People v. Pedersen, A115239 (Cal. App. 12/11/2007)
| Decision Date | 11 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | A115239 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL PEDERSEN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appeal from the Alameda County, Super. Ct. No. 129317.
After serving the sentence for his second conviction for a crime of sexual violence, defendant Paul Pedersen was civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).1 In this recommitment hearing, two prosecution psychologists provided expert testimony that defendant had been convicted of qualifying sexually violent crimes, suffered from a mental disorder, and was likely to commit future sexually violent crimes if released. A defense psychologist disputed the diagnosis of a mental disorder and contended that defendant's age made it unlikely that he would commit further sexual crimes if released. The jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator. Defendant raises several claims of error in connection with his trial. We affirm.
In 1999, defendant was adjudged a sexually violent predator and civilly committed pursuant to section 6600 and former section 6604, which then specified a two-year term of commitment. (Stats. 1995, ch. 762, § 3, p. 5917.) He was recommitted once before the instant petition to extend his commitment was filed on February 13, 2004. Prior to trial on that petition, on January 24, 2006, the district attorney filed an additional petition. The two petitions were consolidated for trial.
The matter was tried to a jury. The prosecution relied on testimony by two psychologists, Jeremy Coles and Lisa Jeko. Their testimony was similar in most material respects. They described two prior incidents of violent sexual conduct by defendant that led to criminal convictions. In the first, defendant induced a six-year-old girl to approach him, grabbed her, took her behind the house where he was staying, and sexually assaulted her. In connection with that offense, defendant pled guilty to a charge of oral copulation with a child under the age of 14. In the second incident, which occurred within five months of his release from prison on the first conviction, defendant broke into a woman's room in a boarding house and kept her confined for approximately an hour and a half, while he beat and sexually assaulted her. Defendant pleaded guilty to a series of charges in connection with that incident, including rape with a foreign object, forcible oral copulation, sodomy, and attempted rape.
On the basis primarily of these acts and a further sexual incident that occurred during defendant's imprisonment, both psychologists diagnosed defendant as suffering from a mental illness known as paraphilia not otherwise specified. Both also opined that defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent conduct in the future if released from confinement. They based this view on the results of two psychological "instruments" used for predicting the likelihood of future sexual offenses, known as Static-99 and MNSOST-R, and on various personal characteristics and attitudes of defendant, such as his alcohol abuse, his refusal of treatment for a sexual disorder, and a personality disorder that causes him to disregard rules and lack empathy for others.
Defendant was called to testify by the prosecution. He was examined about the various sexual incidents, which he generally acknowledged. He denied, however, having a mental disorder and blamed alcohol abuse for his various acts of sexual violence.
Clinical psychologist Raymond Anderson provided expert testimony on defendant's behalf. Dr. Anderson opined that defendant did not fit the definition for the disorder of paraphilia. Although Dr. Anderson acknowledged that some rapists suffer from a mental disorder, which he referred to as "preferential rape disorder," Dr. Anderson did not believe defendant fit the behavior pattern for this illness. Dr. Anderson was also critical of the Static-99 test, which he believed was unreliable in predicting reoffense. Dr. Anderson estimated defendant's likelihood of reoffense if released "in the low-single digits," based in part on defendant's age, nearly 55 at the time.
The jury recommitted defendant, finding true the allegation that he is a sexually violent predator as defined in section 6600.
Each element must be proved. It is not enough, for example, that there exist a risk that the person will commit further sexually violent acts; the risk must arise from a mental impairment. (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1157.) Further, the danger and mental disorder must exist at the time of the commitment hearing. (Id. at p. 1162; People v. Munoz (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 421, 430.)
Defendant first contends that "the `likely to reoffend' standard offends substantive due process" because it "guarantees his lifelong forced hospitalization absent meaningful review standards or clear standards governing release for aged patients." Because the statute does not in any way "guarantee" defendant's lifelong commitment, his exact legal claim on this point is vague. The claim is premised, however, on two contentions about SVPA proceedings: that they are flawed because they fail to take account of the decreasing tendency of sex offenders to reoffend as they age and that recommitment can be based on past acts and assumptions made on the basis of those acts, rather than on the present condition of a defendant. For the reasons discussed below, we find that neither of these contentions was supported by the evidence presented at trial.4
In part, defendant contends that his recommitment was based on his past acts and assumptions made on the basis of those acts, rather than on his present condition. Because his past will not change, he argues, the SVPA will result in his lifelong commitment. The SVPA expressly proscribes an offender's SVPA commitment solely on the basis of his or her past criminal acts. Section 6600, subdivision (a)(3) states, As noted in People v. Rasmuson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1509,
Further, defendant's claim that he was recommitted solely on the basis of his past acts is not supported by the record at trial. It is true that the psychologists' conclusions that defendant suffers from a mental disorder were based largely on his past acts, including forced sodomy against his wife and an incident of public masturbation in prison. The experts' respective conclusions that a mental disorder caused him to be at significant continued risk of reoffense were not, however, based solely on the past. Although they differed somewhat about the basis for their opinions, both gave significant weight to defendant's present attitudes and mental state. They considered both factors weighing in favor of further such crimes, such as his insistence that his acts resulted from alcohol abuse rather than any underlying sexual disorder, his refusal to...
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