People v. Needham

• Decision Date: 04 December 1967
• Docket Number: Docket No. 2913,No. 2,2
• Citation: 8 Mich.App. 679,155 N.W.2d 267
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert A. NEEDHAM, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 267

155 N.W.2d 267

8 Mich.App. 679

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert A. NEEDHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 2913.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

Dec. 4, 1967.

Released for Publication Jan. 17, 1968.

Louis A. Smith, Fowler & Smith, Lansing, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. General, Donald L. Reisig, Pros. Atty., Ingham County, Lansing, for appellee.

Before LESINSKI, C.J., and QUINN and BAUM, ^* JJ.

LESINSKI, Chief Judge.

The defendant appeals his 1966 conviction for the offense of robbery armed, ¹ entered pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty.

The conviction arose out of his alleged participation, along with George C. Kenney, in a robbery which took place December 17, 1965, at the Cavalier gasoline station, 3145 South Cedar street, Lansing, Michigan.

At the time the offense charged occurred, Richard F. Powers and James Antes were on the station premises. Powers had previously been an employee of the establishment, and Antes later served in this capacity, although neither had such status on this occasion. The station attendant, Ray Ricketts, had taken leave of the place to obtain refreshment. Ricketts had asked Antes to watch the station in his absence and had given Antes the key to the cash drawer. Powers joined Antes and the two of them waited on customers.

Kenney testified ² to a prearranged plan which was executed by the defendant and himself. The defendant, who was driving Kenney's car, was to drop Kenney in the rear of the station. If more than two persons were present, defendant would just 'pull through the station.' If not, he would stop the car and raise the hood, and would, in this manner, draw an attendant to help him open and use a can of windshield deicer. Kenney stated that the confederates put this plan into effect at the Cavalier gasoline station after going to the defendant's home to get a sawed-off gun. While the defendant diverted Antes' attention and kept him occupied with the windshield deicer ruse, Kenney ordered Powers, at gun point, to open the cash drawer. Since Powers did not have the key, Kenney supplied him with a chisel to force open the drawer, and ordered Powers to put its contents into a pillowcase furnished for this purpose by Kenney.

Powers and Kenney were apprehended separately; the pillowcase and its contents were retrieved; and those suspected of the offense were charged with its commission.

The issue on appeal questions whether the defendant could be found guilty under Michigan law of robbery armed, where the person named in the information as having been assaulted and robbed of the property specified therein was neither the owner of the property nor the owner's agent. Otherwise stated, the issue questions whether Power's 'possession' of the named property was sufficient to sustain the charge and conviction. ³

It is settled law in Michigan that the common-law crime of robbery is superseded in this state by statute; ⁴ therefore, we set forth the statutory offense defined in C.L.S.1961, § 750.529 (Stat.Ann.1965 Cum.Supp. § 28.797), at this point.

'Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years. If an aggravated assault or serious injury is inflicted by any person while committing an armed robbery as defined in this section, the sentence shall be not less than 2 years' imprisonment in the state prison.'

According to 4 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed.), § 2218, pp. 2441, 2442:

'The essential elements of robbery armed under the statute are:

'1. An assault by the defendant upon the complainant; and '2. A felonious taking of any property which may be the subject of larceny, from his person or in his presence; and,

'3. That the defendant was armed with a weapon described in the statute.'

46 Am.Jur., Robbery, § 9, p. 143, states that 'Obviously goods cannot be taken from 'the person of another or in his presence' unless the victim has possession or custody of the goods.' Michigan case law has long held that it is not necessary that the victim be the actual owner. 'As against a wrongdoer an actual possession or custody of the goods would be sufficient.' Durand v. People (1882), 47 Mich. 332, 334, 11 N.W. 184. Durand was later cited in People v. Cabassa (1930), 249 Mich. 543, 547, 229 N.W. 442, where the person robbed was in charge of a gasoline station.

Here, however, Powers was not appointed to act as the custodian of the property by the actual owner. Since a case factually identical to the instant one has not come to our attention through appellate briefs or research, we turn to analogous reasoning for our determination.

The New Jersey court in State v. Bowden (1960), 62 N.J.Super. 339, 162 A.2d 911, 914, stated that the essence of the crime 'is not that the property belonged to a specific person, but rather that it was the property of someone other than the thief.'

In Barfield v. State (1939), 137 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 129 S.W.2d 310, 313, 123 A.L.R. 1093, where a porter and night watchman was the person assaulted and robbed, the court said:

'In robbery the property must be taken by force and violence, not necessarily from the owner, but from any person in possession thereof whose right of possession is superior to that of the robber. The very fact that the property is taken from a person by the use of firearms, violence or threatened violence, is, within itself, sufficient to show that the person from whom it was taken was in possession thereof.'

In State v. Pokini (1961), 45 Haw. 295, 367 P.2d 499, 89 A.L.R.2d 1421, the court noted that 'the actual condition of the legal title is immaterial to the thief.' On the same point, the Pokini court said, 367 P.2d at 503:

'Just as in the case of larceny, 'one who has the right of possession as against the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner." (Citations omitted.)

State v. Cottone (1958), 52 N.J.Super. 316, 145 A.2d 509, presented a situation wherein the person assaulted and robbed was a housekeeper who had been given the general...