People v. Pack

• Decision Date: 19 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 102253.,102253.
• Citation: 224 Ill.2d 144,308 Ill.Dec. 735,862 N.E.2d 938
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James L. PACK, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

862 N.E.2d 938

224 Ill.2d 144

308 Ill.Dec. 735

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James L. PACK, Appellant.

No. 102253.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 19, 2007.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Stewart Umholtz, State's Attorney, Pekin (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Ira Kohlman, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2004)) requires a petitioner to be "imprisoned in the penitentiary" before a postconviction petition may be filed. In the instant case, defendant James L. Pack was serving the second of two consecutive sentences when he attempted to file a postconviction petition challenging the conviction which led to his first sentence. The circuit court of Tazewell County dismissed his petition, finding that he was not "imprisoned" as is required under section 122-1(a) of the Act. The appellate court affirmed. No. 3-04-0948 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On April 19, 1991, defendant was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for his conviction of aggravated criminal sexual abuse by a Tazewell County jury in case number 90-CF-116. On November 25, 1991, defendant was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment to be served consecutively to his 7-year sentence after being found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault by a different Tazewell County jury in case number 90-CF-115. The cases, which were originally scheduled for jury trials on the same date, were not related, and each case involved a separate victim. The State stated at oral argument that it pursued the sexual abuse case before the sexual assault case due to witness availability. Both convictions and sentences were affirmed by the appellate court in 1993. People v. Pack, 245 Ill.App.3d 1113, 212 Ill.Dec. 868, 657 N.E.2d 1213 (1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (table); People v. Pack, 246 Ill. App.3d 1117, 213 Ill.Dec. 85, 658 N.E.2d 555 (1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (table).

On February 20, 2004, defendant filed a postconviction petition challenging his sexual abuse conviction. Defendant's petition alleged that two witnesses had been coerced by the assistant State's Attorney to lie at his sexual abuse trial. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition, arguing that defendant had already served the seven-year sentence for his sexual abuse conviction and therefore was not "imprisoned in the penitentiary" for that conviction as required by section 122-1(a). The trial court agreed with the State and granted the motion to dismiss.

The appellate court affirmed, stating,

"[W]e must treat defendant's sentences individually and not as one sentence. The [mandatory supervised release] period for aggravated sexual abuse is a two-year period. 720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 2004). * * * Seven years (with 145 days), plus two years from April 19, 1991, had long since run when defendant filed the postconviction petition. Defendant was no longer imprisoned in the penitentiary on that conviction. Only a person imprisoned in the penitentiary may file a postconviction petition. * * * Since defendant was no longer imprisoned in the penitentiary for aggravated criminal sexual abuse in 90-CF-116, he is not entitled to postconviction relief."

We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

At issue in this case is whether defendant, who was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 7 and 60 years, respectively, qualifies as "imprisoned" under section 122-1(a) when, after spending almost 13 years in the penitentiary, he challenged the conviction that resulted in his 7-year sentence. Our review of the dismissal of a defendant's postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 247, 258 Ill.Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001).

We begin by examining section 122-1(a), which provides, in pertinent part:

"Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a proceeding under this Article if the person asserts that:

(1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both[.]" 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2004).

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill.2d 166, 170, 301 Ill.Dec. 458, 847 N.E.2d 117 (2006). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Wooddell, 219 Ill.2d at 170-71, 301 Ill.Dec. 458, 847 N.E.2d 117.

The plain language of the statute appears to support defendant's position because he was unquestionably a prisoner of the state at the time he filed his petition. The State, however, argues that defendant's status as a state prisoner is of no moment because, for purposes of section 122-1(a), he must be imprisoned for the conviction that he is challenging. According to the State, the long-standing rule in Illinois is that consecutive sentences must be treated as discrete and individual. See People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 286, 256 Ill.Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d 430 (2001) ("It is a settled rule in this state that sentences which run consecutively to each other are not transmuted thereby into a single sentence"); People v. Phelps, 211 Ill.2d 1, 14, 284 Ill.Dec. 268, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (2004) (consecutive sentences treated as individual sentences for conviction enhancement purposes). The State contends that, by 2004, when defendant filed his petition challenging his sexual abuse conviction, he had already served the 7-year sentence for that conviction, and was incarcerated on his consecutive 60-year sentence, which did not qualify him as "imprisoned" for purposes of section 122-1(a).

Defendant concedes that Illinois views consecutive sentences as discrete, but urges this court to find that he was "imprisoned" for purposes of section 122-1(a). In support of his argument, defendant relies on Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 115 S.Ct. 1948, 132 L.Ed.2d 36 (1995). In Garlotte, the petitioner was imprisoned by Mississippi state courts on a three-year sentence for a marijuana conviction, followed consecutively by concurrent life sentences for a murder conviction. Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 42, 115 S.Ct. at 1950, 132 L.Ed.2d at 40. After four years in a Mississippi prison, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus on his marijuana conviction in federal district court. Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 42, 115 S.Ct. at 1950, 132 L.Ed.2d at 41. The district court and court of appeals both rejected the petition on jurisdictional grounds, finding that the petitioner had served his three-year sentence, was not "in custody" under that sentence when he filed the petition, and therefore did not meet the requirements of section 2254(a) of the United States Code. Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 43, 115 S.Ct. at 1950-51, 132 L.Ed.2d at 41. Section 2254(a) of the Code provides that a federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).

The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on its earlier holding in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968). Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 47, 115 S.Ct. at 1952, 132 L.Ed.2d at 43-44. In Peyton, the Court found that defendants incarcerated under two consecutive sentences did not have to wait until their first sentence had been served before filing a habeas corpus petition against their second sentence. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 64-65, 88 S.Ct. at 1555, 20 L.Ed.2d at 433. Specifically, Peyton stated, "a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is `in custody' under any one of them for purposes of [the habeas statute]." Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67, 88 S.Ct. at 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d at 435. The Court noted that, if successful, the petitioners would advance their release dates, which was reason enough to permit them to file their petitions once they satisfied the "in custody" element of the statute. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. at 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d at 434-35.

The Garlotte Court compared the status of its petitioner to that of the petitioners in Peyton and found that, since Peyton construed the statutory term "in custody" to require that consecutive sentences be viewed in the aggregate, there was no reason to adopt a different construction "simply because the sentence imposed under the challenged conviction lies in the past rather than in the future." Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 46, 115 S.Ct. at 1952, 132 L.Ed.2d at 43. The Court then found that the petitioner was "in custody," and that his habeas corpus petition could be filed because his release date would be advanced by three years if his petition was successful. Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 47, 115 S.Ct. at 1952, 132 L.Ed.2d at 43.

The rationale expressed in Garlotte comports with our previous interpretations of section 122-1(a). A review of the history of the Act and our construction of the term "imprisoned" reveals that courts in this state have always held a defendant's liberty interest to be paramount when construing the Act.

The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted in response to Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S.Ct. 1073, 93 L.Ed. 1333 (1949), which held that prisoners must be given a statutory method by which they can raise claims of denial of federal...