People v. Olson

Decision Date23 February 1965
Docket NumberCr. 143-,143-B
Citation232 Cal.App.2d 480,42 Cal.Rptr. 760
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Allan T. OLSON and Ben G. Petrucci, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attys. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., by Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for appellant.

Bradford, Cross, Dahl & Hefner, by Archie Hefner and Ted W. Isles, Sacramento, for respondents.

CONLEY, Presiding Justice.

Invoking the provisions of the statutes of limitation, the trial judge sustained the motion of defendants, Allan T. Olson and Ben G. Petrucci, to set aside the indictments in 5 Criminal 143-A (Sacramento No. 27045), charging them in Count I with conspiracy to offer for filing a false instrument, to wit: a bid for a garbage franchise, and in Count II the violation of section 115 of the Penal Code by procuring and offering the same bid for filing, and in 5 Criminal 143-B (Sacramento No. 27046), charging conspiracy to pervert or obstruct the due administration of the laws (Pen.Code, §§ 182, subd. 5). Originally, the indictments also named Ralph Scovel as a defendant, but upon his death the charges were dismissed as to him upon motion of the district attorney. The sole ground of the ruling in each case was that all offenses charged were barred by the three-year statute of limitations (Pen.Code, § 800). There were separate appeals, which were consolidated for hearing by order of this court.

The defendants have filed a voluminous brief consisting of some 257 printed pages, interlarded with a whole library-load of authorities on numerous points, including constitutional arguments; however, if the simple reason for the rulings advanced by the trial judge is justified, all of the other points urged by defendants would be rendered irrelevant to a decision.

Although the appeal in 5 Criminal 143-A covers both counts in the indictment, the Attorney General's office conceded in its brief and on the oral argument that the trial judge was correct in his ruling on the first count because nothing is legitimately alleged in it which did not occur more than three years prior to the offense alleged in the indictment. We need not, therefore, consider the first count; but there is left Count II in which the People claim the statute of limitations does not bar the charge. It alleges:

'* * * That on the 13th day of November, A.D. 1957, at the County of Sacramento, in the State of California, the said BEN G. PETRUCCI did then and there wilfully and unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly procure or offer a false instrument, to wit, a bid for a garbage franchise, to be filed or registered or recorded in a public office, to wit, the office of the Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County, which instrument if genuine could have been filed or registered or recorded under the law of this state; that the ALLAN T. OLSON and RALPH SCOVEL then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously aided and abetted in the commission of said offense; * * *'

The instrument itself shows that more than three years have elapsed, the indictment having been presented on the 10th day of June, 1963, unless the provisions of section 799 of the Penal Code preserve the right to prosecute the criminal charge. That section reads as follows:

'There is no limitation of time within which a prosecution for murder, the embezzlement of public moneys, and the falsification of public records must be commenced. Prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time after the death of the person killed, and for the embezzlement of public money or the falsification of public records, at any time after the discovery of the crime.' (Emphasis added.)

The Attorney General claims that the defendants are accused of 'the falsification of public records,' and that there is, consequently, no limitation of time to bar that particular charge. If, on the contrary, the defendants are not thereby accused of the 'falsification of public records,' as that term is used in section 799 of the Penal Code, it would be conceded that the statute of limitations bars the prosecution.

In the year 1956, M. D. Tarshes, the County Executive of Sacramento County, and members of his staff discussed the possibility of changing from a system of permits for the collection of garbage in the area outside the City of Sacramento to the establishment of an exclusive franchise system purusant to the provisions of section 4201 of the Health and Safety Code. A favorable recommendation was made to the board of supervisors by Tarshes and A. L. Kiefer, County Director of Public Works; the area involved was divided into two parts, one, north of the American River and the other south of that river. Several companies had been operating in the areas involved under permits. North Area Garbage and Rubbish Service (hereafter, for convenience, called North Area) was the largest north of the river; it had ten partners and the organization had been charging $1.25 a month for standard residential garbage pick-ups. On August 21, 1957, the supervisors decided to invite separate bids for the two proposed franchise areas and, accordingly, a notice to bidders was issued. Kiefer prepared the bid forms; all persons intending to use them were required to sign for them.

