People v. Ojeda

• Decision Date: 14 February 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19SC763
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Ray OJEDA, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

503 P.3d 856

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

v.Ray OJEDA, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 19SC763

Supreme Court of Colorado.

February 14, 2021

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Elizabeth Griffin, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 We review a split decision of a division of the court of appeals in People v. Ojeda , 2019 COA 137M, 487 P.3d 1117, holding that the trial court erred in denying Ray Ojeda's challenge to an allegedly discriminatory jury strike under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), during the jury selection process. We hold that because the prosecution offered an explicitly race-based¹ reason for striking Juror R.P., it did not meet its burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for the strike, as required under step two of the Batson test.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on other grounds.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 In 2013, Ojeda was charged with kidnapping, sexually assaulting, and shooting a fifteen-year-old girl back in 1997. The victim, who somehow survived, reported the crime immediately but could not identify the perpetrator. The investigation eventually stalled out. At some point in time, the Denver Police Department's Crime Lab misplaced the victim's rape kit. Years later, when the police found and retested evidence from the victim's rape kit, DNA from the vaginal swab matched Ojeda.

¶3 At the beginning of Ojeda's trial in 2015, prospective jurors completed a written questionnaire that asked, among other things, whether they, a friend, or a relative had been the victim of a sexual assault; whether they had friends or relatives in law enforcement; and whether they or a family member had ever had a particularly good or bad experience with a police officer.

¶4 Juror R.P., a Hispanic² man, explained in his responses to the questionnaire that he and his ex-wife had been victims of sexual misconduct or assault, that he had a friend in law enforcement, and that he or a family member had been "racially profil[ed]." Because he answered the first question affirmatively, Juror R.P., like at least a dozen other jurors, was questioned individually by counsel outside the presence of the venire. He explained that the "inappropriate sexual behavior" to which he was subjected, as well as his ex-wife's separate experience, both occurred in the 1980s, before they were married. He indicated, in response to a question by the prosecution, that those experiences would not impact his ability to listen to the evidence or affect his judgment. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecution expressed any concern about Juror R.P.’s answers.

¶5 During group voir dire, the prosecutor asked Juror R.P. whether he had a "response in [his] gut" to the delay in bringing the case to trial. Juror R.P. said that the delay raised questions: "Maybe the person didn't disclose for some reason, the victim? Or maybe there was a mistrial before, or you know, something went awfully wrong for so many years to have gone by."

¶6 The prosecutor later asked eight of the prospective jurors to rate the criminal justice system on a scale of one to ten. Two jurors rated the system a four, three said it was a five or six, one rated it a six or seven, and two rated the system a nine or ten. Juror R.P. was one of two jurors who rated the system a four. Later, in response to a different line of questioning, Juror R.P. indicated that he had "a little bit of a bias on the system itself," explaining that he had "worked with communities of color," and he knew "that the criminal justice system is disproportionately filled with people of color and folks with mental disabilities

." He stated that, while he would try not to let his views affect him as a juror, his feelings about the system might color the way he "hear[d] and weigh[ed] the evidence in the case."

¶7 At the conclusion of the group questioning, the prosecutor challenged Juror R.P. for cause. She stated that her challenge was based on the content of Juror R.P.’s questionnaire, the remarks he made during general voir dire, and his demeanor. She explained that Juror R.P. expressed "bias" against the criminal justice system and "visibly showed hesitation" when asked whether he could be fair.

¶8 As for the questionnaire, the prosecutor observed that Juror R.P. worked in a field "ha[ving] to do with a quality of healthcare for individuals." Next, she turned to Juror R.P.’s voir dire comments, focusing on what she characterized as his "bias against the system." She construed this comment as an admission by Juror R.P. that his bias would "impact his ability to listen to both sides." She then summed up her concerns:

And I believe that when you look at that in-court behavior against what is clearly his commitment to his job, in terms of serving people of color and what he talked about in terms of the defendant being a person of color—he is himself a person of color—I thought that the totality of the record indicated that he has a distinctive leaning, that he himself said he would have trouble listening to the evidence.

