People v. Patton
Decision Date | 25 July 2019 |
Docket Number | D074344 |
Citation | 250 Cal.Rptr.3d 552,37 Cal.App.5th 1062 |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kayvon PATTON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Leslie A. Rose, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Kristine A. Gutierrez, and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Kayvon Patton pleaded guilty to grand theft of personal property ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a) )1 and was sentenced to three years of formal probation. Among the conditions of probation was a condition subjecting his electronic devices to warrantless search. Patton challenges this condition as unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 ( Lent ) and unconstitutionally overbroad.
At the outset, we reject the People's contention that Patton's appeal should be dismissed because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (See § 1237.5.) The People maintain a certificate is necessary because Patton (1) knew at the time of his plea that some reasonable conditions of probation would be imposed, and (2) waived his appellate rights as part of the plea agreement, including the ability to challenge a condition that was unknown at the time of the plea. As we explain, notice that some unspecified probation conditions will likely be imposed at a future date does not mean that a postsentence challenge to a particular condition is an attack on the validity of the plea. More fundamentally, the language of Patton's plea agreement cannot be reasonably construed to waive his right to appeal a probation condition that was not specifically addressed in that agreement. As a result, Patton's contentions in this appeal are based on "[g]rounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea's validity," thus obviating the need for a certificate. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4).)2
Considering the merits of Patton's appeal, however, we conclude that the electronic device search condition was properly imposed. Patton pleaded guilty to stealing electronic devices—cell phones and other items—so that he could buy drugs. There is a direct and manifestly reasonable relationship between the electronic device search condition and both the crime of which Patton was convicted as well as the underlying reasons for his criminal behavior such that the condition will assist in preventing future criminality. And while searches of electronic devices surely implicate privacy interests, a condition of probation permitting examination of such devices without a warrant is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
On January 19, 2018 around 4:30 p.m., officers with the San Diego Police Department responded to a reported theft at Hit Mobile Store. Store employee Miguel O. stated that he had been helping a female customer at the front counter when two men entered the store, followed by two more men. At some point he heard a loud crack and saw the four men pulling electronic devices off security cords attached to the wall. They ran out of the store with three iPhones, two Apple Watches, an iPad Pro, a Samsung S7, and Samsung gear VR.
When officers arrived, they discovered a smudged fingerprint on a Samsung phone that was dropped by one of the men on his way out of the store.3 A lab report identified the fingerprint as belonging to defendant Kayvon Patton. Video from the store's surveillance camera confirmed Patton as one of the four men.
The San Diego County District Attorney charged Patton with felony grand theft of personal property ( § 487, subd. (a) ). Patton pleaded guilty as part of a plea agreement whereby he would receive formal probation and pay restitution of $4,620. As part of the plea deal he agreed to "give up my right to appeal ... any sentence stipulated herein." Another part of the form agreement stated, "As conditions of probation I may be given up to a year in jail custody, plus the fine, and any other conditions deemed reasonable by the Court."
At the sentencing hearing in July 2018, the judge imposed three years of formal probation under various conditions with a stay of 240 days in local custody pending successful completion of probation. The probation conditions included limitations on drug and alcohol possession and an order to stay away from the other unidentified perpetrators. Another condition required that Patton "submit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers , and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [a probation officer] or law enforcement officer." (Italics added.) Patton's appeal challenges this condition. He did not request a certificate of probable cause.
The People contend we should not reach the merits of Patton's appeal because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5 after entering his guilty plea. That section generally prohibits appeals following pleas of guilty or no contest unless the defendant first obtains a certificate from the trial court attesting that there are reasonable grounds for the appeal. There are two exceptions to this general rule, as provided in Rule 8.304(b)(4) : A certificate is not required if the appeal is based on either "[t]he denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5" or "[g]rounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea's validity." The People contend a certificate was required because the second exception (the only one pertinent here) was not satisfied.
The People do not dispute that the specific grounds for Patton's appeal—a condition of probation imposed at sentencing two months after his plea—"arose after entry of the plea" within the meaning of Rule 8.304. They suggest, however, that because the plea agreement contemplated a grant of probation with "reasonable" conditions, Patton is attempting to challenge something he knew about, at least in a general sense, at the time of the plea. More forcefully, they rely on People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 ( Espinoza ) to argue that by waiving his right to appeal the "sentence stipulated herein," Patton's challenge to the probation condition necessarily "affect[s] the validity of the plea" because he is seeking to narrow the scope of his appellate waiver.
The People's first argument need not detain us long. The mere fact that Patton knew some unspecified "reasonable" restrictions or requirements could be imposed as a condition of his probation does not mean he was agreeing to accept anything the court decided to include, regardless of how unreasonable he thought it was. The People's reliance on People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ( Panizzon ) is misplaced. In that case, the defendant challenged the specific sentence to which he had agreed as part of his plea agreement, "as opposed to a matter left open or unaddressed by the deal." ( Id. at p. 86, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061.) Here, unlike in Panizzon , Patton is challenging the imposition of an allegedly unreasonable probation condition that he had no knowledge of at the time he entered into the agreement.
The boilerplate appellate waiver included on the plea form likewise does not preclude Patton's appeal. As this court has previously observed, ( People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 815, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 ( Mumm ), quoting Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at p. 85, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ; accord, People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1662–1663, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 ( Vargas ) [ ]; People v. Sherrick (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 657, 659, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 [ ]; In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1160, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 [ ]; People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 391, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 [ ].)
In Espinoza , supra , 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, the appellate court relied on Justice Baxter's unusual concurring opinion to his own majority opinion in ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Alvarez
...(Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th 773; Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68) and recent application of this guidance by our court (People v. Patton (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1062 (Patton)). In Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68, the plea agreement included a specified sentence, and the defendant's argument on ......