State v. B.T.D.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | CR-17-1171 |
| Citation | 296 So.3d 343 |
| Parties | STATE of Alabama v. B.T.D. B.T.D. v. State of Alabama |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Alabama Supreme Court 1180807
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Stephen N. Dodd, asst. atty. gen., for appellant/cross-appellee State of Alabama.
Gary L. Blume, Northport; and Marsha L. Levick, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for appellee/cross-appellant B.T.D.
Ebony Howard, Grace Graham, and Kathryn Sadasivan, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Southern Poverty Law Center, in support of the appellee/cross-appellant B.T.D.
The State of Alabama appeals a judgment of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissing an indictment charging B.T.D. with second-degree assault, see § 13A-6-21, Ala. Code 1975, based on the circuit court's conclusion that § 12-15-204, Ala. Code 1975, is unconstitutional. B.T.D. cross-appeals. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
On August 25, 2017, a Tuscaloosa County grand jury returned an indictment charging B.T.D. with the second-degree assault of C.H. Although B.T.D. was 17 years old at the time of the alleged assault, in which C.H. allegedly suffered a broken leg, § 12-15-204 required that B.T.D. be tried as an adult for the alleged assault. Specifically, § 12-15-204(a) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
On December 6, 2017, B.T.D. filed a motion seeking to have the circuit court dismiss the indictment and to declare § 12-15-204 unconstitutional. According to B.T.D., § 12-15-204 violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. In support of that argument, B.T.D. cited Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), in which, he said, the United States Supreme Court "held that the transfer of a child from juvenile to adult court imposes a significant deprivation of liberty" and therefore "made clear that a transfer proceeding must provide due process protections." (C. 44.) Specifically, B.T.D. contended that Kent requires the juvenile court to make a "full investigation ... into the facts of the alleged offense" and consider certain factors before a juvenile offender can be tried as an adult. (C. 45.) Thus, B.T.D. argued, § 12-15-204, which automatically requires that certain juvenile offenders be tried as an adult, "lacks the core requirements of Kent" (C. 45) because "procedural protections ... [are] nonexistent." (C. 49.) In further support of his due-process claim, B.T.D. also argued that juveniles have "a substantive due process right to have their youthfulness and its attendant characteristics considered as a mitigating factor at every stage of delinquency and criminal proceedings, ... especially regarding automatic transfer." (C. 55.) In support of that argument, B.T.D. cited Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) ; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ; and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). According to B.T.D., in those cases, the United States Supreme Court "repeatedly emphasized the importance of the hallmark features of adolescence to our laws of criminal procedure" (C. 42) and "demanded individualized consideration of those features before children can be exposed to the harshest consequences of the adult criminal justice system." (C. 42-43.)
B.T.D. also argued that § 12-15-204 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 In support of that argument, B.T.D. noted that, under § 12-15-203, Ala. Code 1975, a juvenile offender who is 14 or 15 years old can be tried as an adult, regardless of the offense, only after a hearing at which the juvenile court must consider certain factors.2 However, B.T.D. noted, a juvenile who has attained the age of 16 years and is charged with an offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 is automatically prosecuted as an adult. Relying on Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery, B.T.D. argued that "no ground can be conceived to justify the distinctions drawn between older and younger children" in § 12-15-204. (C. 57.)
Finally, B.T.D. argued that § 12-15-204(a)(4) -- the specific paragraph of § 12-15-204 mandating that he be tried as an adult -- is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. As noted, § 12-15-204(a)(4) requires that a juvenile offender who has attained the age of 16 years be tried as an adult for committing "[a] felony which has as an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical injury." According to B.T.D., however, the phrase "serious physical injury" lacks sufficient clarity and is "so broad and vague that it invites arbitrary ... prosecution." (C. 54.)
The State filed a response to B.T.D.'s motion in which it argued that this Court has already decided the constitutionality of § 12-15-34.1, Ala. Code 1975 -- the predecessor to § 12-15-204 -- in Price v. State, 683 So.2d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).3 On June 25, 2018, the circuit court heard oral arguments from the parties regarding B.T.D.'s due-process and equal-protection challenges to § 12-15-204 and his vagueness and overbreadth challenges to § 12-15-204(a)(4).
On August 30, 2018, the circuit court entered a judgment dismissing the indictment against B.T.D. based on the court's findings that § 12-15-204 violates a juvenile offender's due-process rights and that § 12-15-204(a)(4), specifically, is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. In support of its conclusion that § 12-15-204 violates due-process principles, the circuit court relied on Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery to find that a juvenile has "a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his status as a juvenile." (C. 1248.) (For ease of reference in this opinion, we hereinafter refer to Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery as "the Roper line of cases.") In reaching that conclusion, the circuit court reasoned that the Roper line of cases "recognized that youth are developmentally different from adults" (C. 1241) and therefore "mandate[s] an individualized approach before youth may be subjected to adult consequences." (C. 1243.) Specifically, the circuit court contended that Kent "listed several factors that should be considered before a child may be transferred to adult criminal court." (C. 1246.) Thus, the circuit court concluded, because § 12-15-204 "does not allow for consideration of any of the Kent factors," the statute "violates due process by mandating that certain children automatically be treated as adults, thereby foreclosing any consideration of their individual attributes and circumstances."4 (C. 1247.) As to § 12-15-204(a)(4), specifically, the circuit court concluded that the legislature's use of the phrase "serious physical injury" renders § 12-15-204(a)(4) unconstitutionally "vague and overly-broad." (C. 1251.) According to the circuit court, under § 12-15-204(a)(4), "[a] child can be deprived of her/his liberty interest in remaining in juvenile court ... in virtually every circumstance involving allegations of a felony with an injury." (C. 1251-52.) Finally, the circuit court rejected the State's argument that this Court upheld the constitutionality of § 12-15-204 in Price. According to the circuit court, this Court did not address the appellant's due-process arguments in Price because those arguments had been waived for appellate review. The circuit court also noted that Price "makes no mention of Kent" and "was decided ... before the current automatic transfer...
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