People v. Pedesclaux
| Decision Date | 08 May 1963 |
| Citation | 216 Cal.App.2d 1,30 Cal.Rptr. 574 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jules J. PEDESCLAUX, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 3380. |
Walter Cook, under appointment by the Third District Court of Appeal, Sacramento, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., by Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John L. Giordano, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.
Jules J. Pedesclaux and a codefendant were found to be guilty by a jury of the crime of robbery. Pedesclaux has appealed from the judgment entered.
The facts as shown by the record are as follows:
The victim, Hing Kung, lived in Locke, California. On April 29, 1962, he went to Stockton, California, from Sacramento, California, and took a room at the MacArthur Hotel on Lafayette Street.
He got up the next morning about 3:30 a. m. and went out to try to find a job. He left the hotel carrying on his person $2 in folding money in one pocket and fifty cents, a nickel and a penny in a green coin purse, nail clippers and two keys in the other.
He left the hotel and started to walk down Lafayette Street. Douglas Foster and Jules J. Pedesclaux were standing on the south side of Lafayette Street. As he started walking the victim heard Foster and Pedesclaux say, 'Let's get that guy!'
They ran toward the victim. Foster and appellant Pedesclaux grabbed the victim, one on each side, and Foster held a knife to the victim's throat while he and the appellant went through his pockets.
They took the victim's possessions from him, which consisted of two $1 bills, a fifty-cent piece, a nickel and a penny, a green leather coin purse, two keys and a pair of nail clippers. Then they let him go.
At that moment the victim spotted a cruising police car about a third of a block away and started running toward it, waving his arms and saying, 'Help, help, they just robbed me.'
While he was saying, 'they just robbed me,' he turned and motioned toward the sidewalk on the south side of Lafayette Street. The two policemen saw the two defendants standing there.
Officer Henderson, who was driving the car, swung it around in front of the Grand Hotel which Foster had entered on a dead run. Officer Johnson immediately jumped out of the car. He ordered appellant who was trying to sneak away to halt and ran into the Grand Hotel. When he brought Foster back, he found the appellant in the custody of Officer Henderson. They conducted a search and found a knife on Foster. They searched the area and found two $1 bills, a fifty-cent piece, a green coin purse containing one nickel, and a key ring or key chain with finger nail clippers and two keys on it on the ground in the gutter.
Appellant testifying in his own defense claimed that he was walking down Lafayette Street to Eliot's Cafe, having just left the Grand Hotel where he was living at the time, when he saw the victim mumbling to himself and shaking his hands. Appellant said he stopped and watched him. He thought he was drunk.
Appellant claimed he heard the man saying that someone had robbed him and he was pointing at the appellant. The next thing he knew a squad car pulled up and Officer Johnson jumped out of the car. The appellant moved out of his way and Johnson ran right by him. Appellant started walking back to where he came from and then Officer Henderson stopped him. Appellant asked him, 'What's the matter, Officer?' He was arrested and taken to the police station.
Appellant does not contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction but contends that a number of instructions given by the court were prejudicially erroneous.
He first contends that the court erred in giving the second paragraph of the following instructions:
'All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly and actively commit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission, or who advise and encourage its commission, are regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.
' '
'For one person to aid and abet another in the commission of a criminal offense means to knowingly and with criminal intent aid, promote, encourage or instigate by act or counsel, or by both act and counsel, the commission of such offense.'
Appellant claims that that portion of the quoted instruction defining the word 'abet' was erroneous because of the use of the disjunctive 'or' before the words 'aiding the commission of such criminal offense.' Appellant contends that this instruction permitted the jury to find him guilty if he merely aided his codefendant.
The instruction was not improper. The definition has been accepted in People v. Munoz, 198 Cal.App.2d 649, 18 Cal.Rptr. 82, and People v. Best, 43 Cal.App.2d 100, 105, 110 P.2d 504. Any one of the acts set forth would suffice. If, as appellant contends, the conjunctive should have been used, the jury would have had to find all the acts set forth, which would have been an improper test.
Appellant contends also that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an aider and abettor must have been present at the time of the alleged offense. This contention is without merit. This is not necessarily true as constructive presence is sufficient. In this case there is no question as to the presence of the appellant at the scene so it could not have been error not to have given the instruction.
Furthermore, the general rule that the jury in a criminal case should be instructed on general principles of law pertinent to the case is not applicable to specific points developed during the trial and, unless intructions as to these specific points are requested by the party desiring them, it is not incumbent on the court to give such instructions on its own motion where the jury is otherwise fully and fairly instructed in the general principles of law involved in the case. (People v. Turville, 51 Cal.2d 620, 335 P.2d 678.)
Whether a person shown to have been present at the time and place of the commission of a crime aided and abetted therein is a question of fact for the jury to decide from the circumstances proved. (People v. Perez, 169 Cal.App.2d 473, 337 P.2d 539; People v. Esparza, 182 Cal.App.2d 656, 6 Cal.Rptr. 568.)
Appellant also contends the court committed error in giving the following instruction:
'When two * * * persons participate in committing the crime of robbery, if one of them has in his possession a dangerous or deadly weapon while engaged in the robbery, such possession constitutes a possession of the weapon by the other * * *.'
Appellant objects because the word 'participate' was not defined and the failure to...
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...The decision of the trier of fact on this issue is final when it is supported by sufficient evidence in the record. (People v. Pedesclaux, 216 Cal.App.2d 1, 30 Cal.Rptr. 574. The record clearly supports the inference that appellant David Martinez knowingly aided and abetted Frank Martinez i......
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