People v. Norwood

Decision Date17 May 2021
Docket NumberB307814
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRANDON A. NORWOOD, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 0PH05051)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jerry B. Marshak, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________ Appellant Brandon A. Norwood was placed on parole following his conviction and prison sentence for forcible rape. The trial court revoked Norwood's parole after finding he willfully removed his global positioning system (GPS) ankle monitor. Norwood appeals from the court's order revoking parole, contending the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. We disagree, and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2015, Norwood was sentenced to six years in prison after pleading guilty to forcible rape. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2).)1

In July 2019, Norwood was released on parole. A condition of parole—which Norwood acknowledged—was that he wear a GPS monitoring device affixed to his person, and not tamper with it. (See § 3010.10.) The GPS monitor had a strap that went through the device, attaching it to the wearer's ankle. It was charged by means of a separate charging cable.

On August 24, 2020, the Division of Adult Parole Operations filed a petition to revoke Norwood's parole, alleging that he had removed the GPS monitor. The trial court preliminarily revoked parole.

On September 8, 2020, the trial court held a combined, contested probable cause and revocation hearing, at which the following evidence was adduced.

1. People's evidence

Norwood's parole agent, Sarany Ou, testified that on August 6, 2020, she fitted him with a GPS monitoring device. She ensured that it was securely attached to his ankle and was in good working order. She explained to Norwood that if the device's strap became detached, he should call her immediately or, if it was after hours, text her.

On August 17 or 18, 2020, Ou was notified that the battery on Norwood's monitor was low. He claimed the charger was not operating properly. On the afternoon of the 19th, he went to the parole office and obtained a new charger.

At approximately 6:15 p.m. that evening, Ou was electronically notified that Norwood's monitor had gone into "master tamper status," indicating that the strap was no longer in contact with the device. Upon receiving the notification Ou called Norwood and asked what had happened. Norwood told her nothing was wrong with the device. Ou told him she had received a "master tamper" alert, and queried whether he was "sure" nothing was wrong with the monitor. Norwood then stated that it had "snapped off," but he was able to put it back together. However, once a GPS monitor is in "master tamper" mode it has to be replaced and cannot be put back together. Norwood texted to Ou a photograph showing the device, which was sitting on his ankle but was not affixed by the strap. Ou told Norwood to report to the parole office the following day, with the monitor and all its parts.

When Norwood arrived at the parole office, the monitor was not attached to his ankle. He told Ou that the device "got snagged while he was charging." First, he stated that the charger cord became snagged on a chair when he was reachingfor something. Then he said it got caught on a desk. He did not say that the strap itself had been snagged. Ou and her supervisor examined the monitor. The strap was bent outward, which in Ou's experience indicated that the damage had been caused by force. The People introduced into evidence photographs of the device taken when Norwood brought it to the office.

Ou had previously attempted to pull a strap from a device, but had been unable to do so even when pulling "very, very hard." Once the strap is secured to the monitor, a "regular human force can't pull them apart[.]" On the other hand, the charger cord simply snaps into the bottom of the monitor with a plastic snap, and it would be "fairly easy" to yank out. It would take "a lot more" force to pull the strap out of the device than to pull the charging cable out.

Norwood's device had a detached strap on several prior occasions. Each time Ou discussed with him what to do under those circumstances.

2. Defense evidence

Norwood testified in his own behalf, as follows. On August 17, 2020, he began to have problems with the monitor's charger not working properly. On the afternoon of August 18, 2020, he went to the parole office and obtained a new charger from Agent Ou.

That evening, Norwood was at the home he shared with his mother, Kathy Mackie, and his fiancé, Tannika Price. Norwood was charging the GPS device in his room. His mother was in the family room, and Price was outside the house cleaning her new car. Norwood bent over awkwardly and the charger got snagged on a chair that had an iron rod and some "hoops" or spirals at thebottom. The strap broke and came off. However, the charger was still attached to the device.

Norwood "panicked a little," thinking Agent Ou would be angry since "this happened a couple times already." He telephoned Agent Ou, but she did not pick up. Within five minutes, Ou called him back. He told her that the monitor was fine but the strap was broken. He did not leave his home thereafter until he travelled to the parole office the next day.

Norwood's fiancé and his mother both testified that he alerted them that the GPS monitor had caught on a piece of furniture and broke. Neither actually saw what happened, however. Both affirmed that Norwood did not leave the house after the monitor broke. Mackie was present when Norwood tried to call Agent Ou, and corroborated that he was initially unable to reach her.

3. The trial court's findings

The trial court found Norwood had violated the terms of his parole by willfully removing the GPS device. It reasoned that the photographs were "extremely persuasive," as they "depict the strap that is supposed to be connected to the device itself, the strap that circumnavigates the ankle to be removed, and it is clearly removed forcibly. It's jagged on one end and the strap is round . . . and the last bit of it, perhaps an indenture into the strap, is notably bent. It looks—it's no longer round. It has a deep divot and it looks like it's been pried with force. It visibly looks different than the remainder of the straps in the photograph." The court found not credible Norwood's testimony that the strap broke when it was snagged on a piece of furniture. Instead, the court found "that actually to be impossible." The court credited Agent Ou's testimony that the strap could not becasually removed or broken. It acknowledged that Norwood's motivation was unknown, but motivation was not an element of the violation; "It's just the question of whether the action of removing it was willfully done in that moment." Accordingly, the court revoked Norwood's parole, to be restored upon his completion of 180 days in county jail.

DISCUSSION

Norwood contends the trial court's revocation order must be reversed, because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding he willfully removed the GPS monitor.2 We disagree.

"Any person who is required to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290) and who is released on parole upon the condition they wear a global positioning system (GPS) device, or other electronic monitoring device (§ 3010.10, subd. (a)), is prohibited from removing, disabling, or rendering the device inoperable (§ 3010.10, subd. (b)). If a parolee violates this provision, the parolee is required to be incarcerated in a county jail for 180 days. (§ 3010.10, subd. (e).)" (People v. Schaffer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 500, 503, fn. omitted.) To justify revocation of parole, the violation must have been willful. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 370, 382, disapproved onanother ground by People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646; cf. People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295.) A violation is willful when it was committed intentionally. (§ 7; In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438; People v. Hagedorn (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 734, 744, fn. 6.)

The People must prove the facts supporting an alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 3044, subd. (a)(5); In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234-1235.) A trial court has "very broad discretion" when determining whether revocation is warranted. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443.) We review a revocation order for abuse of discretion, and examine the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318; People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773; see People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 688.)3

Under the substantial evidence standard, our review "is limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court's decision." (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848-849; People v. Buell, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 687.) "Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact." (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181; People v. Buell, at p. 687; People v...

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