Defendants, Olson and Petrucci, had become interested in a Danish garbage composting process and had formed Dano of Sacramento in April of 1956. Petrucci had headed a bone meal company known as By-Dry Feed Products; Olson was a general contractor, who operated Brighton Sand & Gravel Company. About October 1, 1956, Dr. Ralph Scovel became interested in the venture; he had been a physician in San Francisco, but later moved to Sacramento, saying that his interest was 'anemotional one on the basis of this Dano process of composting garbage'; Dr. Scovel had received a bacteriological and scientific education and had been a chemist at one time; in his testimony before the grand jury, he stated that he felt that through returning the Dano compost to the soil, farm lands could be improved. In order to make the Dano system work successfully, it was necessary to have a constant supply of garbage. In 1957, Dano of Sacramento merged with Dano of America; Scovel became president, Petrucci, vice-president and general manager, and Olson, secretary. Neither Scovel, nor Petrucci, nor Olson had had any experience in collecting garbage.

The next scene in the drama occurred when NAWDSCO (North American Waste Disposal Service Company) was formed. This partnership was composed of Olson, Petrucci, and Scovel, and, although it was probably not known outside of the partnership, Joseph Arbini was also a partner. In the words of Dr. Scovel as a witness at the grand jury inquiry, Arbini 'wore two hats' as he was then, also, the managing partner of North Area. NAWDSCO persuaded North Area to haul and collect the garbage if NAWDSCO should be successful in its bid for a county franchise; North Area was to get $1.10 per month for weekly 30-gallon residential pick-ups of garbage; this amount was cut by a later agreement to $1.00, and raised afterwards to $1.05. North Area did not bid for the franchise itself, being resigned to function as subcontractor. Three companies did in fact put in bids for one or the other of the franchises on November 13, 1957. As to the franchise in the northern part of the county, there was a bid by NAWDSCO of $1.60 and a putative bid of $1.75 by Estes Service Company of Colorado.

The record shows that Mr. Estes was from Texas and that he had come to Sacramento at the request of Loren Monroe, whose wife was a partner in North Area. Estes was undoubtedly a big garbage man. The Monroes had hoped that he would file an honest competitive bid and that they could form an operating company with him. It did not work out that way, however; Estes testified that he decided not to bid after he met Petrucci, Olson, Scovel, and Arbini and that, while he left Sacramento before the actual opening of the bids, he had, at the suggestion of Petrucci, signed two bids in blank leaving them with Petrucci to fill out as he pleased.

NAWDSCO prepared for itself forms of tow bids for each area, one for $160 and one for $1.40; these were all signed by Olson. On November 13, Petrucci took the bids with him to the board of supervisors' quarters and, seeing that no previously unknown bidder intended to compete, he filed the two for $1.60. NAWDSCO was awarded the franchise for the northern area on January 6, 1958; its competitor in the southern area was awarded a franchise at the lower figure of $1.25 per standard can.

Each of the partners in NAWDSCO invested only $1,000 to provide capital for its operations; they used land owned by Olson as a dump site; they effectuated the agreement with North Area to use their equipment and staff to collect and dispose of the garbage at $1.05 per can; and they used the Dano plant to take care of a relatively small part of the garbage collected by North Area. The franchise was to run for fifteen years with the right of review as to rates reserved to the supervisors after three years. The evidence shows that NAWDSCO made tremendous profits and that no rate review was instituted immediately after the expiration of the three-year period.

The evidence shows that when Estes, as he testified, had made up his mind that the NAWDSCO people were sure to be awarded their bid, he acceded to the request of Petrucci to sign two bids in blank and to let the NAWDSCO people fill the blanks in these putative bids in any way they pleased. These bids were actually filled out by one or more of the alleged conspirators, and their filing created good 'window-dressing' for the award of the franchise to Olson, Petrucci and their associates. With only these two bids for the northern area franchise, it appeared that...

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