People v. Oglesby

Citation2016 IL App (1st) 141477,69 N.E.3d 328
Decision Date15 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1-14-1477,1-14-1477
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carla OGLESBY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Cynthia Giacchetti, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Miles Keleher, and Samantha N. Lemke, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Carla Oglesby was charged with several offenses related to the allegedly improper steering of government contracts between Cook County and various vendors, including two of defendant's own companies, that were formed while defendant was deputy chief of staff for the former president of the Cook County board of commissioners. Following a bench trial, the trial court acquitted her of many charges but found her guilty of two counts of theft, one count of money laundering, and one count of unlawful stringing of bids.

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to each count and the sentence imposed, and further argues that one of her convictions for theft must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

¶ 3 We affirm defendant's convictions for theft. The State presented sufficient evidence that defendant intended to permanently deprive the county of the use and benefit of its funds, that she obtained or exerted unauthorized control over the funds, and that she engaged in deception. We agree with both parties, however, that because both theft convictions were carved from the same act, one of the two convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We remand to the trial court to determine which of the counts was less serious and should be vacated.

¶ 4 We affirm defendant's conviction for money laundering. The State sufficiently proved that defendant received a kickback from a vendor that was disguised as a legitimate transaction between two companies.

¶ 5 Finally, we affirm defendant's conviction for bid stringing. The State presented ample evidence that defendant improperly designated several vendor contracts in such a way to avoid a competitive-bidding process, so that the preferred vendor would receive the contracts without any competition.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to each of her four convictions, it is necessary to examine the facts in great detail.

¶ 8 Cook County's main governing body is a board of commissioners. See generally 55 ILCS 5/div. 2-6 (West 2010) (laying out structure, powers, and duties of Cook County board of commissioners). The voters of Cook County select a president of the board from among the candidates for commissioner. 55 ILCS 5/2-6002 (West 2010).

¶ 9 At all times relevant to this case, Todd Stroger was president of the Cook County board of commissioners. Stroger hired defendant as his deputy chief of staff on February 16, 2010. Defendant was arrested in connection with this case on October 4, 2010.

¶ 10 The State's charges in this case related to several public contracts between various vendors that were ostensibly hired to perform public relations work for various departments in Cook County. The State charged defendant with organizing (counts I and II) and continuing (counts V and VI) a financial crimes enterprise, theft (count III), theft by deception (count IV), money laundering (count VII), official misconduct (counts VIII through XIV), and unlawful stringing of bids (count XV). After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of theft, theft by deception, money laundering, and unlawful stringing of bids and acquitted of the other charges.

¶ 11 A. The Contracting Process, Generally

¶ 12 Generally, when Cook County contracted with outside vendors for services, those contracts were offered up for competitive bidding among various vendors. However, a department seeking the services of a particular vendor could seek a "sole-source contract," which was a contract to be performed by a specific vendor without competitive bidding. See Cook County Code of Ordinances § 34-139 (amended Mar. 12, 2014) ("Procurements of supplies, equipment, goods or services may be made without use of one of the competitive processes if there is either only one source or there is a need for the unique or specialized skill, experience, or ability possessed by a particular source.").

¶ 13 In order to obtain a sole-source contract, the head of the department seeking to use a particular vendor would complete a "justification letter"—a letter explaining why the department needed to use that particular vendor, instead of selecting a bidder through a competitive bidding process. See id. ("The Using Agency must submit a letter to the CPO justifying the sole source Procurement, and provide any other documents or information required by the CPO."). The letters were sent to the office of the purchasing agent.

¶ 14 In addition, contracts were usually submitted to the Cook County board of commissioners for approval. But during defendant's tenure, contracts valued at less than $25,000 did not need to be submitted to the board for approval.

¶ 15 Three other entities also had to sign off on a single source contract in order for it to be completed: the office of the purchasing agent, the comptroller, and the chief financial officer (CFO) of the county.

¶ 16 B. Contracts at Issue

¶ 17 The contracts at issue in this case were all formed between late February 2010 and mid-April 2010. They were ostensibly made to serve three projects: (1) a federal grant to assist individuals affected by a 2008 flood in suburban Cook County, administered through Cook County's department of homeland security; (2) a federal Department of Energy grant administered through Cook County's department of environmental control; and (3) a project to inform the public about the 2010 census to increase turnout.

¶ 18 1. Flood Grant Contracts

¶ 19 On February 24, 2010, eight days after defendant had been hired as deputy chief of staff, two justification letters were drafted for single source contracts relating to the flood grant. The letters were signed by David Ramos, the executive director of the Cook County department of homeland security, relating to two vendors who would work for the county on the flood grants: CGC Communications, LLC (CGC) and Gary Render. Although Ramos ran the department of homeland security, the justification letters were drafted on letterhead from the office of the president, i.e. , Stroger's letterhead.

¶ 20 Both justification letters said that CGC and Render would "work in conjunction with the Office of the President, the Board of Commissioners, and the Department of Public Affairs and Communications in the strategic implementation of media tactics designed to inform residents of suburban Cook County of" the flood grant. Both letters said that Ramos had selected these particular vendors because of "the vast experiences [they] possess[ ] in areas related, but not limited to, strategic planning and [their] diverse background [s] in general consumer and multicultural media."

¶ 21 On February 26, 2010, the county issued checks to CGC and Render for $24,975 and $24,980, respectively. Bank records showed that CGC deposited the check in its account on March 1, 2010. Defendant had set up CGC's bank account, and it was undisputed that she controlled that account.

¶ 22 Ramos testified that Stroger appointed him to be the executive director of the department of homeland security in September 2009. Soon after his appointment, he learned that the county was "under the gun to disperse the [flood] grant funds." According to Ramos, if the county did not use the grant funds within a certain amount of time, the money would be returned to the federal government.

¶ 23 Ramos testified that it was part of his job to inform the public about the availability of the grant funds. Ramos spoke to Eugene Mullins, the head of Cook County's department of public affairs and communications (DPAC), about a public relations campaign.

¶ 24 Ramos testified that Mullins brought him the completed justification letters for CGC and Render. Ramos signed them, and he acknowledged that he did not review them "with a fine tooth [sic ] comb." Ramos added, "I entrusted [Mullins] as DPAC Director that he was going to assist my department in getting the word out to the residents of Cook County." He also thought that DPAC would work with the vendors in performing the outreach.

¶ 25 Ramos said that he did not know anything about CGC or Render at the time he signed the letters. He did not know that defendant owned CGC. Ramos never spoke to defendant about these justification letters.

¶ 26 Prior to being hired as deputy chief of staff, defendant owned and operated CGC. Defendant listed CGC on a dual employment form she gave to the county at the beginning of her tenure. When defendant took on the job at Cook County, she asked Tesa Anewishki, who had been working for CGC as an independent consultant, to take over the responsibility of running CGC's day-to-day operations. Defendant remained in control of CGC's bank accounts, however, and was still its owner.

¶ 27 Anewishki testified that she was not employed by CGC; she worked as an independent consultant for the company from late 2008 until 2010.

¶ 28 Anewishki met Mullins in summer or early fall 2009. CGC was working on Stroger's reelection campaign at that time. Mullins said that he liked the way CGC worked, so he told Anewishki that he wanted CGC to work on community outreach projects for "all of these grant opportunities that people [in Cook County were] not applying for."

¶ 29 In December 2009, CGC was working for DPAC and Mullins on an outreach program informing residents of the county funds available for foreclosure relief. Anewishki testified that CGC provided DPAC with "strategic plans" for the foreclosure project. Anewishki...

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