People v. Patel
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-19-0532,2-19-0532 |
| Citation | 445 Ill.Dec. 242,166 N.E.3d 271,2020 IL App (2d) 190532 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Upen S. PATEL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert B. Berlin, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman and Mary A. Fleming, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Alan T. Davis, of Fagan, Fagan & Davis, of Des Plaines, for appellee.
¶ 1 The State appeals from a ruling by the circuit court of Du Page County granting defendant Upen S. Patel's motion in limine to bar admission of blood-alcohol test results in his criminal trial for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Because the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine , we reverse and remand.
¶ 3 Defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated DUI ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(C) (West 2014)), one count of aggravated DUI while having a blood alcohol of 0.08 or more ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(C) (West 2014)), one count of aggravated DUI while having consumed a controlled substance ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(C) (West 2014)), and two counts of aggravated DUI based on driving with a revoked license ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2), (d)(1)(G), (d)(2)(A) (West 2014)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of blood and urine testing and a motion in limine to bar admission of the blood and urine test results. Defendant argued that his test results were not admissible in his prosecution for DUI because he was not under arrest when the police obtained his blood and urine samples. Defendant relied on sections 11-501.1 and 11-501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1, 11-501.2 (West 2014)).
¶ 4 The following facts were established at the combined hearing on the two motions. At about 5:20 p.m. on November 10, 2014, Officer Christopher Zito of the Wood Dale Police Department was assigned to investigate a two-vehicle accident at the intersection of Addison Road and Irving Park Road. Upon arriving, Officer Zito observed two vehicles in the intersection. The driver of one of the vehicles told him that, while he was waiting for the red light to turn green, defendant's vehicle rear-ended him. Someone had requested an ambulance for both parties. When asked if anyone was seriously injured, Officer Zito testified that he did not know but that both individuals were transported to the hospital.
¶ 5 Officer Zito saw defendant sitting on a nearby retaining wall. Defendant's head was bleeding. He told Officer Zito that he had a head injury.
¶ 6 When the paramedics arrived, they treated defendant and told Officer Zito that they would be transporting defendant to the hospital. Officer Zito overheard defendant tell the paramedics that, before driving that day, he had consumed vodka and a drug called Norco.
¶ 7 At about 6:15 p.m., Officer Zito went to the hospital to talk to defendant. When he arrived, defendant was being treated on a gurney in the emergency room.
¶ 8 Officer Zito was in uniform. He was the only officer present and did not draw his weapon or display it aggressively. His interaction with defendant was calm, and he never raised his voice.
¶ 9 Officer Zito administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on defendant. Defendant seemed to understand the instructions and complied with the test. The HGN test indicated that defendant had consumed alcohol. Defendant also agreed to take a portable breath test, which showed that his blood alcohol content was 0.168.
¶ 10 Officer Zito read defendant a "[t]raffic [c]rash [w]arning to [m]otorists." Officer Zito admitted that he should have read the "standard DUI [w]arning to [m]otorists." According to Officer Zito, both warnings contained essentially the same description of the potential penalties regarding defendant's driver's license. Each warning advised the same applicable license-suspension period depending on whether a driver refused or submitted to a chemical test.
¶ 11 When Officer Zito "told [defendant] that we [were] asking him to give blood and urine and that the nurse or phlebotomist would be collecting it," defendant agreed to provide both. According to Officer Zito, defendant was aware that Officer Zito was conducting a DUI investigation. Officer Zito denied that he ordered defendant to submit to a chemical test. Officer Zito did not arrest defendant before defendant provided blood or urine.
¶ 12 Officer Zito received the blood test results in May 2015. However, he did not arrest defendant then, because he was still waiting for the urine test results, which he received in November 2015. Officer Zito arrested defendant in March 2016.
¶ 13 The State moved for a directed finding on defendant's motion to suppress and for denial of the motion in limine . In response, defendant argued that, because he was not under arrest when he provided blood and urine samples, the test results based on those samples were inadmissible in his prosecution for DUI. Defendant relied on section 11-501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2014)), which provides that any motorist driving on the roads of this state "shall be deemed to have given consent" to drug and alcohol testing if he is "arrested *** for any offense as defined in [s]ection 11-501." Defendant proposed that section 11-501.1(a), together with section 11-501.2 of the Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2014) ), allowed the admission of chemical testing in DUI prosecutions only where the testing was done after the defendant was arrested.
¶ 14 In granting the motion for a directed finding on the motion to suppress and denying the motion in limine , the trial court found that Officer Zito was credible. It further found that defendant was not under arrest when he agreed to provide his blood and urine and that his consent was voluntary. The court determined that Officer Zito had probable cause to believe that defendant was driving under the influence.
¶ 15 The court found no Illinois cases holding that section 11-501.1 applied to the "introduction of the blood test that's consensually given with probable cause at a criminal trial."
¶ 16 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion in limine ,1 contending that section 11-501.1 "is not merely for the purpose of [s]tatutory [s]ummary [s]uspensions, [but] is the template for what is necessary for the proper blood-draw of the [d]efendant" if the State would introduce the blood-test results in a prosecution for DUI. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 17 Defendant then filed a second motion to reconsider the denial of his motion in limine . In this motion, defendant contended that the recent decision in People v. Pratt , 2018 IL App (5th) 170427, 436 Ill.Dec. 345, 142 N.E.3d 746, supported his original argument that he was required to be under arrest before his blood could be drawn for use in a criminal trial for DUI.
¶ 18 At the hearing on the second motion to reconsider, the trial court noted that it had already found that defendant was not under arrest when he provided blood and urine samples and that he consented to Officer Zito's request for samples. The court added that Officer Zito read to defendant the wrong motorist warning and that it was not entirely the same as the correct motorist warning. Based on Pratt and the fact that Officer Zito read defendant the wrong motorist warning and obtained blood and urine samples from him before he was under arrest, the court granted defendant's motion to reconsider and granted his motion in limine . The State, in turn, filed a timely appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 20 On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine , because a defendant is not required to have been under arrest before consenting to chemical testing that will be used at a criminal trial for DUI. Defendant disagrees, relying primarily on Pratt .
¶ 21 We begin by clarifying the applicable standard of review. The State incorrectly asserts that de novo review applies because we are reviewing the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress. We disagree—we are reviewing a ruling on a motion in limine .
¶ 22 Ordinarily, a reviewing court will not reverse a ruling on a motion in limine absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Williams , 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539 (1999). However, a trial court must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law. Williams , 188 Ill. 2d at 369, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539. Where a trial court's exercise of discretion is frustrated by an erroneous rule of law, the reviewing court must require the exercise of discretion consistent with the law. Williams , 188 Ill. 2d at 369, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539. Further, where the question is one of law, the reviewing court determines it de novo . Williams , 188 Ill. 2d at 369, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539. Here, because the issue is whether the trial court, in granting defendant's motion in limine , properly interpreted the applicable statutory provisions, we apply de novo review. See People v. Miles , 2020 IL App (1st) 180736, ¶ 9, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– ().
¶ 23 Defendant renews on appeal the argument he presented below. He contends that section 11-501.1's requirement, that a driver must first be arrested before he shall be deemed to have impliedly consented to a chemical test of his blood or urine, applies in a criminal prosecution for DUI. We disagree.
¶ 24 We begin by noting that defendant cites no case directly supporting his contention. Our research, however, reveals a case that directly refutes defendant's position. See People v. Wozniak , 199 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 146 Ill.Dec. 54, 557 N.E.2d 996 (1...
To continue reading
Request your trial