People v. Oliver

• Decision Date: 26 April 1956
• Citation: 1 N.Y.2d 152,134 N.E.2d 197,151 N.Y.S.2d 367
• Parties: , 134 N.E.2d 197 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Louis OLIVER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 367

151 N.Y.S.2d 367

1 N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Louis OLIVER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 26, 1956.

Thomas Keogh, John J. Ryan and Joseph L. Maged, New York City, for appellant.

Daniel V. Sullivan, Dist. Atty., New York City (Albert A. Blinder and Walter E. Dillon, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

On April 3, 1945, defendant, then 14 years old, killed his two-year-old brother, and a week later he was indicted by the Grand Jury of Bronx County for murder in the first degree. He pleaded not guilty and shortly thereafter following a report from Bellevue Hospital that he was 'in such state of * * * insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge against him or the proceedings or of making his defense', Code Crim.Proc., § 662-b; Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1120-he was committed to Matteawan State Hospital, where he remained for more than nine years. At the end of that period, in October of 1954, he was found 'no longer * * * incapable of understanding the charge against him or of making his defense thereto', Code Crim.Proc., § 662-b, and some months later he was brought to trial upon the 1945 indictment.

From the confession which he made soon after the killing, as well as from ample supporting proof, it appears that defendant arose, shortly after midnight, from the couch on which he slept, obtained a butcher knife from the kitchen, removed his brother from his bed, 'laid him on the floor' and stabbed him several times in the chest and back; then carried the child to the bathroom, placed him in the tub, filled it with water and kept him immersed for 5 or 10 minutes; and then, after returning him to his bed, defendant set fire to the bedclothes. The deed done, he went back to his couch, remained a few minutes, got up again, went to a closet, packed his clothes in a suitcase with some idea of running away, went downstairs until the fire engines arrived and then proceeded to a police station where he told the officer on duty that he had stabbed and killed his brother. What he did, defendant stated, was prompted, not by any anger towards or dislike for his brother, but because he was 'mad' at his mother and wanted 'to get even' with her.

Defendant took the stand. He testified that, at the time of the homicide, he had beed living with his mother, his little brother, his sister, her husband and their child; that his father, whom he had never seen, was confined, as 'insane,' in Central Islip Hospital; that an aunt (a sister of his father) was an inmate of Rockland State Hospital, and that his sister, who had forced him to commit acts of sodomy with her, was committed to Pilgrim State Hospital while he was in Matteawan. He acknowledged that he had killed his brother in the manner described above, after first attempting to commit suicide by turning on the gas. He declared that he had heard voices which told him 'To set fire to the building and to kill * * * To kill the family' and then 'dismember the bodies'; he did not go through with that plan because he became 'panicky.'

In an attempt to show that defendant was insane at the time he committed the homicide, the defense called four psychiatrists, but only one of them addressed himself to the question rendered vital and operative by section 1120 of the Penal Law. It was the opinion of that psychiatrist, Dr. Kwalwasser, who had been designated by the court, that defendant knew neither the nature and quality of his act nor that it was wrong. Dr. Kaplan, the sole expert called by the District Attorney, expressed a contrary view. In addition to interposing the defense of insanity, defendant maintained that, by reason of section 486 of the Penal Law, he could not be tried for murder since he was but 14 years old when the homicide occurred. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment upon that ground, and the jury, returning a verdict of first degree murder, following a charge on the subject of insanity, necessarily found defendant sane.

We treat but one of the several points advanced by able and conscientious court-assigned defense counsel, since it is dispositive of the appeal, requiring as it does dismissal of the indictment. ¹

Section 486 of the Penal Law was amended in 1948, L.1948, ch. 544. Before that amendment, a child over 7 and under 16 could be prosecuted for murder or any other crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. Penal Law, §§ 486, 2186; see People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220; People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88. After the amendment, a child under the age of 15 may be subjected only to treatment as a 'delinquent' and not to punishment as a criminal. In other words, the effect of the modification is that no child of 14 or less may be charged with or prosecuted for any crime, even though it be punishable by death. (See, also, Penal Law, § 2186, as amended by L.1949, ch. 388.)

