dismissal of the accusatory instruments was also denied.

At a nonjury trial, it was uncontested that defendant owned the subject premises which it leased to 17 tenants, and that the certificate of occupancy for the house indicated that it was a six-bedroom, two-story, single-family house. The Town investigator testified that, upon his execution of a search warrant, he had observed 16 bedrooms in the house, and that the rooms designated on the building plans for the house as the living room, library, den, gathering room, exercise room, play room and computer room, had been altered/changed into bedrooms, for which no certificates of occupancy had been issued. Each of these rooms had privacy doors, some of which had key locks, and the investigator described the contents of each room, which included, among other things, beds, pillows, bed linens, closets, clothes, and personal belongings. The investigator also testified that the gathering room, exercise room, computer room and the play room had been altered by the enclosure of the pass-throughs into these rooms with the installation of sheetrock, doors and door frames, but no building permits had been issued for these alterations. The door to the play room/bedroom was a hazardous condition to the health and safety of persons because the hinges and handle of the door were on the same side of the door, and the house had inadequate sanitary facilities, as he had observed a five-by-six foot pile of household garbage, broken furniture and other debris inside of the attached garage, in which he had also observed a rodent. The access to the equipment/air conditioner room was a hazardous condition to the health and safety of persons because it was blocked by cardboard and doors.

Following the trial, the District Court convicted defendant of violating Brookhaven Town Codes § 16–3(A) (charges 1, 2, 3 and 4), § 16–4(A) (charges 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15), § 82–3(F) (charges 32 and 33), and § 82–3(H) (charge 43). The court found defendant not guilty of the remaining charges.

On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, that all of the evidence obtained attendant to the execution of a search warrant should be suppressed; that the accusatory instruments are facially insufficient because they fail to allege each and every element of the offenses charged, contain conclusory factual allegations, do not allege that defendant made, or was aware of, any alteration, do not use the same descriptive words provided in the Code, and do not provide sufficient allegations regarding defendant's actions and requisite mental culpability; that the District Court improperly convicted defendant of the charges even though no trial evidence had been presented that defendant was culpable pursuant to Penal Law §§ 15.10 and 20.00 ; and that the trial evidence was legally insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of the eight charges of violating Brookhaven Town Code § 16–4(A).

It is well settled that a defendant seeking suppression of evidence obtained as the result of an alleged illegal search must establish that it has standing to challenge the search (see People v. Hunter, 17 N.Y.3d 725, 726 [2011] ; People v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 108 [1996] ). This...