People v. Payne

• Decision Date: 07 May 1996
• Citation: 88 N.Y.2d 172,643 N.Y.S.2d 949,666 N.E.2d 542
• Parties: , 666 N.E.2d 542 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel PAYNE, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony JONES, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles LOWERY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 949

643 N.Y.S.2d 949

88 N.Y.2d 172, 666 N.E.2d 542

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel PAYNE, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony JONES, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles LOWERY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 7, 1996.

[88 N.Y.2d 174] [666 N.E.2d 545] Claudia S. Trupp and Daniel L. Greenberg, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

[88 N.Y.2d 175] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Victor Barall and Roseann B. MacKechnie, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Claudia S. Trupp and Daniel L. Greenberg, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Victor Barall and Roseann B. MacKechnie, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

[88 N.Y.2d 176] Allen Fallek and Daniel L. Greenberg, New York City, for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

[88 N.Y.2d 177] [666 N.E.2d 546] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Michael Gore, Roseann B. MacKechnie and Victor Barall, of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

This Court recently refined the three-step procedure that trial courts are required to follow in determining allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against prospective jurors (People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 653 N.E.2d 1173; see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69). These appeals in three unrelated cases require the Court to review the application of these procedures when the People assert discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the defense (see, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235). In all three cases, the trial courts upheld several objections from the People that defense peremptory strikes discriminated on the basis of race (two in People v. Payne, two in People v. Jones and one in People v. Lowery ).

I.

A.

In People v. Payne, defendant was convicted of obstructing governmental administration and second-degree criminal contempt, arising out of an incident in a Brooklyn courtroom involving two court officers. During the jury examination phase of his trial, defendant, who is African-American, challenged four white prospective jurors: Numbers Two, Six, Eight and Nine. Only Numbers Eight and Nine, whom the trial court ordered seated despite defendant's effort to peremptorily excuse them, are at issue on this appeal. The People made a Batson- Kern objection, alleging that the four peremptory challenges were racially discriminatory. The trial court required defense counsel to "[g]ive me race-neutral reasons." Defense counsel's explanation for his challenge to juror Number Eight was as follows:

"I just note for him, he's lived in the same neighborhood in Brooklyn for 50 years and that his criteria for judging a witness' credibility was limited. He seemed to believe that one would judge the credibility of a witness just by observing their body language and I think the Court Officers are going to be more calm witnesses than Mr. Payne will. So, I had a problem with that."

As to Number Nine, counsel stated:

"[A]ll I could say was that I had trouble getting any information out of him. He sat there quietly for the most part. All his answers were yes or no and I'm insecure with that because I have no idea who this person is and that makes both me and Mr. Payne uncomfortable. We'd like to elicit dialogue from jurors and, so, we couldn't be confident that he could be fair and impartial."

Notably, counsel did not challenge other, similarly-situated jurors, who had either lived in one place for a long time or gave laconic answers to counsel's questions.

After hearing defense counsel's proffered reasons, the trial court ruled that the peremptory challenge to juror Number Eight could not stand because the race-neutral explanation was "totally disingenuous." As to Number Nine, the trial court stated, "the fact that he answered yes or no, other jurors answered yes or no. You didn't challenge them. I find that to be a racially motivated challenge and I will disallow that challenge." The court allowed the defense peremptory challenges to Numbers Two and Six.

The Appellate Division affirmed, and on the pertinent issue ruled:

"[T]he Supreme Court properly determined that the explanations proffered by defense counsel for the exercise of his peremptory challenges against the two subject panelists were mere pretext offered in an attempt to conceal a racially discriminatory intent. This determination is entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by the record" (213 A.D.2d 565, 565-566, 623 N.Y.S.2d 922).

A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal to the defendant, and we now affirm. B.

In People v. Jones, the defendant, an African-American, was convicted in Brooklyn of selling crack/cocaine. After the first round of jury examination prior to trial, defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against six white prospective jurors. The prosecutor objected, asserting racial discrimination. The trial court was satisfied that the People had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and asked defense counsel to provide "non-pretextual" reasons for the peremptory challenges. Defense counsel objected, arguing the lack of a prima facie showing, but nonetheless proffered purportedly race-neutral explanations as to each of the challenged jurors.

The excusal of two of the six jurors--those for whom the trial court ultimately disallowed the defense peremptory challenges--are the only ones at issue in this case. As to juror Number Two, defense counsel stated:

"[He] was challenged based on a consultation with my client. He, based on his own feelings regarding the types of individuals that he wanted to sit on the jury that would judge him, felt that juror number two did not respond in a way that he felt that that individual would be fair to him."

Counsel articulated his challenge to juror Number Six as follows:

"[H]is wife is a legal secretary and has experience in that area and, again, number six was one of the jurors that on consultation with my client, he again felt that one of the peremptory challenges that we have that he felt was to be used because of the way he felt about this particular person."

The court found, however, that "the reasons given for [Numbers Two and Six] are pretextual and those jurors will be seated." The Trial Judge denied the rest of the People's objections--allowing the defense peremptory strikes to stand as to the other four prospective jurors. The court also granted in part and denied in part a Batson objection by the defendant pertaining to some of the People's peremptory challenges.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (213 A.D.2d 677, 624 N.Y.S.2d 209). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal and we now modify and conditionally remit for further proceedings.

C.

In People v. Lowery, defendant was convicted in Brooklyn of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. After the fourth round of jury selection at defendant's trial, the prosecutor made a Batson- Kern objection, alleging a defense pattern of striking white jurors throughout all four rounds, culminating with six-out-of-six challenges of white jurors in the fourth round. In response to a trial court inquiry, defense counsel gave the following explanation for his challenge to juror Number Three, the only juror at issue on this appeal:

"[B]asically, I looked at her, she's from Bay Ridge. I'm looking at--I would like to increase, have more the type of people who come from the neighborhood he comes from. She's from Bay Ridge. She's a high school teacher.

"She didn't appeal to me, she didn't appeal--it's a peremptory challenge. She did not appeal to me."

The court ordered Number Three to be seated over defendant's objection, but upheld the defense peremptory strikes for the other five. The court stated, "That one is overruled on the basis of the objection made. It's not race neutral, in my view."

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination and, thus, properly required defense counsel to proffer race-neutral reasons. As to juror Number Three, the court held that, "[w]hile the defense counsel's explanations were generally race-neutral, we agree with the court's conclusion, which is to be accorded great deference on appeal" that the challenge to juror Number Three was pretextual (214 A.D.2d 684, 685, 626 N.Y.S.2d 205).

A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal, and we now modify and conditionally remit for further proceedings. II.

A.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, supra, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the peremptory challenge of prospective jurors based on their race (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.). The Batson rule circumscribes racially rooted peremptory excusals by lawyers for both the defense and prosecution equally (see, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 643, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, supra; N.Y. Const., Art. I, § 11; see also, People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 104, n. 1, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 653 N.E.2d 1173, supra; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33). The essence of a Batson violation is intentional discrimination that rises to an equal protection violation (Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866-1867, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, affg. 75 N.Y.2d 350, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621). The cases of the past 10 years honor and enforce these constitutional principles and promulgate...