People v. Pagan

• Decision Date: 19 July 2012
• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 05666,948 N.Y.S.2d 757,97 A.D.3d 963
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Victor A. PAGAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

97 A.D.3d 963

948 N.Y.S.2d 757

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 05666

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Victor A. PAGAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 19, 2012.

Stephen Lance Cimino, Syracuse, for appellant.

Louise K. Sira, District Attorney, Johnstown, for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, MALONE JR., STEIN and GARRY, JJ.

GARRY, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Fulton County (Giardino, J.), rendered March 1, 2010, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of insurance fraud in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree (two counts), reckless endangerment in the second degree, conspiracy in the fourth degree and conspiracy in the fifth degree.

In 2004, a three-unit apartment building in the City of Gloversville, Fulton County was destroyed by fire. The purported tenants of this building were defendant, codefendant Aubrey Pagan and John Hart, and codefendant Jeffrey Alnutt owned the building. Investigators initially determined that the fire was accidental, but upon receiving new information in 2007, police reopened the investigation. Hart was granted immunity from prosecution and told police that he, defendant and Pagan had participated in a plot formulated by Alnutt to collect fraudulent insurance proceeds by burning down the building and making the fire appear accidental. During this period, defendant was in the U.S. Army, and stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. He spoke by telephone with a detective and the Fulton County District Attorney, admitting during the conversation that he “had knowledge of” the fire and “was involved in it.” Defendant offered to speak further with police upon his return to New York if he was granted immunity. Ultimately, he declined the offer of immunity and refused to speak further with investigators.

Defendant, Pagan and Alnutt were jointly indicted on multiple charges arising from the fire.¹ During their joint jury trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements from the telephone conversation. County Court denied the motion and admitted the statements into evidence solely against defendant. Defendant was convicted of insurance fraud in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree (two counts), reckless endangermentin the second degree, conspiracy in the fourth degree and conspiracy in the fifth degree. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 1 1/3 to 4 years and ordered to pay restitution. Defendant appeals.

Initially, defendant contends that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues that the testimony of Hart—an accomplice as a matter of law—was insufficiently corroborated by evidence “ tending to connect [him] with the commission of” the charged crimes (CPL 60.22[1] ). Corroborative evidence need not independently prove a defendant's involvement; the statutory requirements are satisfied if “read with the accomplice's testimony, [the evidence] makes it more likely that the defendant committed the offense, and thus tends to connect him [or her] to it” ( People v. Reome, 15 N.Y.3d 188, 194, 906 N.Y.S.2d 788, 933 N.E.2d 186 [2010];see People v. Berry, 78 A.D.3d 1226, 1227, 910 N.Y.S.2d 281 [2010],lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 828, 921 N.Y.S.2d 192, 946 N.E.2d 180 [2011] ). Here, defendant admitted to police that he was involved in the fire. Additionally, the People showed that he purchased renter's insurance about a month before the fire, made a claim afterward and was paid $10,000.² THERE WAS EVIDENCE that the electrical service for the upstairs apartment where defendant claimed to live was in Alnutt's name and that defendant actually shared Pagan's downstairs apartment. Alnutt's former wife testified that neither defendant nor Pagan had leases until after the fire, when she prepared backdated leases at Alnutt's request. There was also evidence that defendant purchased numerous items from a thrift shop in the months just before the fire, many of which were later found in the apartments; this was consistent with Hart's testimony that the plan called for placing furnishings in the apartments to drive up the insurance claims. Finally, a fire investigator testified that he found evidence of an “extreme burn pattern” caused by an unknown substance on a kitchen floor where Hart testified that he and Alnutt spread an accelerant when they started the fire. This and other evidence amply met the “minimal requirements” of corroborating evidence ( People v. Jones, 85 N.Y.2d 823, 825, 623 N.Y.S.2d 836, 647 N.E.2d 1344 [1995];accord People v. Gilbo, 52 A.D.3d 952, 954, 859 N.Y.S.2d 521 [2008],lv. denied11 N.Y.3d 788, 866 N.Y.S.2d 614, 896 N.E.2d 100 [2008] ). Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find “a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury” ( People v. Vargas, 60 A.D.3d 1236, 1237, 875 N.Y.S.2d 625 [2009],lv. denied13 N.Y.3d 750, 886 N.Y.S.2d 104, 914 N.E.2d 1022 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Self, 75 A.D.3d 924, 925, 906 N.Y.S.2d 164 [2010],lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 583, 938 N.E.2d 1018 [2010] ). There was some evidence to rebut the People's proof, including the testimony of a fire investigator who provided alternate interpretations of the burn-pattern evidence. Nonetheless, evaluating the evidence in a neutral light, and according deference to the jury's credibility assessments, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Berry, 78 A.D.3d at 1227, 910 N.Y.S.2d 281).

