People v. Osgood

• Decision Date: 22 December 1980
• Parties: , 417 N.E.2d 507 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ruby OSGOOD, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jocelyn HAYNES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 213

436 N.Y.S.2d 213

52 N.Y.2d 37, 417 N.E.2d 507

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ruby OSGOOD, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jocelyn HAYNES, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 22, 1980.

Erica Horwitz, Susan C. Thon, and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for Ruby Osgood, and appellant in the second above entitled action.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Peter Weinstein and A. David Stern, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for respondent in the first and second above entitled actions.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

The question on these appeals is whether the prosecutor's statutory obligation to be ready for trial within six months after commencing a felony action against the accused (CPL 30.30, subd. 1, par. (a)) should be postponed when the felony complaint, the initial accusatory instrument, is dismissed because of the prosecutor's inexcusable failure to prosecute.

In People v. Haynes, 72 A.D.2d 401, 421 N.Y.S.2d 401, the defendant was arrested on June 11, 1977 and, the following day, was arraigned on a felony complaint. A felony hearing originally scheduled for June 27 was, at the People's request, adjourned first to July 14 and then again to August 3. When the prosecutor was still unable to proceed with the hearing on that latter date, the court dismissed the felony complaint. However, on November 4, 1977 the defendant was indicted for the same offenses originally charged in the felony complaint. The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 (subd. 1, par. (a)). At that point more than six months had elapsed since the filing of the original felony complaint.

In People v. Osgood, 71 A.D.2d 1030, 420 N.Y.S.2d 398, the defendant, arrested on June 1, 1977, was arraigned on a felony complaint the following day. At the People's request the felony hearing scheduled for June 22 was successively adjourned to August 12, September 7, and September 26. On the latter date the court granted the People an additional adjournment of 30 days, noting that the case was being marked "final" against them. Nevertheless on October 26, the People were still unable to proceed with the hearing and the court dismissed the felony complaint. On December 23, 1977, the defendant was indicted for the same offenses. She was arraigned on February 21, 1978 and the case was adjourned to April 4 at which time she moved to dismiss relying on CPL 30.30 (subd. 1, par. (a)).

In each case the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. Computing the statutory period from the filing of the felony complaint, the courts found that the People had not met their obligation of being ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action, and had not provided any satisfactory excuse for the delay. In each case, however, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the six-month period within which the People must be ready for trial should be measured from the date the indictment was returned whenever the felony complaint has been dismissed and the defendant has not been held for Grand Jury action. Noting that the motions to dismiss were made less than six months after indictment, the Appellate Division determined that the motions should be denied. The defendants have now appealed to this court.

At the heart of our difference with the dissenters is their apparent unwillingness to accept two pertinent facts. The first is that, while speedy trial principles unquestionably prompted the enactment of CPL 30.30, the Legislature, in supplanting the speedy trial rule promulgated by the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference with its proposed specified time schedules, elected to rely for assurance of basic speedy trial rights on the enforcement of constitutional standards (CPL 30.20) and in addition accorded defendants the new statutory right to a dismissal if the People are not ready for trial within specified time limits (People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 416-418, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 407 N.E.2d 405). Thus, cited considerations with respect to the impact of dismissals on speedy trial rights while relevant, surely are not determinative with respect to the application of the ready trial statute. The second fact is that the ready trial statute, which establishes an elaborate and detailed scheme for computing the statutory period, makes allowance for exceptional circumstances and expressly provides for exclusion of certain periods (subd. 4) or recommencement of the statutory period (subd. 5) when a delay has been caused by the defendant, or is due to circumstances beyond the prosecutor's control. However, the statute does not provide any dispensation, by way of exclusion or recommencement of the statutory period, when, as in the cases now before us, the felony complaint initiating a criminal action against the defendant is dismissed because of the prosecutor's inexcusable delay.

It would, of course, be inconsistent, if not perverse, for the Legislature to provide that a statute, designed to insure to the public diligent prosecution of criminal charges filed in court, should be suspended when the District Attorney has inexcusably delayed the prosecution of the case. Nor can it be said that dismissal of the felony complaint, which may only temporarily interrupt the prosecution, eliminates the adverse effects the delay may have on the defendant's rights which in this State has always been one of the prime objectives of the various statutes requiring prompt disposition of criminal charges (see, e. g., People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891; People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 275-276, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d 525). Despite the dismissal there is still the danger that the accused will lose witnesses or exculpatory evidence he may need if the prosecution is resumed. The fact that the defendant may not be "held" after the dismissal does not remove this type of risk. On the contrary, dismissal of the charge and release of the defendant may aggravate the problem by creating confusion or uncertainty as to whether the prosecution has dropped the case and, thus, whether there is any need to prepare or preserve a defense. Nor will this type of dismissal relieve the defendant of anxiety and public suspicion when, as here, the dismissal merely serves as an intermission in a prosecution to be resumed at some unannounced date. Indeed this additional uncertainty may well increase the defendant's anxiety, and, once again, frustrate the legislative purpose.

Nevertheless the District Attorney urges that the statutory period recommenced when the indictment was returned, because it marked the commencement of a second criminal action. Although that result would be inconsistent with the purpose of the six-month ready rule prescribed in CPL 30.30, ¹ the prosecutor argues that it is compelled by other sections of the CPL where the Legislature has defined a "criminal action" (CPL 1.20, subd. 16), and the "commencement of criminal action" (CPL 1.20, subd. 17).

"A criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court" (CPL 1.20, subd. 17), which includes the filing of a felony complaint (CPL 1.20, subd. 1). Thus in this case the filing of the felony complaint commenced a criminal action, and at that point the People incurred the obligation of being ready for trial within six months. The contention that the subsequent return of the indictment, after the felony complaint had been dismissed, commenced a separate criminal action is not compelled or supported by the terms of this statute which, on the contrary, expressly provides that "if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed." We have only recently noted that the statute contemplates that "there can be only one criminal action for each set of criminal charges brought against a particular defendant, notwithstanding that the original accusatory instrument may be replaced or superseded during the course of the action. This is so even in cases such as this, where the original accusatory instrument was dismissed outright and the defendant was subsequently haled into court under an entirely new indictment" (People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351, 356, 428 N.Y.S.2d 937, 406 N.E.2d 793).

The District Attorney contends that this statement is overly broad. He notes that in Lomax the trial court had dismissed an indictment and had specifically granted the People permission to resubmit the charge to the Grand Jury, which by statute is "deemed to constitute an order holding the defendant for the action of a grand jury with respect to such charge" (CPL 210.45, subd. 9). He claims, however, that when, as there, the defendant has not been held or deemed to be held for further proceedings after dismissal of the prior accusatory instrument, there can indeed be more than one criminal action for any set of criminal charges. This exception is said to be compelled by the fact that the Legislature in defining a criminal action (CPL 1.20, subd. 16), stated that it includes "all further accusatory instruments directly derived from the initial one" (emphasis added) and also provided, according to the District Attorney, that it terminates with the final disposition of an accusatory instrument.

The People take the position that an indictment may only be said to be "directly derived" from an earlier accusatory instrument when the defendant has been held for Grand Jury action as a result of the prior accusatory instrument. The term "directly derived", however, is not defined anywhere in the CPL and thus there is no indication that the Legislature intended it to have any special meaning, or the peculiar meaning ascribed to it by the People. The ordinary meaning of the word "derive" is simply to "trace" or "originate" (see, e. g., Webster's New...