People v. Pate

• Decision Date: 10 May 1965
• Docket Number: Cr. 4659
• Citation: 44 Cal.Rptr. 462,234 Cal.App.2d 273
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard H. PATE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 462

44 Cal.Rptr. 462

234 Cal.App.2d 273

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard H. PATE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4659.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

May 10, 1965.

Molly H. Minudri, San Francisco (under appointment of the District Court of Appeal), for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Charles W. Rumph, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

AGEE, Justice.

Following plea of guilty to second degree burglary and proceedings conducted pursuant to section 6451 of the Penal Code, the superior court found defendant to be a narcotic addict and ordered that he be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center for care and treatment. He was received at the Reception Guidance Center at Vacaville, California, on February 14, 1964 and remained there until April 28, 1964. He was not given any treatment while there.

On April 15, 1964 the Director of Corrections notified the committing court that defendant was not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in the California Rehabilitation Center and that he was being returned to the court for further proceedings as provided by section 6453 of the Penal Code.

On May 21, 1964 the court modified defendant's plea of guilty to second degree burglary to a plea of guilty of attempted burglary of the second degree and sentenced him to state prison. Defendant has appealed from the judgment entered on that date.

The sole issue on appeal relates to the propriety of the action taken by the Director of Corrections in rejecting defendant for treatment and returning him to the court.

Section 6453 of the Penal Code provides as follows: 'If at any time after 60 days following receipt of a person at the facility, the Director of Corrections concludes that the person, because of excessive criminality or for other relevant reason, is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in such narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility, he shall return the person to the court in which the case originated for such further proceedings on the criminal charges as that court may deem warranted.'

In returning the defendant to the court, the Director of Corrections did not base his reason for doing so upon defendant's 'excessive criminality.' Therefore, the validity of the return must rest upon the second basis, 'other relevant reason.'

The reason given is stated in the April 15, 1964 notice to the court, as follows: 'Our records indicate that Richard H. Pate was under active parole supervision of the Department of Corrections at the time of his commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center. By agreement of Mr. Richard A. McGee, Administrator, Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, and Mr. Walter Dunbar, Director of Corrections, the California Rehabilitation Center program is reserved for those individuals not now under supervisory control of the Department.'

We have found nothing in any of the enactments of the Legislature which indicates that its narcotics rehabilitation program is reserved for persons who are not on parole. There is no issue here as to defendant's statutory eligibility for treatment under such program and there is no contention that the superior court did not have the power in this case to make an order of commitment under section 6451 of the Penal Code. It was not bound by any 'agreement' between Mr. McGee and Mr. Dunbar.

Respondent acknowledges very forthrightly that, at the time of defendant's commitment 'he was not considered for treatment under that program [California Narcotic Rehabilitation Program, as instituted by the 1961 Legislature] since he was a dual commitment,' i. e., commitment for prior felony conviction and commitment under section 6451 as a narcotic addict.

We again quote respondent: 'In August of 1964, this broad policy of exclusion of dual commitments was altered to the extent that all narcotics commitments, including dual commitments, are evaluated during the sixty-day period established by the code. As the attached letters indicate, if the accused has basically a narcotics problem, he may be accepted for treatment despite the fact that he is confined under an existing felony commitment as well.' (Emphasis added.)

The record is clear that the sole reason for the Director's conclusion that the defendant was not a fit subject for treatment is that he was a 'dual commitment.' Whether this is a 'relevant reason' for returning him to the committing court is a question addressed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the Director of Corrections.

While the committing court cannot control the discretion of the Director, it can correct an abuse of such discretion. (2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 228, 'Abuse of Discretion.')

In Cranford v. Jordan, 7 Cal.2d 465, 467, 61 P.2d 45, 46, which involved a statute directing the secretary of state not to file articles of incorporation setting forth a name likely to mislead the public, the Supreme Court stated: 'The section vests in him a certain discretionary power which he may be compelled to exercise, but which, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, we should not compel him to exercise in any particular manner.' (Emphasis added.)

In McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-47, 91 P.2d 1035, 1039, 123 A.L.R. 1205, the court said: 'The legislature has the power to vest in a public officer the discretion to deny an application for a permit to engage in a business subject to regulation when prerequisite facts do not exist. But such a discretion must be exercised within legal bounds. Those bounds are generally that the discretion of the administrative officer or board may not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without a factual basis sufficient to justify the refusal.' (Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, we reject respondent's contention that the superior court had no power to review the action of the Director. Specificall...