People v. Olender

• Decision Date: 15 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 98932.,98932.
• Citation: 222 Ill.2d 123,854 N.E.2d 593
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Valdy OLENDER et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 593

854 N.E.2d 593

222 Ill.2d 123

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Valdy OLENDER et al., Appellees.

No. 98932.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 15, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

John Benson, Chicago, for appellee Valdy Olender.

Perry Grimaldi, Chicago, for appellee Malgorzata Olender.

Chief Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in this case is whether the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)) when it enacted Public Act 88-669 (Pub. Act 88-669, eff. November 29, 1994). The legislation in Public Act 88-669, entitled "An Act in relation to government regulation," amended, among other statutes, section 1301 of the Illinois Income Tax Act (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 1994)), to state that a first violation of that section is a Class 4 felony and each subsequent violation is a Class 3 felony. The defendants, Valdy and Malgorzata Olender, had been charged under the amended version of section 1301. Defendants moved to dismiss the indictments against them on the ground that section 1301 had been unconstitutionally amended by Public Act 88-669 in violation of the single subject clause. The circuit court of Cook County granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and hold that Public Act 88-669 violates the single subject clause.

BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2002, defendants were charged by indictment with two counts of filing a fraudulent income tax return in violation of section 1301 (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 2002)). Count I charged that defendants had willfully filed a fraudulent Illinois income tax return for the year 1998. The indictment alleged that defendants listed $0 on the line for adjusted gross income when they knew that their adjusted gross income for 1998 was in excess of that amount. Count II charged that defendants had willfully filed a fraudulent Illinois income tax return for the year 1999. Count II charged that defendants listed $0 on the line for adjusted gross income when they knew that their adjusted gross income for 1999 was in excess of that amount.

As noted, defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments on the ground that Public Act 88-669, which amended the version of section 1301 at issue, was enacted in violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d)). Defendants argued that the provisions of Public Act 88-669 had no natural and logical connection to a single subject. Following argument, the circuit court, without stating the basis for its decision, entered an order granting defendants' motions to dismiss, discharging defendants, and releasing defendants from all conditions of their previous bonds.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State first argues that the defendants lack standing to challenge the Act based upon the single subject clause given the nine-year delay between the passage of Public Act 88-669 (the Act) on November 29, 1994, and defendants' challenge to the Act in October 2003. In support of its argument, the State cites this court's decision in Meister v. Carbaugh, 310 Ill. 486, 142 N.E. 189 (1923), and the appellate court's decision in Durjak v. Thompson, 144 Ill.App.3d 594, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589 (1986).

In Meister, the plaintiff sought a declaration that "`An act relating to civil service in park systems'" be declared unconstitutional and void and sought an injunction restraining the Civil Service Board of the South Park Commissioners from proceeding thereunder. Meister, 310 Ill. at 487, 142 N.E. 189. The plaintiff challenged the act on the ground that the act was passed in violation of section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 (Ill. Const.1870, art. IV, § 13), which required that "the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the vote is taken on its final passage." Meister, 310 Ill. at 487, 142 N.E. 189. The dispute concerned section 11 of the Park Civil Service Act, which contained exemptions. Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. A Senate amendment to section 11 of the bill provided for exemptions including "`All elective officers, the general superintendent, the attorneys, the chief of police and one confidential clerk or secretary.'" Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. A conference committee report recommended that the words "chief of police" be stricken from section 11. Meister, 310 Ill. at 487, 142 N.E. 189. However, the conference committee report was not printed in either house before the houses voted on the version of the bill that omitted the words "chief of police." Meister, 310 Ill. at 487, 142 N.E. 189.

In addressing the plaintiff's argument, this court noted that a material consideration of the two houses in enacting the law was the deletion of the words "chief of police." Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. Thus, if the constitutional objections were properly taken, this court could not hold section 11 constitutional, nor could section 11 of the act be held invalid and the remainder of the act sustained. Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. This court noted, however, that the act at issue had been passed by the General Assembly 12 years earlier and had been acted upon since that time. Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. In addition, the act had been amended by the General Assembly at a succeeding session and had constituted a part of the state's legislative policy for a number of years. Meister, 310 Ill. at 488, 142 N.E. 189. This court therefore concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest the validity of the act. Meister, 310 Ill. at 489, 142 N.E. 189.

In so holding, this court noted that the constitutional provision at issue had been adopted to prevent surprise in the enactment of legislation. Meister, 310 Ill. at 489, 142 N.E. 189. Although there had been no prior decisions upon the constitutionality of the act, the act had gone into operation and had been applied for substantially 12 years without contest. Meister, 310 Ill. at 489, 142 N.E. 189. This court stated that:

"We do not lay down a principle that constitutional provisions of this character regarding legislative procedure must be availed of promptly, but we do regard it as improper for us to upset, on a basis such as this, a law long applied without constitutional question. We are of the opinion that under facts such as these, parties seeking to contest the validity of a law have lost by some eleven or twelve years' delay any standing that they might otherwise have in this court." Meister, 310 Ill. at 489, 142 N.E. 189.

In Durjak, the plaintiff sought to challenge the procedure under which the Income Tax Act had been enacted. Durjak v. Thompson, 144 Ill.App.3d 594, 98 Ill. Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589 (1986). As in Meister, the plaintiff claimed that the Income Tax Act had not been enacted in accordance with section 13 of article IV of the 1870 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, § 13), which required that a bill be read at large on three different days in each house and that the bill and its amendments be printed before the vote on its final passage. Durjak, 144 Ill.App.3d at 595, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589. The circuit court denied plaintiff leave to file a complaint and the appellate court affirmed. Durjak, 144 Ill.App.3d at 595, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589.

The appellate court found that the Meister decision controlled. Durjak, 144 Ill. App.3d at 596, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589. The appellate court noted that the Illinois Income Tax Act had been enacted 16 years prior to plaintiff's challenge and had been repeatedly amended by the General Assembly since its original enactment. Durjak, 144 Ill.App.3d at 596-97, 98 Ill. Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589. As in Meister, the constitutional defect alleged was "simply that the bill and the amendments to it were not printed before the vote was taken on its final passage." Durjak, 144 Ill. App.3d at 597, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589. Moreover, the constitutionality of the Income Tax Act had been passed upon by the courts. Durjak, 144 Ill.App.3d at 597, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589. The appellate court therefore concluded that under the circumstances, the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain his constitutional challenge. Durjak, 144 Ill.App.3d at 597, 98 Ill.Dec. 467, 494 N.E.2d 589.

The State argues that the instant case presents the same situation and concerns as those present in Meister and Durjak. The State notes that Public Act 88-669 was enacted nine years prior to defendants' challenge to the Act. During that time, the provisions of the Act have been subsequently amended, and it is reasonable to presume that in the past nine years, the provisions of the Act had been relied upon by every branch of the Illinois government. The State argues that the constitutional challenge in this case is similar to the challenges in Meister and Durjak, because the challenge in this case is based upon the constitutional requirement for the passage of legislation rather than a substantive defect in the provisions of the statute. The single subject requirement is contained in the same subsection of the constitution as the printing requirement and is intended to ensure that legislation is not passed without adequate consideration by the legislature and to prevent passage of a bill containing unrelated subjects. The State maintains that Meister controls, so that the circuit court's order granting defendants' motions to dismiss must be reversed.

In response, defendants argue that the State...