People v. Pate, No. 03SA37.

Decision Date30 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. 03SA37.
Citation71 P.3d 1005
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin Otto PATE, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Jeanne M. Smith, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District, Gordon R. Denison, Deputy District Attorney, Jeanne M. Wilson, Deputy District Attorney, Diana May, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, William A. Martinez, Deputy State Public Defender, Cynthia J. Jones, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

In this interlocutory appeal, we uphold the trial court's historical findings of facts, substantiated by the record, which support its conclusions of law that the police in this case lacked probable cause to believe that a burglary was in progress and that the police lacked a reasonable basis to believe that there was a colorable claim of an emergency threatening the life or safety of another in the defendant's home. Accordingly, we hold that the police's warrantless entry into the defendant's home was justified by neither the exigent circumstances exception nor the emergency aid exception and violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. Thus, we affirm the trial court's suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Facts and Proceedings Below

Based on the testimony of Officers Good and Zortman, the only witnesses testifying at two suppression hearings, the pertinent facts are as follows.

Colorado Springs Officers Good and Zortman responded to an early morning 911 call about a burglary in progress. The caller reported a "lot of racket" and could see possibly four suspects.

The officers went to the specified address and searched the area. After an extensive walk through, the officers found no evidence of a burglary. The officers were about to leave when they encountered two people in a car. The passengers in the car directed the officers to a group of nearby apartments, not the original burglary call address, where they had heard someone shout "Let her go" and the sound of breaking glass. The first passenger saw two individuals running from the area while the other passenger saw four individuals running.

After speaking with the two people in the car and approximately twenty minutes after the initial dispatch call, Officer Good walked toward the apartments. Upon approaching the apartments, he saw a man walking towards him from the back of the apartment building. Although the man, whom the officers later identified as William Wonza, had blood on his head and face, Officer Good did not believe that Wonza had a serious injury or required immediate attention. Wonza was fully aware and cooperative with the officers. There was a brief exchange between Officer Good and Wonza, during which time Officer Zortman joined them.

At the two suppression hearings, the testimony of Officers Good and Zortman differed as to what Wonza said during the brief exchange. During the first hearing, Officer Good testified on direct that he asked Wonza where he had come from and Wonza indicated an apartment and said only that his friend "Ben was inside." Consistent with this statement, Officer Good said that after speaking with all of the witnesses, including Wonza, he still did not have any idea about what was going on:

[W]e weren't exactly sure what we had at that point. According to the witnesses, we weren't even sure if they made entry into the apartment, whether we actually had a burglary. I mean, we didn't know what we had, so everyone is a suspect until we find out otherwise, till we clear them all, and then we start figuring out exactly what's going on.

But upon cross-examination, Officer Good modified his testimony and stated that Wonza told him that "Ben was injured inside" and thus Officer Good became concerned about Ben's welfare after talking with Wonza. During the second hearing, Officer Good repeated that after speaking with Wonza, he still had "no clue what was going on, so we kind of wanted to gather everyone first, then start asking questions."

In her testimony, Officer Zortman stated that she did not hear Wonza say a person was injured inside the apartment. Consequently, her official report of events fails to state that Wonza indicated that someone was injured inside the apartment.

During the exchange with Wonza, neither Officer Good nor Zortman asked him who resided in the apartment, whether they had permission to enter the apartment, about the extent of anyone's injuries, if anyone required medical assistance, who or what had caused any of the injuries, whether the injuries had occurred in the apartment, or whether there was any illegal activity occurring in the apartment.

Despite lacking any understanding of what had happened, Officers Good and Zortman left Wonza with another officer without any further questions or assistance, and walked towards the apartment to investigate with two other officers who had arrived at the scene.

Upon arriving at the backyard deck of the apartment building, the officers noticed broken window glass. They saw no other signs of a disturbance or a burglary. The officers did not hear any noises coming from the building nor did they have any other indication of violence. Upon reaching the apartment door, however, the four officers drew their guns and without knocking or otherwise asking permission to enter, moved into the defendant's home and down a stairwell toward the defendant's living space.

The defendant, Benjamin Pate, was standing at the bottom of the stairs. He was injured and bleeding, but calm and cooperative. Officer Good pointed his gun at Pate and asked him to show him his hands and whether there were any other people in the apartment. Pate complied and said there were no other people in the apartment.

The three officers detained Pate while Officer Good conducted a quick search. Finding no one else, Officer Good returned to Pate and asked him if he was carrying any drugs or weapons. Pate said yes, stating that he had ketamine and marijuana in his possession. Officer Good patted him down and discovered thirty-six bags of ketamine, a Schedule III controlled substance, and less than an ounce of marijuana in Pate's pockets. While in the apartment, Officer Good did not ask about Pate's injuries, whether he required medical assistance, whether he had been the victim of a crime or whether any crime had occurred in the apartment.

The officers removed Pate from the apartment and took him outside to question him further. For the first time, the officers asked both Pate and Wonza what had happened. They told the officers that they were victims of assault and robbery. Both Pate and Wonza required medical attention and were taken to the hospital.

Upon the conclusion of the officers' testimony during the first suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that there was no justification whatsoever for the police officers' warrantless entry into Pate's residence. The trial court found that there was no evidence that the police knocked, that they did not get a response, or that they needed to make a warrantless entry to determine Pate's well-being. The trial court found that the only evidence available to the police that was reliable was the statement from Wonza that his friend was still in the apartment. The trial court concluded that not only did the police lack probable cause to enter Pate's apartment, there was not even a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred in Pate's apartment that would justify their intrusion. Thus, the trial court suppressed all evidence and statements secured by the police during their illegal search of Pate's residence.

On its own motion, the court held a second suppression hearing with additional testimony from the two officers but similarly concluded that the police entered Pate's apartment in violation of his constitutional rights.

First, the trial court found that the officers did not have probable cause to support any of the traditional exigent circumstances exceptions that would justify a warrantless entry. The police were not involved in hot pursuit and they did not have probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred in the apartment or that evidence would be lost if they did not take immediate action. The trial court found that all of the officers testified repeatedly that they had no idea what was going on and were simply trying to conduct an investigation to make a determination. The trial court concluded that any of the warrantless exceptions based upon probable cause clearly failed for the absence of any probable cause whatsoever.

Second, the trial court ruled that there was no evidence that the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that there was an immediate crisis or emergency in the apartment with respect to Pate's well-being that required police assistance to justify their illegal intrusion. The trial court found that the officers had an opportunity to question Wonza, who had just come from Pate's apartment, about whose apartment it was, who was in the apartment, and the extent of the injuries allegedly suffered by Pate. The officers failed to ask any such questions.

The court further found that the first time Officer Good testified, he made no mention of his primary reason in going into the apartment to check on the well-being of Pate. Except when prompted by counsel, at no time did Officer Good state that the officers' primary purpose was to ascertain the well-being of Pate.

The trial court found that the officers might have been able to determine Pate's well-being if they had knocked on his door first and questioned Pate before entering his home. Indeed, the trial court determined that the officers'...

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