People v. Nova

• Decision Date: 30 November 1993
• Citation: 198 A.D.2d 193,603 N.Y.S.2d 863
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ricardo NOVA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 863

603 N.Y.S.2d 863

198 A.D.2d 193

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ricardo NOVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

Nov. 30, 1993.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and ROSENBERGER, ELLERIN, WALLACH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edwin Torres, J.), rendered January 3, 1992, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and two counts each of robbery in the first and second degrees, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of from twenty five years to life, eight and one-third to twenty five years (twice) and five to fifteen years (twice), respectively, and order of the same court and Justice, entered May 20, 1992, denying defendant's motion to vacate his conviction, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant seeks to suppress his initial oral statement on the ground that it was given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and his subsequent written and videotaped confessions, which were preceded by the warnings, on the ground that they were tainted by the initial statement. After an extensive hearing into the matter, the hearing court credited the testimony of the People's witnesses and concluded that defendant had voluntarily accompanied the police to the precinct, that the first interview there did not constitute a custodial interrogation, and that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and confessed to the crime. The court also found that the written and videotaped statements were freely given after a knowing waiver of rights. Still other precinct house statements ascribed to defendant were held admissible on the ground that they were not the product of interrogation but merely conversations between the suspects or statements initiated by defendant.

The issue of whether a suspect is in custody is generally a question of fact (People v. Centano, 76 N.Y.2d 837, 560 N.Y.S.2d 121, 559 N.E.2d 1280). Not only did the hearing court find that defendant was not under custodial detention, but the jury, when confronted with the same issue, also rejected the defense claim. Since the record supports the conclusion of both the hearing court and the jury that defendant was not in custody prior to being given the Miranda warnings, their findings should not be disturbed (see, People v. Caviano, 194 A.D.2d 429, 599 N.Y.S.2d 251). Defendant clearly agreed to accompany the detectives to the precinct. He voluntarily answered the inquiries posed to him and displayed no agitation. He was not made physically uncomfortable, was offered food, drink and cigarettes, and the tone of the interviews remained conversational throughout. The questioning of defendant before the administration of the Miranda warnings lasted for about an hour and a half, a not unduly long period of time, and he never requested permission to call either his parents or a lawyer. Defendant's freedom of movement was not restricted, and the atmosphere was not at all coercive. There was also no indication that he ever wanted to terminate the interview and leave.

Under these circumstances, the hearing court could have, as it did, reasonably find that defendant was not in custody when he originally spoke with the police prior to being read his Miranda rights. The standard to be applied in ascertaining whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is "what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant's position" (People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89; see also, People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861). "A suspect's awareness that the police may have incriminating evidence against him is generally irrelevant in determining whether the questioning is custodial; the critical consideration is whether he reasonably believes his freedom is significantly restricted (Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 219-220 [401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814]." (People v. White, 164 A.D.2d 413, 417, 564 N.Y.S.2d 314, aff'd79 N.Y.2d 900, 581 N.Y.S.2d 651, 590 N.E.2d 236).

In any event, defendant's videotaped statement, taken seven and one-half hours after defendant finished his second written statement, his final response to police questioning, is admissible regardless of the admissibility of his morning statements. When, "as part of a continuous chain of events", a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, any statements made in response as well as any additional statements made after the warnings are administered and questioning resumes must be suppressed. (...