To be somewhat more specific, section 486 dealt and deals with the treatment of children found to be 'neglected' or 'delinquent.' It provided and provides that any child so denominated is to be brought before the court for commitment to a charitable reformatory or other institution. And, though the definition of a 'neglected' child was not changed by the amendment, the definition of a 'delinquent' child was; prior to 1948, it included any child over 7 and under 16 who committed any act which, if perpetrated by an adult, would be a crime, 'not punishable by death or life imprisonment'. The Legislature removed those quoted words and substituted in their place an exception existing 'any child fifteen years of age who commits an act which if committed by an adult would be punishable by death or life imprisonment'. As a result of the amendment, the relevant portion of section 486 reads in this way:

'Any child actually or apparently under the age of sixteen years who is found:

'1. To be neglected; or,

'2. To be delinquent; or,

'3. * * *

'Must be brought before a proper court which, unless other disposition shall be made of the case as provided by law, may commit the child to any incorporated charitable reformatory, or other institution, and when practicable, to such as is governed by persons of the same religious faith as the parents of the child.

'The word 'delinquent' shall include any child over seven and under sixteen years of age (a) who violates any law of this state or of the United States or any municipal ordinance or who commits any act which if committed by an adult would be a crime, except any child fifteen years of age who commits an act which if committed by an adult would be punishable by death or life imprisonment'.

unless an order removing the action to the children's court is made pursuant to certain specified sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Italics indicate matter added by amendment.) ² As already noted, the effect of the amendment was to prevent the State from prosecuting a child under 15 for any act which he may have committed; he was to be treated, for misconduct no matter how egregious, as a delinquent and not punished as a criminal. Cf. State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21.

When he signed the bill effecting this amendment, as well as several other related and implementing bills, Governor Dewey issued a memorandum in which he declared (Public Papers of Governor Dewey (1948), pp. 225-226):

'These five measures bring about a major advance in our legal concepts of crime and of juvenile delinquency. By redefinition they bring to an end the classification of any child under the age of 15 as a criminal.

'It is a shocking thought that under our criminal statutes a child of 7 may be guilty of crime and conceivably could be electrocuted for the crime of murder. Of course, no enlightened community would permit such a situation to occur. * * * The time is well overdue to state in the law in no uncertain terms that a child under the age of 15 has no criminal responsibility irrespective of the act involved.

'It is particularly gratifying to me that we in the State of New York are making this important advance in our laws, an advance which recognizes and proclaims the dignity of human beings, in a period in which it is frequently difficult to separate the institutions of barbarism from those of civilization.'

We must decide, of course, whether the 1948 amendment, removing the acts of children under 15 from the category of crimes, should be read to apply to the act of this defendant, committed before its enactment, when he was only 14 years old.

The general rule is clear. Statutes dealing with matters other than procedure are not to be applied retroactively absent a plainly manifested legislative intent to that effect. See, e. g., Garzo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 522, 104 N.E.2d 882, 885; Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180, 188, 61 N.E.2d 435, 438, 159 A.L.R. 971; Addiss v. Selig, 264 N.Y. 274, 281, 190 N.E. 490, 492, 92 A.L.R. 1384; Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 240, 111 N.E. 837, 838. The rule recognizes that people guide their affairs in the light of existing laws and that it would be unfair to defeat the expectations, rights and liabilities arising under those laws by subsequent retroactive changes. Particularly in the area of criminal law, statutes which condemn an act innocent when done, or increase the punishment for previously committed crimes, have always been regarded as oppressive and prohibited, as ex post facto laws, by the Federal Constitution. U.S.Const., art. I, § 10; see, e. g., People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 454-455, 9 N.E.2d 46, 48-49; People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 490-491, 35 N.E. 951, 952, 23 L.R.A. 830; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648.

On the other hand, when a criminal statute is repealed or a penalty reduced, different considerations are involved. In such a case, there is no problem of preserving private rights...