People v. Peetz

• Decision Date: 30 December 1959
• Citation: 7 N.Y.2d 147,196 N.Y.S.2d 83,164 N.E.2d 384
• Parties: , 164 N.E.2d 384 PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent v. Herbert PEETZ, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 83

196 N.Y.S.2d 83

7 N.Y.2d 147, 164 N.E.2d 384

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent v. Herbert PEETZ, Jr., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 30, 1959.

Arnold E. Wallach, Aaron B. Z. Silver, Brooklyn, Chester E. Kleinberg, New York City, for appellant.

Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (William I. Siegel, David Diamond, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

The basic question presented is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indictment returned by the Kings County Grand Jury charging the defendant with the crime of manslaughter, second degree. He is accused of throwing his infant son into a baby carriage while in the heat of passion, thereby inflicting fatal injuries. The defendant's motions to dismiss the indictment before trial following the inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and to dismiss the indictment at the trial for the failure of the prosecution to prove a prima facie case were denied.

The degree of evidence sufficient to warrant the return of an indictment by a Grand Jury is defined in the statute as the condition 'when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury'. (Code of Criminal Procedure, § 251.)

In the clearest of thems the statute states that the determination as to whether a trial jury would convict upon the evidence is specifically relegated by the Legislature to the judgment of the Grand Jury (People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 129, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 554). In order to form such a judgment, however, the evidence presented to the Grand Jury taken together must be the equivalent of prima facie proof that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant (People v. Silinsky, 235 App.Div. 289, 293, 257 N.Y.S. 58, 62). If the legal evidence does not establish the commission of the crime, it would be manifestly impossible for a Grand Jury to arrive at a judgment that a trial jury might convict.

A homicide is manslaughter in the second degree 'when committed without a design to effect death * * * (i)n the heat of passion, but not by a dangerous weapon or by the use of means either cruel or unusual' (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1052, subd. 2).

The minutes of the Grand Jury contain the following pertinent testimony. The Acting Medical Examiner of Kings County read from the medical report of the autopsy which revealed the cause of death. According to the medical report, it was due to a fractured skull, subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhage. A stenographer from the District Attorney's office identified statements recorded by him which had been made by the defendant to an Assistant District Attorney. The detective who arrested the defendant testified that he was present at the interview conducted by the Assistant District Attorney. He said that the defendant stated that upon entering his home on the evening of June 3, 1956, between 8:00 and 8:30 p. m., he was greeted by his wife in a costume which he criticized. He admitted that he was annoyed because he had on prior occasions advised her that he expected his wife to be tidy. On this occasion his wife was sitting in the living proom holding the infant in her arms, while their daughter, then aged 17 months, played on the floor beside her. After a brief discussion defendant took the infant and dropped him in his carriage which was standing nearby in the kitchen. When the defendant returned to the kitchen later, the boby was gasping for breath. Following fruitless efforts to resuscitate the baby, defendant called a priest, who in turn notified the fire department. The firemen administered oxygen in vain.

The sworn testimony of the defendant's wife before the Grand Jury presents the events leading up to the child's death in this manner. She said her husband carried the child into the kitchen. She was with him and watched him 'lay the bady in the carriage * * * just like he always do'. When Mrs. Peetz, Jr., was asked whether she and defendant had an argument, she replied 'No, we had a little discussion about how I was dressed'. She explained that her husband expected her to be attractive when he arrived home, but that on the day of the tragedy she appeared dishevelled.

The Assistant District Attorney, dissatisfied with Mrs. Peetz, Jr's., replies, then endeavored to persuade her to admit that she had given different answers to questions put to her on a prior date. Mrs. Peetz, Jr., was asked many questions from a 'transcript' of the alleged prior interrogation of her concerning the state of mind of the defendant and the manner in which he carried and placed the baby in the carriage. She disavowed the answers read to her from the alleged statement taken at the time of the death of the baby. She flatly denied the...