People v. Paton

• Decision Date: 24 October 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 4332
• Citation: 255 Cal.App.2d 347,62 Cal.Rptr. 865
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Betty Jane PATON, also known as Betty Jane Sylvester Smith, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 865

62 Cal.Rptr. 865

255 Cal.App.2d 347

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Betty Jane PATON, also known as Betty Jane Sylvester Smith, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4332.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Oct. 24, 1967.

Jere E. Hurley, Jr., Redding, Court-appointed counsel, for defendant appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Raymond Momboisse and Marjory E. Winston Parker, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff-respondent.

VAN DYKE, Associate Justice pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Shasta County. Appellant was charged with murder. After a jury trial, she was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Probation was denied and she was sentenced to prison.

Appellant was the common-law wife of the deceased, Robert 'Rusty' Paton. The relations of the two for years had been stormy. On July 5, 1966, appellant and Paton had driven to Redding and on their return to Central Valley had stopped at the Shasta Dam Club for a drink. When they reached home, they began arguing and he accused her of having affairs with other men. Angered by this, she went out for a walk. When she returned 30 minutes later, he had left the residence and she, knowing he would be at the Shasta Dam Club, went there. She was sitting at the bar when he insisted that they go home, argued with her, poured her drink on the bar, grabbed her purse, and took her out of the premises. When they arrived home he again accused her of affairs with other men and began telling the children that their mother was a tramp. During the argument Paton threatened to have the children taken away from her as being an unfit mother. Appellant was swearing and using vile language toward Paton. She told him she was going to the Hitching Post, another bar, to have a drink and pick up a man. She went out the front door and around to the back of the house and came back in. Paton was telling her minor daughters how bad their mother was. Appellant left the living room to go into the bathroom and Paton followed her. In the bathroom they quarreled. Appellant hit him and bloodied his nose. He again accused her of 'chippying' and 'going out on him' and then, as she said because she couldn't take the accusations of her sleeping with other men any longer she turned, walked into the kitchen, took a steak knife out of a drawer, walked back to where he was standing, and, with an overhand motion, drove the knife into his chest. She then took the knife back into the kitchen and washed off the blood. Paton went into the living room and laid on a couch. Appellant saw that he was bleeding quite badly and called for an ambulance. She then called the sheriff's office, saying, 'I just stabbed my husband.' The sheriff's office sent a deputy who went to the scene. When he arrived, Paton was lying on the couch and appellant was kneeling alongside. The deputy greeted her and asked what happened. Appellant said, 'The same thing as last time. I stabbed him again.' After the ambulance arrived and took Paton to the hospital, the sheriff's deputy advised her as to her constitutional rights. His testimony as to the manner in which this was done was as follows: 'I advised her that she had the right to remain silent, the right to consult an attorney. If she didn't have the funds to secure one for herself, the Court would appoint her one, and also that anything she did say could be used in a court of law.' He said he asked if she understood what he had told her and if there were any questions that she might not be clear on, and she said that she understood what had been said to her. Thereupon the deputy sheriff questioned appellant concerning the circumstances of her having stabbed Paton.

Thereafter appellant was taken to the sheriff's office. After the above warning had been repeated to her, she gave a statement which was later reduced to writing and signed by her. At her trial, all inculpatory statements made by her, including her written statement, were introduced into evidence without objection. Her written statement was read as follows:

"I have been advised I can consult an attorney and of my right to remain silent. I also have been advised I can have a Court appointed attorney if I have no fund. I also want to state no one had promised me anything if I give a statement.

"Yesterday my husband Robert Paton and myself came to Redding from Central Valley where we live at 405 Flower Street, and arrived at approximately 12:00 noon. We stopped at the Clover Club and had two drinks apiece, and then went to the hospital to see our son. We then left and returned to the Central Valley area where we stopped at the Shasta Dam Club for a drink.

"When we got inside the club two fellows who are friends of Bob's, Dick Thorenson and Roy Barns put their arms around me and gave me a kiss on the cheek. I believe we had three drinks at the club in all and left for home.

