People v. One 1953 Buick 2-Door

• Decision Date: 26 February 1962
• Docket Number: L,No. DAT,No. V1502695,V1502695,DAT
• Citation: 369 P.2d 16,57 Cal.2d 358,19 Cal.Rptr. 488
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 369 P.2d 16 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1953 BUICK 2-DOOR, Engineicense725, Defendant, Commercial Credit Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. S. F. 20936.

Page 488

19 Cal.Rptr. 488

57 Cal.2d 358, 369 P.2d 16

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1953 BUICK 2-DOOR, Engine No. V1502695, License No. DAT 725, Defendant Commercial Credit Corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

S. F. 20936.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 26, 1962.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., John S. McInerny and Joseph I. Kelly, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Partridge, O'Connell, Partridge & Fall and Wallace O'Connell, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

DOOLING, Justice.

The State appeals from a judgment releasing a 1953 Buick automobile to Commercial mercial Credit Corporation, the legal owner, pursuant to its lien asserted in a forfeiture proceeding brought by the State. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11610-11629.)

The statutes authorizing the State to institute forfeiture proceedings relative to a vehicle used to unlawfully transport narcotics were materially revised by the Legislature at its 1959 session. (Stats.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4816.) These enactments became effective after the date of the seizure of the subject automobile but before the present forfeiture proceeding was commenced. The sole question to be determined is whether the former or the amended code provisions govern the disposition of this proceeding.

The appeal is presented on a settled statement of facts. On July 31, 1959, Commercial Credit Corporation, hereinafter called defendant, became the legal owner of the subject automobile through purchase of a conditional sales contract. On September 7 the automobile was used to unlawfully transport narcotics (Health & Saf.Code, § 11610) and was seized by the State (Health & Saf.Code, § 11611). On September 18, 1959, certain amendments and repeals, hereinafter described, of provisions of article 1 ('Forfeiture of Vehicles'), chapter 7, division 10 of the Health and Safety Code became effective. On October 9 the State commenced the present proceeding and notified defendant of the seizure and intended forfeiture of the automobile (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11612, 11613). Defendant filed an answer asserting its lien and the matter was set for hearing.

The relevant statutory changes made by the Legislature at its regular 1959 session were as follows: Prior to that time section 11620 of the Health and Safety Code provided in material part that '(t)he claimant of any right, title or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract to be bona fide and that his right, title, or interest was created after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser, and without any knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged (i. e., unlawful transportation of a narcotic) * * *.' Section 11620 was repealed in its entirety, effective September 18, 1959 (Stats.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4817, § 5). At the same time and effective the same date the following italicized language was added to section 11614: 'Within 20 days after the mailing or publication of the notice (of seizure and intended forfeiture), any owner of any right, title, or interest in, or lien upon, a seized vehicle may file a verified answer to the fact of the use of the vehicle alleged in the notice of seizure and of the intended forfeiture proceeding; and any legal owner, holding a bona fide lien, mortgage or conditional sales contract may file a verified answer to the facts set forth in the notice and setting forth, if such be the fact, that his lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract was acquired without actual knowledge that the vehicle was to be used for the purposes referred to in Section 11610 (unlawful transportation of a narcotic).' (As amended Stats.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4816, § 3.) And the following italicized language was added to section 11619: ¹ 'At the hearing, any owner who has a verified answer on file may show by competent evidence that the vehicle was not used to transport narcotics, or that narcotics were not unlawfully possessed by an occupant of the vehicle, and any legal owner holding a bona fide lien, mortgage or conditional sales contract may show that he acquired his interest without actual knowledge that the vehicle was to be used for the purposes referred to in Section 11610.' (As amended Stats.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4816, § 4.) Similarly section 11622 was amended to provide in relevant part that '(i)f the court finds * * * that the legal owner holding a bona fide lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract acquired his interest without actual knowledge that the vehicle was to be used for the purposes referred to in Section 11610 and if the amount due him is equal to, or in excess of, the appraised value of the vehicle, the court shall order the vehicle released to such legal owner.' (As amended Stats.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4817, § 7.)

