People v. Ocasio

• Decision Date: 01 November 2016
• Citation: 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07105,28 N.Y.3d 178,43 N.Y.S.3d 228,65 N.E.3d 1263
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Alexis OCASIO, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

28 N.Y.3d 178

65 N.E.3d 1263

43 N.Y.S.3d 228

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07105

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,

v.Alexis OCASIO, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 1, 2016.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Marianne Stracquadanio, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, Stanley R. Kaplan and Nancy D. Killian of counsel), for appellant.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York City (Paul A. Paterson, Audra J. Soloway and Stephen C. Thompson of counsel), and Robin Steinberg, The Bronx Defenders, Bronx (Marika Meis and Sid Thaxter of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STEIN, J.

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 265.01[1] ). The accusatory instrument alleged that a police officer observed defendant with a "rubber-gripped, metal, extendable baton (billy club)" in his rear pants pocket. The officer averred—based on his training and experience—that "said baton device is designed primarily as a weapon, consisting of a tubular, metal body with a rubber grip and extendable feature and used to inflict serious injury upon a person by striking or choking." Defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient. Criminal Court granted defend-ant's motion, concluding that the allegations describing the object possessed by defendant were insufficient to charge him with possessing a billy within the meaning of Penal Law § 265.01(1). The Appellate Term affirmed (48 Misc.3d 127[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op.50929[U], 2015 WL 3824054 [App.Term, 1st Dept.2015] ). A Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal (26 N.Y.3d 970, 18 N.Y.S.3d 606, 40 N.E.3d 584 [2015] ), and we now reverse.

To be facially sufficient, the factual allegations of a complaint or information, together with those of any supporting depositions, must "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged" in the instrument (CPL 100.40[1][b] ; [4][b]; see People v. Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d 225, 228, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 906 N.E.2d 381 [2009] ). A misdemeanor information must also contain "[n]on-hearsay allegations ... [which] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 100.40[1][c] ; see People v. Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064, 1066, 23 N.Y.S.3d 134, 44 N.E.3d 209 [2015] ). We have oft stated that, " ‘[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading’ " (Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d at 1066–1067, 23 N.Y.S.3d 134, 44 N.E.3d 209, quoting People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000] ).

Here, defendant argues that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient because the object described therein does not constitute a "billy" under Penal Law § 265.01(1). More specifically, he contends that the accusatory instrument describes the object as being "metal" and "extendable," whereas, in his view, the statutory term "billy" refers only to short, wooden clubs of a fixed length.

The starting point for our analysis is the statutory language in question (see People v. Golo, 26 N.Y.3d 358, 361, 23 N.Y.S.3d 110, 44 N.E.3d 185 [2015] ). Under Penal Law § 265.01(1), a person commits the offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when he or she possesses a "billy." The legislative prohibition on billies was enacted in 1866 (see L 1866, ch 716).¹ At that time, "billies" or "billy clubs" were generally comprised of wood. The Penal Law does not define the term "billy," wooden or otherwise, but we recognized, over a century ago, that the weapons prohibited by section 265.01(1), including billies, had a "well- understood character" (People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402, 97 N.E. 877 [1912] ). As commonly occurs with weaponry, however, technological advances throughout the years have resulted in modifications to the traditional wooden billy. Today, such weapons, often referred to as "batons," may be comprised of metal or synthetic materials, and variations include either fixed length or "extendable" instruments. The issue before us on this appeal distills to whether the "well-understood character" (id. ) of a "billy," as used in Penal Law § 265.01(1), encompasses an extendable, metal baton.

Because the Penal Law contains no definition of "billy," we must give the term its "ordinary" and "commonly understood" meaning (People v. Versaggi, 83 N.Y.2d 123, 129, 608 N.Y.S.2d 155, 629 N.E.2d 1034 [1994] ; see People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247, 958 N.Y.S.2d 660, 982 N.E.2d 580 [2012] ; People v. Quinto, 18 N.Y.3d 409, 417, 941 N.Y.S.2d 8, 964 N.E.2d 379 [2012] ). In determining the meaning of statutory language, we "have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts" (Yaniveth R. v. LTD Realty Co., 27 N.Y.3d 186, 192, 32 N.Y.S.3d 10, 51 N.E.3d 521 [2016] ; see e.g. Versaggi, 83 N.Y.2d at 129, 608 N.Y.S.2d 155, 629 N.E.2d 1034 ). To that end, a billy has been defined as a "small bludgeon that may be carried in the pocket; a club; especially, a policeman's club" (1 Black's Law Dictionary 213 [4th ed. 1951] ). Although some dictionaries note that a billy is usually a wooden instrument see e.g. Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 122 [11th ed. 2003] ), the definitions are not limited thereto, and dictionary definitions generally recognize that the term " baton" is synonymous with the word "billy" or "billy club" (see e.g. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 207 [2d ed. 2001]; Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, billy club [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/billy% 20club] [accessed Oct. 11, 2016] ).