"When we arrived at home my children, Paula, age ten years, Toni, age seven, and Robin, age seventeen months, were there. Bob started picking at me and saying I was sleeping with other men, and saying the kids were not behaving, and other little things. About this time I got up and went for a walk. I believe I was gone for approximately one-half hour, maybe longer, and when I returned Bob was not at home. A friend of mine, Mary Evans, came by, and I had her take me to the Shasta Dam Club, as I knew Bob would be there. I went there so we could talk our troubles out. When I arrived I had a couple of drinks, and Bob was playing pool. We never spoke until he came by and poured my drink out and said--' Then there is a 'let's go, we,' and that is crossed out, and there are the initials 'BJP.'

"We never spoke until he came by and poured my drink out and said 'I'm going home and you are going with me.' "When we got home he accused me again of sleeping with other men. He was sitting in a chair by the phone, and I was standing up. All this time we were arguing. I left the front room to go in the bathroom, and he followed, still arguing. I pushed him and told him to leave me alone. I told told (sic) to get me a blanket, as I was going to sleep outside on the pad.

"I then entered the kitchen and Bob was talking all the time. I went to a drawer in the kitchen I knew had a knife, and got one out. It is approximately four or five inches long, a steak knife. I turned and walked back to where he was standing in the doorway, and I stabbed him once in the chest. I turned and threw the knife in the sink. Bob went into the front room and laid on the couch. I seen he was bleeding badly.

"I then called the ambulance and then the Sheriff's Office.

"This statement is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge."

On appeal, by brief and argument, appellant advanced three contentions of error committed by the trial court:

(1) To instruct on first degree murder because there was no evidence of premeditation. (2) To refuse to instruct on involuntary manslaughter. (3) To instruct that there is a presumption that if one acts as if she were conscious she is presumed to be conscious.

The premeditation and deliberation necessary in the proof of a charge of first degree murder may be inferred from a variety of facts and circumstances and need not necessarily be proved by direct evidence (People v. Torres, 214 Cal.App.2d 734, 29 Cal.Rptr. 706); and first degree murder may be found even though the act of killing quickly follows the formation of the intention to kill if that intent was reached with deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Perrotta, 224 Cal.App.2d 498, 504, 36 Cal.Rptr. 813.) Some of the factors which have been held to be ingredients in determining whether a killing was premeditated and deliberate have been the following: Prior quarrels between the defendant and the deceased (People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 185 P.2d 1); the use of a knife; and the fact that the wounds were not wild and unaimed but were in the area of the chest and the heart (People v. Morris, 174 Cal.App.2d 193, 344 P.2d 333); and the fact that defendant went to get a weapon (People v. Werner, 111 Cal.App.2d 264, 244 P.2d 476). In the present case the record shows that appellant left the doorway into the kitchen where she and Paton were arguing, walked ten feet to a drawer where a knife was, picked up the knife and returned to the doorway, stabbed Paton with an overhand motion, the knife puncturing the heart, returned to the kitchen and rinsed the blood from the knife at the sink. There was ample evidence to support a finding of first degree murder and therefore to require an instruction defining that crime. There was no error in giving such an instruction.

In support of appellant's contention that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to instruct on the offense of involuntary manslaughter, it is argued that appellant was hampered in that she did not remember the circumstances of the actual slaying. It is true that at trial appellant testified in her own behalf that she could not remember what happened during the vital period of time. She said that she could not remember anything between the point of time when she had left the bathroom and the point of time when she stood at the sink, washing the blood off the knife. A clinical psychologist testified as an expert witness that the things she did might have been done subconsciously and without her volition. This testimony does not help her in respect of the present assignment. That one acted unconsciously and without volition is a complete defense. One who so acts does not commit a crime at all. This defense was fully presented to the jury and instructions given thereon. The jury were told that if they found she so acted they should find her not guilty. The jury rejected this defense. Assuming her then to be conscious, she was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter under the facts. There is no evidence that...