People v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 5-17-0427,5-17-0427
• Citation: 2018 IL App (5th) 170427,142 N.E.3d 746,436 Ill.Dec. 345
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ricky L. PRATT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2018 IL App (5th) 170427

142 N.E.3d 746

436 Ill.Dec. 345

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Ricky L. PRATT, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 5-17-0427

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Opinion Filed: December 19, 2018

Brendan F. Kelly, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino and Patrick D. Daly, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Lawrence J. O’Neill, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee.

JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Ricky L. Pratt, was involved in an automobile accident. A detective investigating the accident directed medical personnel to draw the defendant's blood for chemical testing while he was unconscious. The defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated driving under the influence (aggravated DUI) ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2014) ). He filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing that it constituted an unreasonable warrantless search in violation of the fourth amendment. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The State appeals, arguing that (1) the court should have granted its motion for a directed finding because the defendant did not present evidence that the blood draw occurred at all and (2) the blood draw was a valid consensual search under the implied consent provisions in the Illinois Vehicle Code (id. §§ 11-501.1, 11-501.2, 11-501.6). We affirm the trial court's ruling.

¶ 2 On the night of March 9, 2016, the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The Ford Expedition he was driving struck a tractor trailer, causing extensive damage to the defendant's vehicle. Daniel Tutor, a passenger in the defendant's vehicle, died at the scene. The defendant sustained serious injuries to his face. Because the accident involved a fatality, numerous police officers were involved in the investigation. Detective John Vito Parisi, who was not on duty that night, was called in to work and reported to the scene of the accident. When he arrived at the scene, the chief of police of Sauget, Chief Jones, approached Detective Parisi's vehicle and directed him to go to St. Louis University Hospital, where the defendant was being treated, to obtain a blood sample for chemical testing. An emergency room nurse drew blood from the defendant at Detective Parisi's request. Detective Parisi brought the blood sample to the Illinois State Police crime lab, where it was tested for evidence of intoxication. The defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated DUI.

¶ 3 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that it violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. IV ). At a hearing on the motion, the defendant testified that he was treated at St. Louis University Hospital for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on March 9, 2016. He testified that he did not give any police officer permission to have his blood drawn while he was there. Asked if he spoke to any officers from the Sauget Police Department while he was in the hospital, the defendant testified that he did not remember even seeing any officers at the hospital. On cross-examination, the defendant testified that he did not remember having blood drawn that night. He explained that he was "out of it" that night and noted that he lost enough blood that he required a blood transfusion.

¶ 4 After the defendant testified, the State moved for a directed finding. The prosecutor argued that pursuant to Illinois's "implied consent" statutes, "if an individual is unconscious," that individual is deemed to have given "implied consent to any kind of blood draw." The court took the matter under advisement. A few days later, the court entered an order denying the State's motion for a directed finding.

¶ 5 The hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress continued one month later.

The court noted at the outset that it had denied the State's motion for a directed finding and that the burden had now shifted to the State to show that the warrantless blood draw was constitutionally permissible.

¶ 6 The first witness to testify for the State was Officer Scott Mundy of the Sauget Police Department. Officer Mundy testified that on the night of March 9, 2016, he and another officer, Renee Sherman, were dispatched to the scene of an accident on Illinois State Route 3 in Sauget. He explained that Officer Sherman was the primary officer on the case because it was her turn to take a call. He also explained that, because the accident involved a fatality, numerous officers responded, including Sauget Police Chief Jones and an accident reconstruction specialist from the Illinois State Police. Officer Mundy testified that he and Officer Sherman arrived at the scene at approximately the same time. Asked to describe what he observed when he arrived, Officer Mundy stated that he saw a white Ford Expedition with extensive front-end damage blocking both lanes of traffic. Nearby, a tractor trailer was parked along the side of the road. It sustained very little damage. The passenger in the Ford, later identified as Daniel Tutor, was deceased. Paramedic Steve Robbins was assisting the driver, who was still seated in the driver's seat. Officer Mundy identified the driver as the defendant.

¶ 7 Officer Mundy testified that he "thought [the defendant] could have been under the influence." He explained that the defendant had slurred speech when talking to Robbins and he was unable "to answer straight questions." Officer Mundy also noted that when the defendant exited his vehicle, he needed help getting out of the vehicle and walking. Officer Mundy acknowledged that he did not talk to the defendant at any time and he did not get close enough to the defendant to see what type of injury he had sustained. He stated, however, that the defendant's face appeared to be "a little bloody."

¶ 8 Officer Mundy further testified that the defendant was not placed under arrest at the scene of the accident. After the defendant was transported to St. Louis University Hospital for treatment and Daniel Tutor's body was removed from the defendant's vehicle, Officer Mundy conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. He testified that he saw debris all over the interior of the vehicle, including compact discs and cases. He further testified that he found an open bottle of Crown Royal on the driver's seat under debris. There was still some alcohol in the bottle.

¶ 9 The State's second witness was Detective John Vito Parisi. He testified that he was called into work at approximately 12:45 on the morning of March 10, 2016. When he arrived at the scene of the accident, Chief Jones approached his vehicle and directed him to go to St. Louis University Hospital to obtain a blood sample from the defendant.

¶ 10 Detective Parisi arrived at the hospital at approximately 1:25 a.m. and left approximately one hour later. He testified that, when he arrived, the defendant was "either passed out or unconscious." Detective Parisi did not observe the defendant displaying any signs of intoxication. Asked to describe the defendant's injuries, Detective Parisi replied, "His nose was just laid open."

¶ 11 Detective Parisi waited for the emergency room nurses to finish treating the defendant. He then read the defendant the warning to motorists (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c), 11-501.6(c) (West 2014) ) and asked the defendant if he understood. According to Detective Parisi, the defendant "just gave [him] a grunt." He then approached the defendant to ask him to provide a blood sample, but the defendant did not respond. He stated that the defendant appeared to be "either unconscious or in a deep, deep sleep." Detective Parisi then asked one of the nurses to take a blood sample from the defendant. Asked if the defendant was "unconscious during this time," Detective Parisi replied, "He was unconscious. At one time, he gave the nurses a hard time. He told them, ‘why are you laughing at me?’ And the nurses told him, ‘nobody is laughing at you.’ " We note that Detective Parisi was never asked to clarify his somewhat contradictory testimony concerning the defendant's state of consciousness.

¶ 12 A nurse obtained a blood sample from the defendant and gave it to Detective Parisi. Detective Parisi testified that he eventually read the reports of Officer Mundy, Officer Sherman, and the accident reconstruction specialist; however, he acknowledged that he did not read any of these reports on the day he obtained the blood sample from the defendant. Although he testified that he did read Chief Jones's report that morning, he did not say whether he read the report before obtaining the blood sample, and he did not describe its contents.

¶ 13 After Detective Parisi testified, the court turned its attention to the arguments of the parties. The defendant argued that, under Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), a search warrant is required for a blood draw unless there are exigent circumstances and there was no evidence in this case that the State even attempted to obtain a warrant. He further argued that neither section 11-501.1 nor 11-501.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code were applicable because the defendant was not under arrest when his blood was drawn. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1, 11-501.6 (West 2014).

¶ 14 The court asked defense counsel whether an arrest is necessary for section 11-501.2 to apply. See id. § 11-501.2. The court noted that subsection (c)(2) of that statute, the portion relied upon by the State, explicitly states only that it applies "if an officer has probable cause" and says nothing about an arrest of the defendant. See id. § 11-501.2(c)(2). In response, counsel argued that this provision must be read in the context of the entire statute. He noted that subsection (a)...