People v. Patterson

Decision Date17 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. 115102.,115102.
Citation25 N.E.3d 526
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ronald PATTERSON, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Annette Collins and Douglas P. Harvath, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), and Hannah J. McKinney, law student, for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Christopher Kopacz, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, and Molly McPartland and Brad Kaye, law students, for appellee.

Scott F. Main and Julie L. Biehl, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Children & Family Justice Center et al.

Joshua A. Tepfer, Molly Hall and Tara Thompson, of Chicago, and Molly Wyler, law student, for amicus curiae Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant was 15 years old when he was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Pursuant to the Illinois automatic transfer statute (705 ILCS 405/5–130 (West 2008)

), his case was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, where defendant was tried as an adult, convicted by a jury of all three counts, and sentenced to a total of 36 years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the circuit court of Cook County had erred by admitting defendant's confession. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, 363 Ill.Dec. 818, 975 N.E.2d 1127. The court also concluded that evidence of the victim's sexual history was admissible on remand under the “constitutional necessity” exception to the state rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115–7(a) (West 2008)).

¶ 2 Before this court, the State argues that the appellate court erred by excluding defendant's confession and finding that evidence of the victim's sexual past was admissible on remand. Defendant filed a cross-appeal, contending that his confession was also inadmissible because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the pretrial suppression hearing, an issue not reached by the appellate court. Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of the automatic transfer provision (705 ILCS 405/5–130 (West 2008)

) and asserts that his sentence was excessive. We reverse the appellate court's exclusion of defendant's confession and determination that evidence of the victim's sexual history is admissible under an exception to the rape shield statute, reject his ineffective assistance claim, and uphold the constitutionality of the automatic transfer statute. Finally, we remand the cause to the appellate court for its initial consideration of defendant's excessive-sentence claim.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant Ronald Patterson was a 15–year–old ward of the State of Illinois living in a residential treatment facility when he committed a violent sexual assault on a 25–year–old staff member, E.C. While E.C. was driving defendant home from a weekend family visit, he forced her to pull the facility van into a deserted parking lot off the highway, where the assault occurred. After the assault, the victim returned to the facility with defendant. Once defendant was secured in his unit, the victim immediately reported the attack, and the police were called.

¶ 5 Defendant was charged in Cook County circuit court with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. His case was automatically transferred to criminal court, and he was tried as an adult, as required by statute (705 ILCS 405/5–130 (West 2008)

). On defense counsel's motion, a fitness examination and hearing were held. At the hearing, both parties stipulated to the testimony of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Nishad Nadkarni. Dr. Nadkarni found that defendant understood the charges against him, the court proceedings, and the role of court personnel. Dr. Nadkarni concluded that defendant was sane when the offenses were committed and did not suffer from a mental impairment limiting his ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to understand his Miranda rights. Defendant was able to define each of those rights accurately and was able to assist his trial counsel and behave appropriately in court. The trial court subsequently found defendant fit to stand trial without medication.

¶ 6 Defendant next filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to the police, arguing that the police youth officer did not contact defendant's legal guardian, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), before he was interviewed and did not “affirmatively” protect his rights. The motion also claimed his statement was involuntary because he was a special education student with limited reading skills and comprehension who was not given his Miranda rights before questioning. The motion did not allege, and defense counsel expressly denied, “any type of coercion or duress” by the police.

¶ 7 At the suppression hearing, several witnesses testified, including the residential treatment facility director, Stephen Kehoe. Kehoe stated that he spoke to two or three police officers the night defendant was taken into custody at the facility at approximately 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, December 14, 2008. Kehoe could not remember whether any of the officers asked him for permission to speak to defendant, and he denied possessing sufficient authority to grant permission, asserting that DCFS alone retained that authority. Kehoe did recall, however, officers obtaining the name and phone number of defendant's DCFS caseworker the night defendant was taken into custody.

¶ 8 Detective Joe Kaminski also testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he was the youth officer assigned to defendant's case and knew defendant was a resident of the treatment facility. After arriving at the police station on the night defendant was taken into custody, Detective Kaminski briefly spoke to E.C. before talking to defendant. Kaminski inquired about defendant's grade in school but did not inquire about his participation in special education classes. Detective Kaminski stated he called both Kehoe and defendant's caseworker shortly before 10 p.m. to notify them that defendant was at the Schaumburg police station and was going to be questioned about the assault. When they could not be reached, Kaminski left voicemail messages for them. Defendant's caseworker did not return his call for two days. Nonetheless, Kaminski confirmed with another officer prior to the start of questioning that Kehoe had been notified that defendant had been taken to the police station and that Kehoe had given the police permission to speak to defendant. Detective Kaminski testified at trial that after defendant was questioned he again called Kehoe, who confirmed that the police had permission to speak with defendant as well as to search the facility's van for evidence.

¶ 9 Kaminski described the role of a youth officer as advising defendant of his rights and ensuring his understanding, as well as answering defendant's questions. Before the police interview, Detective Kaminski explained to defendant why he was at the station and read his Miranda rights to him from a preprinted form at about 10 p.m., asking defendant to explain each right in his own words. Defendant stated that he understood his rights and accurately described each of them. The officer had defendant read the form waiving his rights aloud, initial each sentence, and sign the form. The record does not indicate that defendant either asked to speak to another adult or made any other request prior to the start of questioning.

¶ 10 A second detective, John Atamian, then interviewed defendant for about 45 minutes about the alleged assault. Although Detective Kaminski remained in the room during questioning, he did not participate. After the interview was over and defendant's statement was typed, it was read to defendant, who did not make any corrections. Defendant then read the statement aloud and signed it at 11:15 p.m.

¶ 11 Defendant's account of the events differed significantly. According to him, after he had been at the Schaumburg Police Station for 30 to 45 minutes, the youth officer asked him if he needed anything and questioning began shortly thereafter. He claimed he did not receive any Miranda warnings until the interview was over and he had signed a typewritten statement. He also asserted he did not read the statement before signing it. During the suppression hearing, defendant did not claim that he had been threatened, mistreated, or coerced by the police, that he failed to understand the interrogation process, that he had asked to speak to another adult, or that he was a special education student with trouble reading and writing.

¶ 12 The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statement, finding both that the youth officer had fulfilled his duty and that it was reasonable for the police to notify the residential facility director of defendant's arrest as he was a State ward and the facility “has been run under the supervision of [DCFS]. So it would be reasonable to assume that the director has some authority to act on behalf of DCFS. Particularly over people that are residents in his residence hall that he directs.” The judge also provided general remarks addressing his observations during the hearing, noting that it was “curious” that Kehoe's counsel attempted, but was not permitted, to sit in the witness box with him and describing Kehoe's inability to recall whether he gave the police permission to interview defendant as “interesting.” In addition, the judge noted that Kehoe never denied giving his permission despite admitting that he had talked to three different officers that night.

¶ 13 The trial court expressly found Detective Kaminski's testimony to be “very...

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