People v. Olsson
| Citation | 56 Mich.App. 500,224 N.W.2d 691 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 13903,No. 3,3 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralf Berne Roland OLSSON, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
James R. Neuhard, State App. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Eugene C. Penzien, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before T. M. BURNS, P.J., and V. J. BRENNAN and BASHARA, JJ.
Defendant Ralf Berne Roland Olsson was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and now appeals as of right.
On June 14, 1971, an information was filed alleging that the defendant 'did willfully, deliberately and premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought and during the perpetration of a larceny or robbery murder Per Torolf Baevre * * *'. Mr. Baevre was fatally stabbed in his cabin aboard the Norwegian merchant ship 'Bolinas' while the vessel was docked in the Saginaw River at Bay City, Michigan, on May 16, 1971.
Defendant was a second cook on the 'Bolinas'. Evidence presented at trial showed that defendant was angry with the victim due to the fact that the crew had complained to defendant about meals, rather than complaining to the victim, who was the steward under whom defendant worked. Defendant had told the crew that there was no variation in the meals because the victim would not give the defendant the proper materials to work with.
The record also reveals that after the victim's body was discovered and the police were notified, the police searched the cabin for the victim's wallet, money and identification papers, but all of these personal effects were missing. The police also attempted to locate the defendant, but he did not report for work that morning, and his whereabouts were unknown.
Defendant testified that he never had any personal trouble with the victim. Defendant further testified that during the period in question he suffered an 'alcoholic blackout' due to excessive drinking and stated that he did not know if he killed the victim because he could not remember what he did on the night in question.
Although defendant has raised numerous issues in this Court we think it necessary to deal with four which will be treated in the manner presented below.
Defendant first asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove murder in the first degree.
The information in this case charged defendant with both statutory first-degree murder and with felony-murder, all in one count. Defendant's argument that the prosecution failed to prove premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the charge of statutory first-degree murder is not well taken.
The elements of premeditation and deliberation may be reasonably inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding a homicide. People v. Vail, 49 Mich.App. 578, 212 N.W.2d 268 (1973); People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971). It is only where there is no evidence presented from which the jury could properly infer the presence of premeditation and deliberation that it is error for the trial court to submit a charge of first-degree murder to the jury. People v. Meier, 47 Mich.App. 179, 209 N.W.2d 311 (1973). After carefully reviewing the records in the present case, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution from which the jury could have properly inferred the existence of premeditation and deliberation. Consequently, the trial court did not err by submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury on the question of premeditation and deliberation.
However, defendant is correct in his contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict of first-degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery or larceny. An essential requirement in a first-degree murder prosecution under the felony-murder theory is proof of one of the independent felonies listed in the statute. The two felonies listed in the information in the case at bar were larceny and robbery. However, the prosecution presented no evidence to show, even by inference, that the defendant was guilty of a felony other than the killing. The evidence presented at the trial only showed that the victim's money, wallet, identification and personal effects were missing from his cabin. None of these items were found in defendant's possession when he was arrested, nor were they discovered in his room aboard the ship. Nor did the prosecution introduce any other evidence to prove that the defendant had committed either a robbery or a larceny. We conclude that there was not sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution from which the jury could properly have inferred that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of a robbery or larceny. Therefore, the trial court erred by submitting the felony-murder charge to the jury.
Defendant's second claim or error is directly related to the issue already discussed. Defendant contends that the jury's verdict of 'guilty in the first degree' was invalid where the jury was charged on alternative theories and did not indicate upon which theory it relied for its verdict.
As previously stated, the information in this case charged defendant, in a single count, with statutory first-degree murder and with felony murder. The jury, in its verdict, simply stated that 'we find the defendant guilty in the first degree.' It is impossible to determine from this verdict whether the jury relied upon the statutory first-degree murder charge involving premeditation and deliberation, or upon the felony-murder charge, or both.
Since, as we have stated, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction of murder committed in the perpetration of a larceny or robbery due to the fact that there was not adequate proof of one of the independent felonies, we cannot conclusively state that the jury did not convict defendant of that charge. This conclusion entitles defendant to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
Defendant's next related claim is that the trial court's instructions failed to inform the jury of their obligation to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of...
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People v. Ramsey
...not find premeditation and deliberation, agree that the murder was committed in the perpetration of a felony. See People v. Olsson, 56 Mich.App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691 (1974), lv. den. 394 Mich. 772 (1975).43 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 443 N.E.2d 386 (1982) (special q......
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State v. Williams
...122 Mont. 377, 384-85, 204 P.2d 792, 796 (1949); People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 127-30, 65 N.E. 989, 990 (1903). People v. Olsson, 56 Mich.App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691 (1974), cited by defendant in support of his position, is simply not Reversal cannot be predicated on this ground. X. Ineffe......
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James v. People, 84SC399
...(5th Cir.1963); Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Ky.1980) (insufficiency of evidence on one count); State v. Olsson, 56 Mich.App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1974) (insufficiency of evidence on one count); State v. Batson, 339 Mo. 298, 96 S.W.2d 384, 390-91 (1936); State v. Green......
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Coleman v. State, 81-115
...v. Golliday (1979), 78 Wash.2d 121, 137, 470 P.2d 191, 201; People v. Embree (1976), 68 Mich.App. 40, 241 N.W.2d 733; People v. Olsson (1974), 56 Mich.App. 500, 507, 224 N.E.2d 691, In Olsson, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a conviction because jury instructions failed to distinguis......