People v. Nothaus
| Citation | 147 Colo. 210,363 P.2d 180 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 19620,19620 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff in Error, v. John Mark NOTHAUS, Defendant in Error, Department of Revenue, Intervenor. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charles S. Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.
John C. Young, Jr., Colorado Springs, for defendant in error.
Defendant in error was tried and convicted before a Justice of the Peace in Cripple Creek, Teller county, upon a complaint in which it was alleged that on November 17, 1959, he drove a motor vehicle while under a suspension order issued by the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Colorado. The case was appealed to the county court of Teller county where all material facts were agreed to by stipulation of counsel. The pertinent facts are as follows:
On January 10, 1959, on a public highway in Teller county, a horse was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant. The director of revenue, upon receiving a report of the accident from one Dobbie, and acting under the purported authority of C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7, suspended the operator's license which had theretofore been issued to defendant. The suspension followed the failure of defendant to 'deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient in the judgment of the director to satisfy any judgments for damages resulting from such accident as may be recovered * * *' against the defendant as required by the statute above cited. Defendant admitted receiving notice of the 'cancellation' of his operator's license, and also admitted that notwithstanding the receipt of said notice he thereafter drove a motor vehicle at the time and place named in the summons and complaint filed against him. The sole defense relied upon by him was, and is, that those sections of the Safety Responsibility Law, and those statutory provisions purporting to authorize a revocation of defendant's operator's license without a hearing or trial, are unconstitutional. The substance of the pertinent statutory provision follows.
Under section C.R.S. '53, 13-7-6, every operator or owner of a motor vehicle in an accident, accompanied by injury to person or property damages of fifty dollars ($50.00) or more, is required to file with the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue, within ten days, a report of what occurred. Failure to file such report is upon pain of having the party's license summarily suspended--not for fault in the accident, negligent driving or wrongdoing, but merely for failure to obey. By the terms of 13-7-6 the aforesaid report is required to be made to the director of revenue by all parties, whether they are or are not guilty of any violation of a traffic law.
By the terms of C.R.S. '53, 13-4-26, all required accident reports are secret--'for the confidential use of the department'--'without prejudice to the individual so reporting,' except that by 13-7-33 the essence of the report may be conveyed to any insurance carrier upon request and payment of the information fee of twenty-five cents.
According to 13-7-7 the director of revenue is required to suspend the license of every operator and the registrations of every owner of an automobile 'in any manner involved' in an accident unless there is a deposit of security referred to as 'sufficient in the judgment of the director to satisfy any judgments for damages resulting from such accident as may be recovered against such operator or owner.' This suspension is mandatory. It is not conditioned upon any report being made by the operator whose license is suspended. It is not conditioned upon a criminal trial and a finding of guilt. This suspension must be made within sixty days after the receipt of 'a report'--any report, a true one, a false one, an unsworn one, the report of a bystander or the hearsay report of any kind by any person. A report such as is required by 13-7-6 (viz.: by one involved in the accident) is not specified.
Analysis of C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7 reveals the following characteristics which counsel for defendant contends cannot be sustained.
1. A deposit of security is required regardless of the question of guilt of a violation of a traffic law, and without regard to the question of whether there was any negligence on the part of the person who is required to deposit the security.
2. The deposit is required after the accident and not before it, and operates only to facilitate collection of damages by the party who may thereafter be adjudged entitled thereto. No protection is offered the public with relation to future occurrences.
3. The deposit is required only because of the happening of an accident.
4. The deposit of security is required without any inquiry whatever concerning the liability of the person required to make it, and must be made in such sum as in the judgment of the director of revenue shall satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from the accident, no standards are fixed for the exercise of his discretion, no evidence is taken, and no notice or hearing is afforded as to the amount or nature of the security to be required.
As shown by the stipulated facts, when a report of an accident, which identifies the parties involved, is made to the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue, a notice is sent to them by mail. It is called a 'Warning of Suspension' by which the parties are informed that if the recipient cannot prove he has insurance covering the accident, he must establish his financial responsibility to the other party to the accident by securing a release from him, or by depositing the amount of money fixed by the director of revenue. In default of which his license to drive a car will be summarily suspended.
Article II, Section 3 of the constitution provides that: 'All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right * * * of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; * * *' A motor vehicle is property and a person cannot be deprived of property without due process of law. The term property, within the meaning of the due process clause, includes the right to make full use of the property which one has the inalienable right to acquire.
Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. The limitations which may be placed upon this inherent right of the citizen must be based upon a proper exercise of the police power of the state in the protection of the public health, safety and welfare. Any unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of the individual to make use of the public highways cannot be sustained. Regulations imposed upon the right of...
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