People v. Nuanez
| Decision Date | 16 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97SC922,97SC922 |
| Citation | 973 P.2d 1260 |
| Parties | 1999 CJ C.A.R. 997 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Caesar NUANEZ, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McLachlan, Solicitor General, Clemmie P. Engle, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Ann M. Roan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
A jury found the defendant, Caesar Nuanez, guilty of one count of second-degree assault arising out of an altercation with a police officer during the course of a traffic stop. The court of appeals subsequently reversed Nuanez's conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Nuanez was subject to the terms and conditions of a deferred sentence for burglary at the time of the assault. See People v. Nuanez, No. 96CA0188, slip op. at 5 (Colo.App. Oct. 9, 1997) (). Thereafter, the prosecution brought this appeal. We hold that the trial court's admission of the evidence in question was proper. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence.
On July 24, 1994, Denver Police Detective David Marker stopped Nuanez after witnessing him drive through a red light. According to the prosecution's evidence, when Detective Marker requested to see Nuanez's driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, Nuanez attempted to flee on foot from the scene. Marker then grabbed Nuanez's arm and a struggle ensued, during which Nuanez threw the detective to the ground. As a result, Marker suffered a large laceration to the back of his head and lost consciousness for a short period of time. Meanwhile, several more police officers arrived on the scene. Nuanez and his brother, who had been a passenger in the vehicle, struggled with the officers in an attempt to escape. Both Nuanez and his brother were ultimately subdued and arrested. As a result of the altercation, Nuanez suffered multiple injuries, including a broken arm. Nuanez was charged with one count of second-degree assault for attacking Detective Marker. 1
At trial, the defense argued that Nuanez was the victim of a police beating. The defense offered the testimony of Nuanez's brother, who claimed that Nuanez did not resist arrest and that Marker and the other officers assaulted Nuanez without justification. The defense argued that Marker's head injury occurred as the result of another police officer striking him or throwing him to the ground during the melee.
In an effort to rebut the defendant's version of events, the prosecution attempted to show that Nuanez had a compelling motive for assaulting Detective Marker. The prosecution's theory was based on the following key facts: (1) on the night in question, Nuanez was driving without a license, as his had been revoked sixteen months earlier due to a habitual traffic offender conviction; and (2) at the time of the stop, Nuanez was subject to the terms and conditions of a deferred judgment and sentence for a 1993 second-degree burglary charge. Based on these facts, the prosecution first asserted that, as Nuanez was driving without a license at the time of the stop, he was aware that he would be subject to further prosecution as a habitual traffic offender. Second, the prosecution argued that Nuanez knew that such a criminal conviction would violate the terms and conditions of his burglary deferred judgment, which would result in an entry of sentence against him in that prior case. Therefore, the prosecution concluded that Nuanez had a strong motive for attempting to flee from Detective Marker at the time of the traffic stop.
In support of its theory, the prosecution introduced certified copies of Nuanez's driving record into evidence. The defense did not object to the introduction of the driving record. Nuanez's driving record included a March 17, 1993 order revoking his driving privileges for a period of three years. This revocation was issued because Nuanez had committed a sufficient number of traffic violations in the preceding five years to be considered a habitual traffic offender. Nuanez's driving record did not include any information explaining the legal ramifications of driving with a revoked license. However, in both its opening and closing arguments, the prosecution alluded to the fact that driving while under a habitual traffic offender license revocation is a crime. 2
Over objection, the prosecution also introduced Exhibit 13, a copy of a Stipulation for Deferred Judgment dated April 19, 1993. This stipulation provided that the entry of judgment and sentence on Nuanez's guilty plea to second-degree burglary would be deferred for a period of four years. It further provided that Nuanez was permitted to remain at liberty during the period of deferral on the condition that he not "commit any criminal offense against the United States of America, the State of Colorado or any other jurisdiction." The prosecution offered no other evidence at trial to prove Nuanez's motive.