The trial court found that defendant's investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the purchaser was inadequate under the law as it stood prior to September 18, 1959, but that defendant was a bona fide lienholder, having acquired its interest without actual knowledge of the vehicle's intended unlawful use. Applying the law as it stood at the time of the hearing and on the date of entering judgment (i. e., § 11619 as amended, supra), the court ordered a forfeiture of the automobile to the State 'subject to a lien thereon in favor of (defendant), legal owner thereof. * * *' Since the lien exceeded the value of the vehicle, the court vested defendant with all interest in the automobile and ordered it delivered to defendant.

The only question presented on appeal is whether as the State contends, the statutory law to be applied is that in effect when the offense which is the basis of the claim of forfeiture occurred or, as the trial court held, the law to be applied is the statutory law in effect at the time that judgment was entered. We are satisfied that the trial court was correct in applying the law in effect at the time of entry of judgment.

The governing rule was stated in Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 659, 671, 102 P.2d 387, 393, i. e., that 'it has been held in a long line of cases that the repeal of a statute creating a penalty, running either to an individual or the state, at any time before final judgment, extinguishes the right to recover the penalty.' (Penziner v. West American Finance Co., 10 Cal.2d 160, 170, 74 P.2d 252; Meriwether Invest. Co., Ltd. v. Lampton, 4 Cal.2d 697, 707, 53 P.2d 147; Ball v. Tolman, 135 Cal. 375, 379-380, 67 P. 339; Anderson v. Byrnes, 122 Cal. 272, 274-275, 54 P. 821; Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303, 305-306, 35 P. 869; Department of Social Welfare v. Wingo, 77 Cal.App.2d 316, 320-321, 175 P.2d 262.) As further pointed out in Lemon, supra, 38 Cal.App.2d at page 670, 102 P.2d at page 392, a forfeiture of this nature 'is a penalty to induce performance of (a) duty,' and its penal character being obvious, the repeal of the statute authorizing the forfeiture extinguishes the right of forfeiture.

This case furnishes an excellent example of the wisdom of the rule above stated. The statutory requirement that every prospective lien claimant make 'a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser' first appeared in the forfeiture provisions in 1933. (Stats.1933, ch. 253, pp. 788-789, § 13.) After some 25 years' experience with a law the purpose of which, it has been said, was 'to require one who finances the purchase of an automobile to aid in the prevention of crime' (People v. One 1957 Ford 2 Door Sedan, 160 Cal.App.2d 797, 801, 325 P.2d 676, 678; see also People v. One 1940 Ford V 8 Coupe, 36 Cal.2d 471, 475, 477, 224 P.2d 677), the Legislature in 1959 repealed in its entirety this law prescribing the prior investigation of the purchaser. This was not only a change in the 'terms and conditions' of forfeiture but was also a substantial reversal of legislative policy and represented the adoption of an entirely new philosophy relative to the rights of a bona fide lienholder in a forfeited vehicle. That philosophy was expressed not only in the repeal of section 11620 of the Health and Safety Code but also in the above quoted amendments of sections 11614, 11619 and 11622, expressly authorizing such lienholder to defend against the forfeiture of his interest by showing that he acquired that interest 'without actual knowledge that the vehicle was to be used for' the unlawful transportation of narcotics. Concurrent with these changes articulating a new legislative policy in these forfeiture laws, the Legislature significantly amended section 11610 which, prior to 1959, provided '(a) vehicle used to unlawfully transport * * * any narcotic * * * shall be forfeited to the State,' to read '(t)he interest of any registered owner of a vehicle used to unlawfully transport * * * any narcotic * * * shall be forfeited to the State.' (Emphasis added; States.1959, ch. 2085, p. 4816, § 1.) Such material amendments may fairly be said to be 'most important and substantial, so important and substantial * * * that, so far as defendant's rights are concerned,' a repeal was effected. (Anderson v. Byrnes, supra, 122 Cal. 272, 274, 54 P. 821.)

It is thus clear that it is the present legislative conclusion that public policy does not require the forfeiture of a legal owner's interest in a vehicle used for the transportation of narcotics where such owner has failed to make an investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the purchaser. Since the only purpose of this condition of forfeiture was to induce the legal owner to make such investigation, and since the Legislature has now determined that public policy does not require such an investigation to be made, it is difficult to conceive any public purpose which could be served at this date by forfeiting the legal owner's interest in the automobile for...