People v. Northrop

• Decision Date: 23 April 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 21897
• Citation: 182 Cal.Rptr. 197,132 Cal.App.3d 1027
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sheila D. NORTHROP, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 197

182 Cal.Rptr. 197

132 Cal.App.3d 1027

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sheila D. NORTHROP, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 21897.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 23, 1982.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 21, 1982.

Hearing Denied June 16, 1982.

As corrected Sept. 22, 1983.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins, Paul D. Gifford, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Paul D. Fogel, Deputy Public Defender, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

NEWSOM, Associate Justice.

Appellant was convicted after jury trial of second degree murder (Pen.Code, § 189) and felony child abuse (Pen.Code, § 273a, subd. (1).) She was thereafter sentenced to state prison for 15 years to life on the murder conviction and concurrently for the middle term of two years on the child abuse conviction. The convictions were based on the following pertinent facts.

On December 10, 1979, at approximately 6:40 a.m., appellant and her husband, Mike Northrup, arrived at the Kaiser Hospital in Redwood City. Mike entered the emergency room, contacted a nurse and explained that his 22-month-old child was "ill." The nurse accompanied him to his car and took the child from appellant, who was "just sitting there" with the child in her arms. When the nurse picked up the child, he noticed that it was "rigid and cold." He then carried the child into the emergency room and contacted one of the physicians.

When told that the child, Kelly, was dead on arrival, Mike cried and "broke down," but, according to the testimony of nurse May Donovan and Dr. Joseph Robinson, appellant remained very "unemotional" and "stoic."

An autopsy on, and X-rays of, Kelly indicated that on different occasions up to 10 of her ribs had been fractured. The oldest fracture was from one to three months old, but five of the ribs had been broken within 24 hours of death. Since a child's bones are more pliable than an adult's, more relative force is required to fracture them.

Dr. Peter Benson, who performed the autopsy, concluded that death had resulted from organ damage and bone injuries resulting from the infliction of blunt force. He specifically noted that there was substantial damage to the right kidney and adrenal gland, which indicates that the force applied to this area was especially severe, as these organs are protected and placed well within the body.

According to expert testimony offered by the prosecution, and not controverted by appellant, Kelly's injuries were consistent with those associated with the "battered child syndrome," due to their multiplicity and type, and the rarity of such severe bone and organ injuries.

The evidence established that Kelly was born to appellant in January 1978, in North Carolina. Thereafter, appellant married Mike, who was not Kelly's father, and subsequently moved with Mike to California, leaving Kelly temporarily in North Carolina with appellant's mother. In April 1979, appellant returned to North Carolina and brought Kelly back with her to live with the couple in California.

During the summer and fall of 1979, friends and neighbors of appellant and Mike observed at various times that Kelly was bruised, scarred, and appeared ill. Kelly never received treatment for any of these injuries. ¹

Appellant testified that she neither beat Kelly nor knew about any of the child's injuries. Appellant's testimony suggests a belief on her part that Mike abused the child. ² According to appellant, while she and Mike were taking Kelly to the hospital on December 10, Mike admitted hitting the child to "make her stop crying."

As part of her defense, appellant also presented the testimony of a psychiatrist; he examined the appellant, administered tests to her, and concluded that she did not fit the "battering mother" syndrome profile.

I

Appellant first complains that the use of felony child abuse as the basis for application of the felony-murder instruction--using child abuse as the underlying felony--was erroneously given to the jury. ³

Appellant has relied upon application of the "Ireland" doctrine to the present case. In People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, our high court announced that "a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged." (Id., at p. 539, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580; see also People v. Wesley [1970] 10 Cal.App.3d 902, 906, 89 Cal.Rptr. 377.)

The Ireland doctrine is designed to prevent establishing the element of malice merely by proof of the commission of a felony which is an integral part of the homicide itself. (People v. Poddar [1974] 10 Cal.3d 750, 756, 111 Cal.Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342.) "The felony murder rule allows the implication of malice as an element of murder from the committing of an inherently dangerous felony" (id., at p. 755, 111 Cal.Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342), but justification for the rule is found in the need to discourage the commission of felonies inherently dangerous to human life by holding for murder those who kill, either intentionally or unintentionally, during the course of such felonies. (People v. Washington [1965] 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130; People v. Calzada [1970] 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606, 91 Cal.Rptr. 912.) ⁴

Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine "should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve." (Emphasis omitted; People v. Satchell [1971] 6 Cal.3d 28, 34, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361; People v. Carlson [1974] 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) Accordingly, it is well-settled that the rule should be given the "narrowest possible application consistent with its ostensible purpose--which is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally." (6 Cal.3d at p. 34, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.)

The "Ireland" doctrine furthers this goal by precluding use of the felony-murder doctrine where the underlying felony is "a necessary ingredient of the homicide," or its elements "were necessary elements in the homicide." (People v. Wilson [1969] 1 Cal.3d 431, 438-441, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22.) The rule is to be applied only when the subject felony is "independent of the homicide." (Id., at p. 442, fn. 5, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22.)

Appellant submits that the felony of child abuse is an "integral part" of and included in fact in the homicide. Since felony child abuse, under the statutory definition, requires an intent to inflict or permit infliction of punishment or injury under conditions "likely to produce great bodily harm or death" ⁵ (People v. Atkins [1975] 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358, 125 Cal.Rptr. 855), appellant reasons that the same acts and intent which constitute the underlying felony here also constituted the homicide, thereby making the Ireland exception applicable.

In People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 9 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793, however, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that Ireland and Wilson should be interpreted "to mean ... that if the facts proven by the prosecution demonstrate that the felony offense is included in fact within the facts of the homicide and integral thereto, then that felony cannot support a felony-murder instruction." (Id., at p. 387, 9 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793.) The court explained that the purpose of the felonious conduct must be examined, and noted that in both Ireland and Wilson "[t]he desired infliction of bodily injury was in each case not satisfied short of death." (Ibid.) ⁶

We find the purpose of the felony-murder rule to be furthered by its application here. Felony child abuse, even if based upon the same acts as the homicide, can be committed without inflicting death, and, more importantly, without intending to inflict injuries which will result in death. In People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 159 Cal.Rptr. 771, the court reasoned that under section 273a: "For the felony punishment there is no requirement that the actual result be great bodily injury. The statute is intended to protect a child from an abusive situation in which the probability of serious injury is great." (Id., at p. 835, 159 Cal.Rptr. 771.)

Thus, felony child abuse can be, and often is, committed without infliction of fatal injuries, so that application of the felony-murder doctrine serves its deterrent function by holding those who commit felony child abuse strictly responsible for deaths that occur either intentionally or accidentally from commission of the underlying felony.

In People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193, application of the felony-murder rule was upheld against a challenge based upon the "Ireland" doctrine under circumstances we find analogous to the present case. The underlying felony was administering poison with the intent to injure. (Pen.Code, § 347.) The court reasoned that application of the felony-murder rule served as a deterrent since the underlying felony could be committed without an intent to cause death-producing injuries. (Id., at pp. 185-186, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) ⁷ Accordingly, application of the felony-murder rule was found proper because the underlying felony was committed with a " 'collateral and independent felonious design.' " (Id., at p. 185, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.)

In People v. Shockley (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 669, 145 Cal.Rptr. 200, it was specifically held that the "Ireland" doctrine was not violated by use of felony child abuse (Pen.Code, §...