People v. Newhall
| Decision Date | 09 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | s. 110617,112620 |
| Citation | 2022 NY Slip Op 03765 |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Vernon Newhall, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Calendar Date: April 18, 2022
Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.
Meagan K. Galligan, District Attorney, Monticello (Lisa M Bondarenka of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Colangelo, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ.
EGAN JR., J.P.
Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (McGuire, J.), rendered October 6, 2017, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of rape in the second degree (two counts), criminal sexual act in the third degree rape in the third degree and endangering the welfare of a child, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court (Rounds, J.), entered November 6, 2020, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.
In February 2017, defendant (born in 1966) was charged in a seven-count indictment with offenses stemming from his sexual relationship with the underage victim (born in 1999) between 2014 and 2016. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of rape in the second degree (two counts) relating to incidents of sexual intercourse at some point in November 2014 and on December 7, 2014, criminal sexual act in the third degree relating to an incident of oral sexual conduct late in December 2014, rape in the third degree relating to a September 2016 incident of sexual intercourse, and endangering the welfare of a child relating to the pattern of defendant's conduct toward the victim between November 2014 and September 2016. County Court (McGuire, J.) thereafter sentenced defendant to terms of seven years in prison to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision on each rape in the second degree conviction and a term of four years in prison to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision on the criminal sexual act in the third degree conviction, those terms to run consecutively and a concurrent sentence of four years in prison and 10 years of postrelease supervision on the rape in the third degree conviction. County Court further sentenced defendant to a jail term of one year upon his endangering the welfare of a child conviction that merged by operation of law with the other sentences (see Penal Law § 70.35). Defendant appeals from the judgment and, by permission, from the order denying his subsequent CPL 440.10 motion.
We affirm. Contrary to defendant's initial contention, his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict was not preserved for our review by his generalized motion to dismiss at trial (see People v Jones, 202 A.D.3d 1285, 1286 [2022]; People v Baber, 182 A.D.3d 794, 795 [2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1064 [2020]). Defendant's further argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence will nevertheless require this Court to assess whether each element of the crimes for which defendant was convicted was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Jones, 202 A.D.3d at 1286). In conducting that analysis, we first consider whether a different verdict "would not have been unreasonable" and, if such is the case, go on to "weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions" to determine "whether the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348; see People v Horton, 181 A.D.3d 986, 988 [2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1045 [2020]).
In that regard, the victim testified to 2014 incidents in which she engaged with the adult defendant in sexual intercourse twice at the age of 14, and in oral sexual conduct shortly after she turned 15 (see Penal Law §§ 130.30 [1]; 130.40 [2]). The victim described how defendant, a man with whom she had resided and whom she viewed as a father figure, had taken her to Georgia to press charges against a man who had sexually assaulted her and personally handled her allegations that family members had sexually molested her. The victim testified that her relationship with defendant itself turned sexual after he provided that assistance, and that they first had sexual intercourse upon their return from Georgia in November 2014. They again had sex in her bedroom on December 7, 2014, a date the victim recalled because seven was her lucky number and she had found a piece of chocolate in her Advent calendar that day. The victim also described an incident toward the end of December 2014, which she remembered specifically because it occurred just before the new year and just after her 15th birthday, in which defendant directed her to join him in the bathroom to retrieve a pair of her earrings and, in view of the victim's mother, inserted his penis into her mouth as she bent over to do so.
The victim testified as to how her sexual encounters with defendant continued from 2014 until 2016 and how defendant would hit her if she refused to have sex with him. She offered few details of the encounters during that period, and stated that they largely ceased after she told defendant in July 2016 that she did not want to continue the sexual relationship. The victim did, however, testify to a single subsequent incident of sexual intercourse that occurred in September 2016, when she was 16 years old (see Penal Law § 130.25 [2]). [1] In particular, the victim described how defendant came to her bedroom demanding sex and that, although she initially turned him down, she acceded out of fear after he promised that he was "going to get what [he] want[ed]" and was "going to take it."
Soon after the September 2016 incident, the victim disclosed the sexual relationship to her therapist and a school nurse she trusted, which led to her speaking to a State Police investigator. In an effort to collect further proof of defendant's guilt, the investigator gave the victim a pen camera to record a conversation with defendant about their relationship. The recording of the resulting conversation between defendant and the victim was entered into evidence at trial, and it depicts, among other things, defendant repeatedly asking if the victim was recording him. Defendant proceeds to tell the victim that she "need[ed] somebody [her] own age," pleads with her not to "give [him] up" and warns her that child abuse investigators were trying to "trip [her] up." The victim goes on to tell defendant that she felt "really bad" that she had "end[ed] it" by telling him that she did not "want to do it anymore," prompting defendant to tell her that he understood, that he knew it was getting "awkward" and that he "want[ed] to be her dad."
In response, defendant presented proof that included testimony from him, the victim's mother and a foster mother to both defendant and the victim's mother who frequently saw the victim. Defendant denied engaging in the charged behavior with the victim and claimed that his comments during the recorded conversation related to his concerns about the victim's relationship with another adult male and a child protective services investigation into a confrontation over the state of her bedroom in which he struck her in the face. Defendant further noted that he denied the victim's accusations when questioned by the State Police investigator, and he testified that his angry demeanor during that recorded interview was due to his indignation at having been falsely accused. The victim's mother testified that she knew nothing about an inappropriate relationship between defendant and the victim and that the December 2014 incident in which she allegedly witnessed the victim engaged in oral sexual conduct with defendant was an innocent one that did not include any sexual behavior. Testimony was further presented as to how the victim's behavior had deteriorated from 2014 onward, the suggestion being that the victim falsely accused defendant of sexual misconduct in order to escape his efforts to discipline her. It was also undisputed that the victim had recanted her allegations against defendant while she was living at a treatment facility in the wake of his arrest.
Assuming without deciding, that the foregoing evidence rendered defendant's acquittal a reasonable possibility despite his damning statements in the recorded conversation between him and the victim, other proof called it into serious question. For example, although defendant claimed that an ongoing investigation into his hitting the victim was what prompted many of the comments he made during their recorded conversation, he admitted receiving a letter prior to that conversation in which he was advised that the investigation had been closed. The victim further explained in her trial testimony that the allegations against defendant were true and that she only recanted because her mother, who was pressuring her to drop the charges against defendant and filed the Family Ct Act article 7 petition that resulted in her placement in a treatment facility after his arrest, promised to secure her release if she did so. The mother did not deny that she had asked the victim to recant in her testimony, instead invoking her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when cross-examined on that point. The jury heard all of this proof and, notwithstanding the lack of physical evidence and the presence of some inconsistencies in the victim's account, found her account more credible than the one offered by defendant. We accord deference to that assessment and, having weighed the conflicting evidence and viewing the proof in a neutral light, are satisfied that the verdict is supported by the weight of the...
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