People v. One 1998 GMC

Decision Date30 December 2011
Docket NumberNo. 110236.,110236.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. ONE 1998 GMC et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Robert Berlin, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Donald J. Ramsell, of Wheaton, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[355 Ill.Dec. 902] ¶ 1 The issue presented in this case is whether the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/36–1 through 36–4 (West 2006)) are facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process because they do not include a provision requiring a prompt, probable cause hearing after the seizure of a vehicle. We find that the forfeiture proceeding itself provides all the process that is due in such cases, and therefore find no constitutional defect in the statute.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This case involves an appeal from three vehicle forfeiture proceedings brought by the State in the circuit court of Du Page County. The same attorney represented the claimants who sought return of their vehicles in all three cases. In No. 07–MR–1126, Wheaton police seized a 1998 GMC on July 24, 2007. The Du Page County sheriff was notified of the seizure on August 3, 2007, and the sheriff in turn sent notice by certified mail on August 7, 2007, to all persons having an interest in the vehicle. On August 15, 2007, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture of the vehicle, stating that the owners were George Reardon and Reardon Painting, which both had the same address in Winfield, Illinois. The complaint also listed the vehicle identification number (VIN) and alleged that George Reardon used the 1998 GMC prior to the seizure to commit the offense of driving while license revoked or suspended (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2006)), at a time when his driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle was suspended or revoked for a violation of either section 11–501.1 or 11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance.1 The day before the forfeiture complaint was filed, a grand jury indicted George Reardon in Du Page County on two felony charges based on his conduct prior to the seizure: aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DUI) and driving while license revoked (DWLR) ( 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d) (West 2006)). As required by statute, the State sent notice of the filing of the forfeiture complaint by certified mail on August 16, 2007. The notice informed the owners that they had 20 days from the mailing of the notice to file a verified answer if they wished to contest the action. See 720 ILCS 5/36–2(a) (West 2006).

¶ 4 George Reardon did not contest the State's complaint within the 20–day period, but Linda Reardon, secretary of Reardon Painting, Inc., filed a timely, verified answer on September 6, 2007. Thereafter, Linda's attorney sought and was granted continuances in the case on December 12, 2007, and January 17, 2008. On May 13, 2008, the case was again continued on Linda's motion, this time until August 1, 2008, to “track the underlying criminal case.” On August 1, 2008, the court again continued the case at Linda's request, but in this instance it was to allow her to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2006)) and to allow the parties time to brief the issues that would arise from her motion. On September 11, 2008, a section 2–619 motion to dismiss was filed, listing George Reardon as the claimant and arguing that the forfeiture provisions of the Code were unconstitutional. The case was set for a hearing to be held October 15, 2008, but further delay resulted from the court giving Linda Reardon's attorney time to file amended pleadings. Then, on November 10, 2008, an amended motion was filed listing George Reardon, Linda Reardon, and Reardon Painting, Inc.,” as claimants. The text of the amended motion, however, stated that the claimant herein is Linda Reardon and Reardon Painting, Inc. The trial court heard argument on the motion on February 18, 2009, and March 24, 2009. The court ordered that the amended motion itself be “amended to reflect that the claimant's name is Linda Reardon, Secretary of Reardon Painting Inc.,’ and not George Reardon.” On March 30, 2009, the court ordered additional briefing, with which the parties complied. Multiple hearings were then held and the case was consolidated for a ruling with the other two cases discussed below.

¶ 5 In No. 08–MR–1320, Carol Stream police seized a 1996 Chevrolet on August 8, 2008, and notified the Du Page County sheriff of the seizure on August 18, 2008. The sheriff then sent notice of the seizure to all persons having an interest in the vehicle. On August 28, 2008, the State filed a two-count complaint seeking forfeiture of the 1996 Chevrolet, listing Michael S. Adams, Jessica S. Adams, and PGL CC Employees Credit Union as the owners or parties of interest in the vehicle. The complaint also set forth the vehicle's VIN. Count I alleged that prior to the seizure on August 8, 2008, the vehicle was used in the commission of the offense of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11–501(d)(1)(A) (West 2006)), “in that the vehicle was operated by Michael S. Adams while under the influence of alcohol, the defendant having at least two prior violations of driving under the influence,” in violation of section 11–501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance. Count II alleged that prior to the seizure on August 8, 2008, the vehicle was used in the commission of the offense of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11–501(d)(1)(H) (West 2006)), in that the vehicle was operated by Michael Adams when he knew or should have known that the vehicle he was driving was not covered by a liability insurance policy. Michael Adams was also indicted by a Du Page County grand jury of two counts of aggravated DUI stemming from the incident.

¶ 6 The State sent the statutory notice of the filing of the forfeiture complaint on September 4, 2008, to the three potential interest holders. On September 24, 2008, Michael Adams filed a verified answer to the complaint. The answer did not challenge the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute. However, about two months later, on December 30, 2008, Michael filed a motion seeking to declare the statute unconstitutional and return of the seized 1996 Chevrolet. Thereafter, additional briefing was requested, and as noted previously, the case was eventually consolidated with the other two for a ruling on the constitutional challenge.

¶ 7 In No. 08–MR–1614, the Illinois State police seized a 2002 Chevrolet in Du Page County on October 4, 2008. The Du Page County sheriff was notified of the seizure on October 8, 2008, and certified mail notice of the seizure was sent to all persons having an interest in the seizure on that same date. On October 14, 2008, the State filed a two-count forfeiture complaint against the 2002 Chevrolet, listing the VIN and stating that the owners or parties of interest were Robert K. Messina, Mary Jo Messina and Wells Fargo Auto Finance. Count I alleged that prior to the seizure, the vehicle was used in the commission of the offense of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11–501(d)(1)(A) (West 2006)), in that the vehicle was operated by Robert Messina while under the influence of alcohol, at a time when he had at least two prior violations for DUI in violation of section 11–501 of the Vehicle Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance. Count II alleged that prior to the seizure, the vehicle was used in the commission of the offense of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11–501(d)(1)(H) (West 2006)), in that the vehicle was operated by Robert Messina while under the influence of alcohol at a time when he knew or should have known that the vehicle he was driving was not covered by a liability insurance policy. A Du Page County grand jury eventually indicted Robert Messina on two counts of aggravated DUI based on the event. On October 14, 2008, the State sent the required certified mail notice of the forfeiture complaint to the three interest holders. On October 21, 2008, Robert Messina filed a verified answer. The answer did not challenge the constitutionality of the Act. But in January 2009, Robert filed a motion to declare the vehicle forfeiture provisions of the Code unconstitutional. Further briefing was ordered and, again, the case was consolidated with the others for a ruling.

¶ 8 The trial court rendered a written decision on the consolidated case on November 17, 2009. The court found that the statutory forfeiture provisions were facially unconstitutional, determining that they violated the due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The court applied the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and relied heavily upon United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), and Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Dist.2002), to rule that due process required that the statute contain a provision for a prompt, probable cause hearing postseizure to allow claimants to test the State's right to retain their vehicles while they await trial on the merits of the forfeiture action. The court also found that due process required that the State assume the burden of proof at the probable cause hearing to “demonstrate the non-criminally charged owner's ‘guilt’ to justify holding the vehicle in the first place.” Finally, the court determined that the appropriate remedy here was to dismiss each of the forfeiture complaints with prejudice....

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