People v. Orange
| Decision Date | 22 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 75786,75786 |
| Citation | 213 Ill.Dec. 589,168 Ill.2d 138,659 N.E.2d 935 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 213 Ill.Dec. 589 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Leroy ORANGE, Appellant. |
Thomas F. Geraghty, Chicago (Arthur S. Freeman, of counsel), and Steven Wernikoff, Kelly Cassidy, David Doyle, Amy Bauman, Angela M. Coin, Thomas P. Swigert and Rod Floro, law students, for appellant.
Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney, Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Joan F. Frazier, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Defendant, Leroy Orange, was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County on charges of murder, concealment of a homicidal death, and aggravated arson. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial for purposes of a death penalty hearing, and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's murder and concealment convictions and death sentence, but reversed the arson conviction. (People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69.) The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Orange v. Illinois (1988), 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 247, 102 L.Ed.2d 235.
Seeking post-conviction relief, defendant filed a pro se petition (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.) in the circuit court of Cook County. With assistance of appointed counsel, the defendant then filed an amended post-conviction petition, seeking reversal of his conviction and a new trial. After hearing arguments on the State's motion to dismiss, the post-conviction judge dismissed the petition without evidentiary hearing. Because the defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying convictions, he appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a).
This court's prior opinion in this case contains a detailed recitation of the facts. (People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69.) We repeat only those facts pertinent to the issues in the post-conviction petition.
On January 12, 1984, police responded to a report of a fire in a Chicago apartment building, and discovered the bodies of three adults--Renee Coleman, Michelle Jointer, Ricardo Pedro--and a child, Anthony Coleman. All four victims had been repeatedly stabbed, and the coroner believed that they died from the stab wounds. Defendant, an acquaintance of the victims, and defendant's half-brother, Leonard Kidd, were arrested in connection with the crimes. Defendant gave an oral statement and a signed confession to the police, admitting he stabbed the victims and attempted to burn the apartment. Defendant and Kidd were tried in separate trials. At trial, defendant testified and denied involvement in the crimes. While defendant acknowledged he was present at the apartment on the night of the crime, he testified that he left before the crimes were committed. Defendant also testified that the police coerced his confession through physical torture.
Leonard Kidd also provided a detailed statement to police that was generally consistent with defendant's confession. However, at defendant's trial Kidd recanted his earlier statement and took full responsibility for the offenses. Kidd denied that the defendant took part in any of the crimes. The jury found defendant guilty on four counts each of murder and concealment of homicidal death and one count of aggravated arson.
The defendant chose to proceed with a sentencing hearing before the judge without a jury. At sentencing the judge found defendant eligible for the death sentence based on the statutory aggravating factors that defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the crimes, that he had been convicted of the murder of two or more individuals, and that one of the victims was under 12 years of age and was murdered in an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(7).) The sentencing judge found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death, and the defendant was sentenced to death.
On direct appeal this court overturned the aggravated arson conviction, but affirmed defendant's murder convictions and his sentence. (People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69.) Defendant's initial, pro se post-conviction petition was dismissed. His amended petition, filed with the assistance of appointed counsel, was dismissed on the State's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals the dismissal of his amended post-conviction petition and seeks an evidentiary hearing.
In support of his post-conviction petition, defendant raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights (. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and adopted by this court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-26, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove (1) that his attorney's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, as measured by reference to prevailing professional norms, and (2) that the substandard representation so prejudiced defendant that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
Defendant first alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the factual basis for a motion to suppress defendant's confession. As grounds for suppression, defendant charges that prior to his interrogation he requested, but was denied, the assistance of counsel. Defendant also claims that a police officer struck him in the mouth in response to his request for an attorney. Defendant maintains that his confession was involuntary and the product of police torture during his interrogation at Area 2 police headquarters. Defendant claims that during his interrogation police used electroshock, stuck needles in his buttocks, repeatedly squeezed his scrotum, and placed a bag over his head in attempts to coerce his confession.
Defendant argues that had his trial counsel investigated further, he would have discovered evidence to corroborate defendant's allegations regarding coercive activities at Area 2. Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not subpoena disciplinary files of the officers who interrogated defendant. Defendant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking expert testimony that would have indicated that the results of defendant's post-interrogation medical exams were consistent with defendant's account of police torture. Defendant further claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with attorneys who represented other clients alleging police brutality in Area 2. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel should have subpoenaed personnel records in an effort to locate the paramedic who examined defendant and completed a report called a "bruise sheet."
In support of his claim, defendant submits various affidavits to demonstrate that trial counsel should have been aware of the need for further investigation to discover evidence corroborating defendant's claims of torture. First, defendant submits the affidavit of a member of a citizen's watchdog group. The affiant describes a pattern and practice of police brutality at Area 2 during the period 1982-84 consistent with defendant's allegations. However, the citizen's watchdog group representative does not name any of the persons who interrogated or arrested this defendant as being a party to the pattern and practice of police brutality in Area 2. Defendant also submits the affidavit of an expert who would have testified at trial that the type of torture defendant alleges he suffered is designed to leave no physical injuries. Finally, defendant offers reports prepared by the City of Chicago's Office of Police Standards concerning an internal investigation of police misconduct in Area 2 in the period 1982-84. However, these reports were not available at the time of defendant's trial, and the trial testimony did not place any of the officers cited in the report at defendant's interrogation. One officer did testify that Jon Burge, the lieutenant at Area 2 named in the internal investigation, and since separated from the police force, was possibly present during defendant's interrogation. However, two other officers testified at trial that Burge was not present during defendant's interrogation.
The paramedic and physician reports submitted with defendant's post-conviction petition record defendant's claim that he was subjected to needle pricks and electronic probe, yet neither physical exam report corroborates these allegations. The paramedic report, or "bruise sheet," contains a line pointing to the diagram of the left buttock with the word "slight." However, the paramedic did not testify at trial and his report was ruled inadmissible for lack of foundation. After the paramedic examined the defendant, a physician also performed an exam. The physician testified at trial that he found no bruising or indication of tenderness on defendant's back, scrotum or anus. The only mark on defendant's body the physician noted was a slight pimple on the buttocks.
As a preliminary matter, the State argues that this and many of defendant's claims regarding his trial attorney's performance are waived because they could have been raised on direct appeal. Generally, the issue of trial counsel...
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