Defendant next contends that his telephone statements regarding his involvement in the fire should have been suppressed because he was subject to custodial interrogation and was not given Miranda warnings. County Court determined that although defendant was interrogated, he was not in custody and therefore no Miranda warnings were required. We agree. “The standard for assessing a suspect's custodial status is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave” ( People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239 [2005] [citations omitted] ). Factors to be considered include the location, length and atmosphere of the questioning, whether police significantly restricted defendant's freedom of action, the degree of defendant's cooperation, and whether the questioning was accusatory or investigatory ( see People v. McCoy, 89 A.D.3d 1218, 1219, 933 N.Y.S.2d 425 [2011],lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 960, 944 N.Y.S.2d 488, 967 N.E.2d 713 [2012];People v. Johnston, 273 A.D.2d 514, 515, 709 N.Y.S.2d 230 [2000],lv. denied95 N.Y.2d 935, 721 N.Y.S.2d 612, 744 N.E.2d 148 [2000] ). During the Huntley hearing, a police sergeant testified that defendant—who knew the sergeant personally—telephoned him at home and said that he had heard that investigators wanted to talk with him, and that he did not want them to come to North Carolina but would speak with them when he was in New York on leave. The sergeant agreed to forward the request to investigators, and did so. A detective testified that the Fulton County District Attorney subsequently asked him to be present in her office during a telephone call from defendant in North Carolina. The call was received by speaker phone, and the detective and the District Attorney spoke with defendant and Joel Abelove, who identified himself as an attorney with the Judge Advocate General's office and, according to the detective, said that he was representing defendant. The detective told defendant he wanted to speak with him about the fire. Defendant responded that he had some involvement in it and would talk with police about it in New York, but only if he received immunity and no investigators went to North Carolina. The detective agreed, and the District Attorney arranged to e-mail an immunity agreement to Abelove. The detective acknowledged that he did not administer Miranda warnings.

Defendant testified that Abelove was not his attorney, directed him to speak with the District Attorney about the fire, and never told him that he did not have to participate in the conversation. Defendant testified that he ended the conversationby asking investigators not to come to Fort Bragg; he acknowledged that no one did so and that an immunity agreement was sent to Abelove. We note that this conversation took place while defendant was hundreds of miles away from police in another state, and defendant could have ended it at any time simply by hanging up the phone ( compare People v. Scott, 269 A.D.2d 96, 98, 710 N.Y.S.2d 228 [2000],lv. denied95 N.Y.2d 892, 715 N.Y.S.2d 384, 738 N.E.2d 788 [2000] ). Defendant did in fact end the conversation on his own terms, after obtaining the agreement he had initially requested. The conversation lasted only a few minutes, and the questioning was limited to the detective's statement that he wanted to speak to defendant about the fire. Accordingly, County Court correctly determined that a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was in custody during this conversation, and that Miranda warnings were not required ( compare People v. Hook, 80 A.D.3d 881, 882–883, 914 N.Y.S.2d 755 [2011],lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 306, 929 N.Y.S.2d 41, 952 N.E.2d 1033 [2011];People v. Lowin, 71 A.D.3d 1194, 1195–1196, 896 N.Y.S.2d 231 [2010];People v. Neil, 24 A.D.3d 893, 893–894, 805 N.Y.S.2d 193 [2005] ).³

We...