People v. Paranzino
| Decision Date | 15 April 1975 |
| Citation | 47 A.D.2d 878,366 N.Y.S.2d 440 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph PARANZINO, Defendant-Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph RUSSO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
J. B. Gould, New York City, for respondent.
R. D. Friedman, New York City, for defendants-appellants.
Before MARKEWICH, J.P., and MURPHY, TILZER, CAPOZZOLI and LYNCH, JJ.
Judgment of conviction after jury trial, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered November 2, 1973, affirmed. We are unanimous as to defendant-appellant Russo, but divided as to defendant-appellant Paranzino. Even as to him, there are only two aspects of the case worthy of comment, and as to one of these, our dissenter makes none: the alleged refusal of the trial court to permit evidence of bias on the part of the police against defendants. There was no such refusal. Counsel was advised by the court that, before ruling on admissibility, he would first hear the proffered testimony out of the jury's presence and rule--a perfectly proper precaution. Counsel did not accede to the offer.
Our dissenter concentrates on the evidence of possession of gambling records by Paranzino. This factor of the case, interestingly enough, was never alluded to either at the trial or in the briefs. The unrefuted pertinent evidence was that, pursuant to a search warrant, police entered the room wherein were found the two defendants and others; that, as they entered, Russo was in the act of handing an envelope, later found to contain the contraband, to Paranzino; that, as he saw the officers, Russo snatched back the envelope and dropped it to the floor. That is the People's case on direct evidence of possession. The case was one of actual, not constructive, possession. No person other than one of the defendants was seen to touch the envelope. All the surrounding circumstances provide the basis for the jury, as they had a right and duty to do, absent any evidence to the contrary or evidence affecting credibility of the witnesses, to arrive at a finding that this was knowing possession of contraband. In this respect, the evidence was no stronger against one defendant than the other. All the arguments made about the key on Russo's person, and control, are completely irrelevant for, to repeat, the case is one of actual, as opposed to constructive possession, such as, for instance, the finding of contraband in nobody's actual possession but in a room to which a defendant has a key.
The possession proven here falls within the definition contained in section 10.00, definition 8, of the Penal Law: "Possess' means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.' ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lynch v. Dolce
...quotation marks omitted), a term usually used in opposition to constructive possession, see, e.g., People v. Paranzino, 47 A.D.2d 878, 366 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (1st Dep't 1975) (“[T]he case is one of actual, as opposed to constructive possession....”). Respondent noted at oral argument that th......
-
People v. Sierra
...the necessary elements, has been rejected consistently (People v. Martin, 52 A.D.2d 988, 989, 383 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426; People v. Paranzino, 47 A.D.2d 878, 366 N.Y.S.2d 440, affd. 40 N.Y.2d 1005, 391 N.Y.S.2d 391; People v. Thomas, 42 A.D.2d 1019, 348 N.Y.S.2d 244; People v. Burke, 25 A.D.2d 6......
- Firedoor Corp. of America, Inc. v. R. K. & A. Jones, Inc.