People v. Pendleton

• Decision Date: 03 April 1985
• Docket Number: Cr. 39472
• Citation: 212 Cal.Rptr. 524,166 Cal.App.3d 496
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 166 Cal.App.3d 496 166 Cal.App.3d 496, 167 Cal.App.3d 413 The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Patrick PENDLETON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 524

212 Cal.Rptr. 524

Previously published at 166 Cal.App.3d 496

166 Cal.App.3d 496, 167 Cal.App.3d 413

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Patrick PENDLETON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 39472.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

April 3, 1985.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 1, 1985.

Review Denied July 11, 1985.

Frank O. Bell, State Public Defender, Richard Avila, Deputy State Public Defender, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow, William V. Ballough, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

COMPTON, Acting Presiding Judge.

During a ten day period between September 29 and October 9, 1979, this defendant, along with various accomplices, committed a series of armed robberies. In each instance defendant was armed with a shotgun.

In a robbery of a bar committed on October 6, defendant and his accomplice, one Robert Tanner, were both armed with shotguns. Each used his weapon to menace the customers and employees in the bar. While defendant was removing $27 from the cash register, Tanner shot and killed one of the customers who disobeyed an order to stand still.

On October 29, 1979, a deputy sheriff attempted to apprehend defendant and Tanner. Defendant shot the deputy in the face with the shotgun. The deputy survived but was blinded in one eye.

A jury found defendant guilty of a count of first degree murder, five counts of robbery, one count of attempted robbery, one count of kidnapping for robbery and one count of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.

The charge of first degree murder was predicated on the felony-murder doctrine and defendant's role as a co-participant in the armed robbery where the killing occurred.

The jury also found the existence of special circumstances in that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery and, as required by the court's instruction, that defendant "intentionally aided and abetted in the commission of a first degree murder." Although the instruction was requested by defendant, he did not testify and offered no evidence on this issue.

At the penalty phase defendant again did not testify. The jury imposed the penalty of life without possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the jury venire; (2) that the felony-murder doctrine was unconstitutional; and (3) that to find the existence of special circumstances the jury must first, under proper instructions, find that defendant intended a killing by either himself or his accomplice. Defendant urged there was no evidence that he intended the victim be killed.

On August 16, 1982, over 2 1/2 years ago this court rejected defendant's contentions and affirmed the judgment. Our Supreme Court granted a hearing. Subsequently on December 12, 1983, it filed its opinion in Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, holding that a finding of special circumstance based upon a killing in the perpetration of one of certain specified felonies, requires an intent to kill on the part of defendant regardless of whether he or she was the killer or an accomplice. By implication the court concluded that an instruction such as was given here would be inadequate since it would, as a result of the felony murder rule, permit a finding of special circumstance on the basis of intentionally aiding the underlying felony.

In People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826, it was determined that Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, would apply retroactively to all cases not yet final. It was further held that failure to instruct the jury on the need for the prosecution to prove an intent to kill in addition to the intent to commit the underlying felony would constitute reversible error except in very limited circumstances.

Prior to the foregoing decisions, our high court had held in People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029, that a trial court retain jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1385 to strike or dismiss a special circumstance finding.

At the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Carlos and Garcia, the instant case was pending before that court. By an order dated February 4, 1985, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637, however, it was ordered transferred back to us with directions to reconsider our previous decision in light of Carlos, Garcia and Williams, supra. The court further directed us to reconsider the decision in light of People v. Cantu (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 259, 207 Cal.Rptr. 460.

We first consider defendant's contention that he was denied his constitutional right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and thus, under the court's holding in People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433, is entitled to an automatic reversal of his conviction.

In Harris, as in the instant case, the defense moved to quash the jury venire on the ground that the use of voter registration lists as a sole source for the jury pool in Los Angeles County resulted in the systematic exclusion of black and Hispanics. ¹ In opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that the defendant's statistical showing was deficient as being based on total population figures rather than more refined data showing the ethnic breakdown of those eligible to serve as jurors. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defense had failed to establish a prima facie case in support of the allegation that the jury was not drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The matter proceeded to trial and the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's statistical evidence, based on total population figures, was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the fair cross-section rule had been violated. The court further held that once such a showing has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with either more precise statistical evidence demonstrating that no significant disparity existed or that there was a compelling justification for the procedure resulting in the disparity in the jury pool.

Concluding that the trial court erred when it found that the defendant had not made a prima facie case, the court characterized the error as prejudicial per se and reversed the conviction. It took no position, however, on the issue of whether the decision should be given retroactive effect.

In Cantu, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District determined that Harris should be given only prospective application. It reached this result after carefully considering the purpose of the new rule, the extent of...