People v. Padilla

• Decision Date: 11 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94SC144,94SC144
• Citation: 907 P.2d 601
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Joseph PADILLA, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 601

907 P.2d 601

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Joseph PADILLA, Respondent.

No. 94SC144.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Dec. 11, 1995.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Jan. 8, 1996.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Robert Mark Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, for Petitioner.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Respondent.

Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The defendant, Joseph Padilla, pled guilty in Denver District Court to one count of assault in the first degree. ¹ At his sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the use of three prior felony convictions in the sentencing determination on the ground that these convictions were unconstitutionally obtained. The sentencing court denied the motion as barred by the statute of limitations, section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), noting the defendant's failure to plead justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, statutorily recognized exceptions to the time limitation. See § 16-5-402(2)(d). The court then sentenced the defendant to eighteen years imprisonment. In People v. Padilla, 878 P.2d 4 (Colo.App.1993), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the pleading requirements applied by the sentencing court were appropriate under this court's decision in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo.1993). However, the court of appeals noted that Wiedemer was not decided until after the sentencing court's determination in this case and held that the pleading requirements did not apply retroactively. Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to the sentencing court with directions that the defendant be allowed to present evidence of justifiable excuse and excusable neglect and, if successful in proving either of those circumstances, be allowed to present evidence that the prior convictions were invalid. We granted certiorari to consider whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the validity of prior convictions at a discretionary sentencing proceeding. ² Because we find that a discretionary sentencing proceeding is not the proper forum in which to challenge prior convictions, we now hold that the defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the validity of prior convictions during such a proceeding. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and return the case to that court with directions to affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the district court.

I.

On April 30, 1991, the defendant was arrested in connection with an assault on his wife that left her with extensive injuries. The defendant was charged with one count each of second degree assault ³ and third degree assault. ⁴ The prosecution subsequently amended the charges to add three habitual criminal counts pursuant to section 16-13-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986). The habitual criminal counts were based on the defendant's three prior felony convictions: (1) a 1970 robbery conviction in Adams County; (2) a 1973 second degree murder conviction in Jefferson County; and (3) a 1973 second degree murder conviction in Denver. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecution added one count of first degree assault, ⁵ to which the defendant pled guilty, and dropped the remaining charges, including the habitual criminal counts.

The parties stipulated to a sentencing range of four to twenty years imprisonment. In the presentence investigation report, the reporting probation officer listed the defendant's three prior convictions as factors for the sentencing court to consider in assessing punishment. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant moved to suppress the use of these prior felony convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. The defendant alleged that all three convictions were unconstitutionally obtained and thus could not be considered by the sentencing court in selecting a sentence. Specifically, the defendant asserted that his 1970 robbery conviction and his 1973 second degree murder conviction were invalid because, among other reasons, when he offered the guilty pleas upon which those convictions were based he did not understand the nature of the charges filed against him or the scope of his constitutional and statutory rights. In addition, he challenged the validity of his 1973 conviction for second degree murder, which was based on a jury verdict, because, among other reasons, he was not advised of his right to testify and was denied effective assistance of counsel.

In ruling on the defendant's motion, the sentencing court noted that the statute of limitations period for collateral attacks on prior convictions, prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), had expired with respect to each of his three prior convictions. Because the defendant did not aver in his motion that the delay was based on justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, the court refused to consider the validity of the underlying convictions. The court also refused defense counsel's offer to make an oral record regarding justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. The court proceeded with the sentencing hearing and explicitly relied to some degree on the prior convictions in sentencing the defendant to eighteen years imprisonment.

The defendant appealed his sentence to the court of appeals, asserting, among other arguments, that the time bar on collateral attacks codified at section 16-5-402 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and that the trial court erred in raising the time bar issue on its own initiative. The defendant sought an opportunity to present evidence of justifiable excuse and excusable neglect as well as evidence that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained. The court of appeals, in People v. Padilla, 878 P.2d 4 (Colo.App.1993), upheld the constitutionality of section 16-5-402 and the sentencing court's decision to raise the time bar issue. The court of appeals further held that motions attacking prior convictions after the expiration of the limitations period for collateral attacks must affirmatively plead the existence of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. Id. at 6-7. The court of appeals based its holding on this court's decision in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo.1993), which addressed the application of the time bar to motions to vacate prior convictions under Crim.P. 35(c). However, the court of appeals held that the Wiedemer pleading requirements did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, because the defendant in this case was sentenced prior to the Wiedemer decision, the court held that the defendant's motion was not barred by his failure to comply. Padilla, 878 P.2d at 7.

The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with the following instructions:

The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions that the trial court consider such evidence as defendant may wish to present in an attempt to show that his untimely attack on these prior convictions was the result of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. Should the court conclude that defendant's untimely attack was not the result of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, then subject to an appeal of that decision, defendant's sentence is affirmed. Should the court determine that defendant's untimely filing was, in fact, the result of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, then the court must determine the validity of defendant's allegations that the prior convictions were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. In the event either or both of the prior convictions at issue ⁶ are determined to have been so obtained, defendant must be resentenced based on that determination.

Id. Without specifically addressing the issue, the court of appeals, by the terms of its order, assumed that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the validity of prior convictions during the sentencing proceeding.

The prosecution petitioned this court for certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted certiorari to determine (1) whether the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the pleading and evidentiary standards applicable to a collateral attack under Crim.P. 35(c) to challenge the validity of prior convictions during a discretionary sentencing hearing, and (2) whether the pleading requirements for justifiable excuse and excusable neglect set forth in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 440 n. 15 (Colo.1993), apply purely prospectively.

II.

We have consistently held that due process considerations prevent the use of criminal convictions obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional rights for the purpose of enhancing punishment in a subsequent criminal proceeding. E.g., People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1985) (unconstitutional convictions "cannot be used in a later criminal proceeding to establish guilt or enhance punishment"); People v. Gandy, 685 P.2d 165, 167 (Colo.1984) (principle is "axiomatic"); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo.1982) (unconstitutionally obtained conviction cannot support enhanced punishment in a subsequent proceeding). However, we have not specifically addressed the distinct issue presented in this case: is a defendant entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions during a discretionary sentencing proceeding? Because a defendant has opportunities to challenge prior convictions at other stages of the criminal process, and because extensive evidentiary hearings are inconsistent with discretionary sentencing, we now hold that a defendant is not entitled to present information or receive an evidentiary hearing on the validity of prior convictions during a discretionary...