People v. Parks

Docket Number162086
Decision Date28 July 2022
Citation510 Mich. 225,987 N.W.2d 161
Parties PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kemo Knicombi PARKS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael A. Tesner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Angeles R. Meneses) for defendant.

James M. Brown in propria persona, amicus curiae.

Robert E. Hawkins in propria persona, amicus curiae.

Cooley LLP (by Kathleen Hartnett, Darina Shtrakhman, Zoë Helstrom, Adam Gershenson, Robert W. Jacques, and Matt Nguyen ) and Gurewitz & Raben PLC, Detroit (by Harold Gurewitz ) for Leading Developmental Psychologists, Neuroscientists, and Scholars, amici curiae.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Welch, J.

This is the direct appeal of the mandatory life-without-parole sentence imposed on defendant, Kemo Knicombi Parks, for his first-degree premeditated-murder conviction under MCL 750.316(1)(a). Parks was 18 years old when he aided and abetted in the murder. Parks asserts that his sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, Parks's Eighth Amendment argument must fail. However, we hold that his sentence of mandatory life without parole violates the Michigan Constitution's ban on "cruel or unusual" punishment. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16. Specifically, his sentence lacks proportionality because it fails to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Parks's sentence, vacate Parks's life-without-parole sentence, and remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for resentencing proceedings that are consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 5, 2016, Parks's older cousin, Dequavion Harris, shot and killed the victim in the parking lot of a convenience store. According to a witness, prior to the murder, Parks and Harris spoke to each other in low voices and whispers in the back seat of a car parked outside the convenience store. Parks then gave a gun to Harris. Both men entered the store, and Harris exited to the parking lot a short time later. Parks remained inside the store. Thereafter, the victim, who was sitting in his car in the parking lot, was shot and killed. Witnesses heard gunshots and observed Harris flee the parking lot. Parks was 18 years old at the time of the shooting.

At trial, the prosecution's theory was that Harris and Parks planned to kill the victim in retaliation for the prior murder of Harris's cousin. The prosecution never alleged that Parks shot the victim; instead, the prosecution charged Parks with first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Both Harris and Parks were found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) ; carrying a concealed pistol, MCL 750.227(2) ; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Both defendants were sentenced to mandatory life without parole for their first-degree-murder convictions, to be served consecutively with the mandatory two-year minimum for felony-firearm.

With the aid of counsel, both defendants appealed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the cases.1 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Harris's and Parks's convictions and sentences, with the exception of ordering a limited remand in Parks's appeal to redetermine a portion of Parks's restitution order. People v Harris , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 13, 2020 (Docket Nos. 346586 and 346587), p. 14, 2020 WL 4723286. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected Parks's challenge to his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state Constitutions. Id. at 11-12.

Parks sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered additional briefing to address

whether the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16, or both.[2 ]
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DICTATES THAT YOUTH MATTERS IN SENTENCING

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. " U.S. Const., Am. VIII (emphasis added). "[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense." Roper v Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S Ct 1183, 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). To that end, the United States Supreme Court has stated that to determine if a punishment is disproportionate, courts must look to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society...." Id. at 561, 125 S Ct 1183 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons." Id. at 560, 125 S Ct 1183. "The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances." Graham v Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S Ct 2011, 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. See Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S Ct 2455, 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). Overall, juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, thereby making them "less deserving of the most severe punishments." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the three significant differences between juveniles and adults. "First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking." Miller , 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Second, children ‘are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings." Id. (citation omitted). "And third, a child's character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult's; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ " Id. (citation omitted). "Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’ " Id. at 472-473, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This basic overall principle—that youthful characteristics render defendants less culpable—has shaped Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for the last two decades.

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court first recognized that children are different from adults for sentencing purposes when it abolished the death penalty for minors in Roper , 543 U.S. at 578-579, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In doing so, it determined that the differences between juvenile and adult defendants "are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability." Id. at 572-573, 125 S Ct 1183. As the death penalty is reserved for only the worst offenders, this group could not include juveniles.3 See id. at 569, 125 S Ct 1183. In making this bright-line prohibition of the death penalty for those under 18 years old, the Court explained why it drew the line at 18:

Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn.... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. [ Id. at 574, 125 S Ct 1183 (emphasis added).]

Five years later, in Graham , 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, the Court concluded that "penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders," and thus the penalty was deemed cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. "This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment." Id. Thus, defendants in this situation should be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 75, 130 S Ct 2011. Notably, in its holding the Court cited Roper ’s reasoning about why...

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