As noted, Nuanez did not object to the introduction of his driving record into evidence. However, defense counsel did object to the admission of the second-degree burglary deferred judgment on the grounds that it constituted impermissible character evidence. After conducting a hearing on the issue out of the presence of the jury, the trial court applied the four-part test for prior act evidence we announced in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo.1990), and held that the deferred judgment evidence was admissible. The court instructed the jury that it was not to consider the evidence of Nuanez's driving record and the conditions of the deferred judgment for any purpose beyond the limited purpose of showing Nuanez's alleged motive for the assault. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree assault.
Nuanez appealed his conviction, claiming that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the admission of the evidence of his deferred judgment. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. See Nuanez, No. 96CA0188, slip op. at 5. Therein, the court of appeals found that the record contained "ample evidence" of motive apart from the deferred judgment. Id. at 4. Specifically, the court stated that "[d]efendant's status as [a] habitual traffic offender also subjected him to incarceration ... and was thus equally probative of motive." Id. Therefore, the court held, "the probative value of defendant's deferred judgment for a prior burglary conviction is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in holding to the contrary and in allowing the additional evidence of the deferred judgment. See id.
Under CRE 402, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by the Colorado or United States Constitutions, the Colorado Rules of Evidence, or the Colorado statutes. In Spoto, we held that the Colorado Rules of Evidence require a four-part analysis to determine whether evidence of prior acts is admissible. See Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1314. Therein, we held as follows:
First, we must ask whether the proffered evidence relates to a material fact, i.e., a fact "that is of consequence to the determination of the action." If it does, we proceed to the second question: is the evidence logically relevant, i.e., does it have "any tendency to make the existence of [the material fact] more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence?" If the evidence is logically relevant, we then must determine whether the logical relevance is independent of the intermediate inference, prohibited by CRE 404(b), that the defendant has a bad character, which would then be employed to suggest the probability that the defendant committed the crime charged because of the likelihood that he acted in conformity with his bad character. Finally, if the proffered evidence survives the first three parts of the analysis, we must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Id. at 1318 (citations omitted). As the court of appeals opinion is based on the fourth prong of this test, and Nuanez only challenges the trial court's application of the fourth prong, we limit our review accordingly.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Wakefield, Court of Appeals No. 15CA0654
...evidence under CRE 403, we must assign the evidence its maximum probative value and minimum unfair prejudice. People v. Nuanez , 973 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo. 1999).2. Discussion¶ 73 The court admitted the photos over defendant's objection. One photo showed several growing plants. The other sh......
-
Masters v. People
...of discretion, Defendant must show that the trial court's decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo.1999). In deference to the trial court's exercise of discretion, a reviewing court "assume[s] the maximum probative value that a ......
-
People v. Gwinn
...prejudice or if its admission would mislead the jury. CRE 403 ; People v. Greenlee , 200 P.3d 363, 366 (Colo. 2009) ; People v. Nuanez , 973 P.2d 1260, 1262-63 (Colo. 1999). ¶ 26 Because Gwinn argues for the first time on appeal that the court erroneously admitted Exhibit 1 under CRE 403, w......
-
People v. Welsh
...it results in unfair prejudice, such that it calls for the jury to reach its decision on an improper basis. See, e.g., People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo. 1999); People v. Dist. Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1286 Under these facts, the danger of unfair prejudice and the likelihood of misle......
-
Rule 403 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
...P.2d 836 (Colo. App. 1998). No abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's deferred judgment for burglary. People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1999). Evidence of defendant's prior domestic violence conviction was properly admitted. The conviction was relevant for impeachment......
-
Chapter 8 - § 8.1 • INTRODUCTION, LIMITATIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS
...misdemeanor conviction for false reporting, but not the conviction itself, could impact character for truthfulness); People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1999) (evidence that defendant was on probation admitted to show motive for eluding police during a traffic stop); People v. Sasson, 62......
-
The Expanding Use of the Res Gestae Doctrine
...v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Colo. 1990). 62. People v. Asberry, 172 P.3d 927, 932 (Colo.App. 2007), citing People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo. 1999). 63. People v. Auldridge, 724 P.2d 87 (Colo.App. 1986). 64. Quintana, supra note 22. 65. People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Col......