People v. One 1960 Mercedes Benz Roadster

• Decision Date: 16 January 1963
• Docket Number: No. 121042-10-017244,No. UJT,L,121042-10-017244,UJT
• Citation: 27 Cal.Rptr. 617,211 Cal.App.2d 842
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ONE 1963 MERCEDES BENZ ROADSTER, Engineicense075, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 20603.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 617

27 Cal.Rptr. 617

211 Cal.App.2d 842

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ONE 1963 MERCEDES BENZ ROADSTER, Engine No. 121042-10-017244, License No. UJT 075, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 20603.

District Court of Appeal, First District Division 2, California.

Jan. 16, 1963.

Hearing Denied March 13, 1963.

Reynold H. Colvin, James A. Blumberg, San Francisco, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., John S. McInerny, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

AGEE, Justice.

On June 9, 1961, the defendant motor vehicle was used unlawfully to transport narcotics. Such use was without the knowledge of its owner, Carfagni. One Santiago, who was on parole for a narcotics offense and was living in Carfagni's home, was using the vehicle with the express permission of the latter. Santiago and an accomplice held up a pharmacy and Santiago drove away in the vehicle with cash and narcotics obtained in the holdup. Forfeiture proceedings resulted in a judgment being entered on November 13, 1961, forfeiting said vehicle to the State of California. Carfagni appeals from the judgment

The sole contention on appeal is that the forfeiture statute (Health & Saf. Code §§ 11610-11629), in particular sections 11621 and 11622, is unconstitutional as being in violation of the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 13 and 21, of the Constitution of the State of California.

The gravamen of the argument is that the statute unreasonably discriminates between the registered owner of a vehicle and one who merely holds a security interest, in that the latter is not held to account for the strict penalties exacted therein of an owner.

Section 11610 provides that the interest of any registered owner of a vehicle used to unlawfully transport any narcotic shall be forfeited to the State. Section 11621 and 11622 exempt lienholders from forfeiture of their right, title and interest in seized vehicles, and provide for restoration of such vehicles to them under certain conditions.

The Legislature has thus classified owners of automobiles for purposes of forfeiture into two different categories, (1) registered owners and (2) legal owners holding a bona fide lien.

Appellant states: 'There is no doubt that control of the evil of narcotics traffic is a proper subject for the Legislature. It is one on which it can validly exercise its police powers to preserve the health, safety and good order of society.' But, continues appellant, 'there remains the principal issue here of the propriety and reasonableness of the classification, * * *.' And, adds appellant, 'any classification must be reasonable.' We agree with these principles, but we disagree with appellant's premise that the distinction made between registered owners and lienholders bears no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statutes, which both parties agree is the curtailment of narcotics traffic generally. (People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck (1945) 26 Cal.2d 503, 507-508, 159 P.2d 641.)

It seems obvious to us that a reasonable construction of the statutes is that their purpose is to hamper narcotics traffic by striking at the source of its mobility. The intent of the Legislature apparently was to place the burden of responsibility on the person who controls the vehicle, so that he becomes the prime responsible entity in the event that his vehicle is used for the transportation of narcotics, his own lack of knowledge of same notwithstanding. If the idea of control is truly the key to the Legislature's campaign...