Notably, case law in this state has recognized that the terms "nightstick" and "baton" may be interchangeable with the term "billy" (see People v. Talbert, 107 A.D.2d 842, 843–844, 484 N.Y.S.2d 680 [3d Dept.1985] [defining billy as a "heavy wooden stick with a handle grip which, from its appearance, is designed to be used to strike an individual and not for other lawful purposes" but recognizing that "(a) policeman's nightstick or billy club is clearly a billy"]; People v. Schoonmaker, 40 A.D.2d 1066, 1066–1067, 339 N.Y.S.2d 338 [3d Dept.1972] [policeman's club, referred to as a "baton," "fits any standard definition of the term ‘billy’ "] ). Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have held, when interpreting criminal statutes, that a modern-day collapsible, metal baton falls within the common definition of a billy (see Shahit v. City of Detroit Police Officer Tosqui, 2005 WL 1345413, *15, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 44942, *47–48 [E.D.Mich., June 1, 2005, No. 0471538] [collecting definitions], aff'd 192 Fed.Appx. 382 [6th Cir.2006] ; People v. Mercer, 42 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 730 [App.Dept., Super. Ct.1995] ).

As the People point out, Penal Law § 265.20(b) also lends support to their position that a "baton" may qualify as a type of billy under Penal Law § 265.01(1). This statute was amended in 1979 in response to an Appellate Division decision equating a police "baton" to a "billy" (L. 1979, ch. 667; see Mem. in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 1979, ch. 667; Schoonmaker, 40 A.D.2d at 1066–1067, 339 N.Y.S.2d 338 ). Concerned that the carrying of batons by auxiliary police officers would violate Penal Law § 265.01(1), the legislature enacted section 265.20(b) to create an exception, which states, in relevant part, that the prohibition against possessing a billy set forth in section 265.01"shall not apply to possession of that type of billy commonly known as a ‘police baton’ " of specified dimensions if possessed by auxiliary police officers in certain cities (Penal Law § 265.20[b] [emphasis added]; see Mem. in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 1979, ch. 667). While we are mindful that Penal Law § 265.01(1) should be interpreted narrowly in light of the absence of an intent element, this language in section 265.20(b) —which must be harmonized and interpreted consistently with Penal Law § 265.01 —plainly demonstrates that the legislature considered "batons" that are designed as weapons to be a "type of billy" (Penal Law § 265.20[b] ; see generally McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 97).²

The common thread, consistent with the general understanding of the term, is that a "billy" is a cylindrical or rounded, rigid, club or baton with a handle grip which, from its appearance and inherent characteristics, is designed to be used as a striking weapon and not for other lawful purposes.³ Such a definition or description does not hinge on the type of material of which the billy is comprised, as is plain from the absence of any statutory language limiting the term "billy" to a specific material. Indeed, although the legislature has banned some weapons made of a specific material, it has not done so with the "billy." For example, Penal Law § 265. 01(1) initially prohibited only "metal" knuckles, but was later amended to also ban "plastic" knuckles—an amendment made necessary by the legislature's original qualification of the term "knuckles" as being comprised of "metal." Absent such an amendment, an interpretation of "metal" knuckles as including " plastic" would conflict with the plain language of the statute. By comparison, the legislature has never prohibited only "wooden" billies—or, as the dissent suggests, "wooden club[s]" (dissenting op. at 187, 43 N.Y.S.3d at 235, 65 N.E.3d at 1270)—signaling that its intended definition is not confined to objects made out of a particular material, as defendant would have us hold. Unquestionably, a billy made of metal or other synthetic material remains a billy under the statute in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term. In so concluding, we do not read the relevant statute "broadly" (dissenting op. at 188 n. 2, 43 N.Y.S.3d at 236 n. 2, 65 N.E.3d at 1270 n. 2) but,...