¶9 Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's challenge, arguing that the prosecutor was mischaracterizing Juror R.P.’s answers. He then highlighted Juror R.P.’s statements that he could set his personal experiences aside, follow the rules provided by the court, and be objective. Defense counsel added that Juror R.P. was "one of the few Hispanic men on this entire jury panel," emphasizing that, under Batson , the prosecutor could not "exclude him just because he's Hispanic and may have something in common with the defendant in his heritage." The prosecutor did not dispute defense counsel's characterization of the basis of her challenge.

¶10 The district court denied the prosecutor's challenge for cause, expressly rejecting the prosecution's assertion that Juror R.P.’s answers regarding his feelings or life experiences indicated that he would not follow the court's rules or reach a verdict based on the evidence. Specifically, the court found that Juror R.P. was "certainly entitled to believe that people of color are not well-served in our criminal justice or medical system." The court explained: "There's nothing in his answers that those feelings o[r] his life experience will affect his judgment in the case, that he won't follow the rules set forth by the Court. There's a completely inadequate record to challenge him in this case." It clarified, however, that it had not made any findings under Batson .

¶11 Not long thereafter, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to excuse Juror R.P. Defense counsel, again, immediately raised a Batson objection, stating that he was "obviously concerned about excusing Hispanic males from the jury." Without waiting for the court to rule on whether defense counsel had made out a prima facie case of discrimination under the first step of Batson , the prosecutor proceeded to articulate her rationale for striking Juror R.P.

¶12 First, she expressly incorporated her comments related to her earlier for-cause challenge. Then, she elaborated on those comments, emphasizing the same underlying theme. She told the court that Juror R.P. would be a bad juror for the prosecution in light of the weaknesses in the prosecution's case, including the evidence that the Denver Police Department and the Denver Crime Lab misplaced the victim's rape kit for a period of years. She explained that the prosecution anticipated vigorous cross-examination concerning the DNA evidence that was ultimately recovered from the rape kit and was concerned that Juror R.P.’s reservations about the system might make him more skeptical of the prosecution's evidence. The problem, the prosecutor explained after gathering her thoughts, was that because the "defendant is a Latino male," and Juror R.P., as a Hispanic male, had discussed his own concerns about being racially profiled, Juror R.P. might "steer the jury towards a race-based reason why" Ojeda was "charged in the case." The prosecutor added that the jury still included a man of Middle Eastern descent, a "gentleman who is literally, not metaphorically, but literally of African-American descent," another Black man, and a Hispanic man.

¶13 Defense counsel responded: "With respect to [Juror R.P.], I think [the prosecutor] made my argument for me. She's concerned about a race-based argument being made by [Juror R.P.] because he's Hispanic." The court overruled the Batson objection, explaining:

The Court will deny the challenge for cause as to [Juror R.P.], but there are abundant race-neutral reasons for a peremptory to be exercised. First of all, he too is a victim of a sex assault, as is his wife, and he struck the Court as remarkably unconcerned about those events in his own lifetime. His first thought when there was a discussion of the time [it has] taken to bring this case was that the victim had delayed disclosure. He does have an anti-law enforcement ben[t], so the Court finds there's a sufficient racially neutral basis for the challenge.

¶14 Following the court's ruling, the prosecutor added that she, too, had "taken a note" about Juror R.P.’s comments concerning the delay and that they were "of particular concern." The jury convicted Ojeda as charged, and the court sentenced him to 144 years in prison.

¶15 Ojeda appealed, and a split division of the court of appeals reversed. Judge Fox, writing for the majority, concluded that the trial court erred in denying Ojeda's Batson challenge. Ojeda , ¶ 34, 487 P.3d at 1126. Applying the "substantial motivating factor" approach to step three of the Batson analysis, Judge Fox concluded that the prosecutor was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26, 487...