People v. Perry

• Decision Date: 14 February 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01077,114 A.D.3d 1282,980 N.Y.S.2d 225
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. David PERRY, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

114 A.D.3d 1282

980 N.Y.S.2d 225

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01077

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,

v.David PERRY, Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 14, 2014.

Brooks T. Baker, District Attorney, Bath (John C. Tunney of Counsel), for Appellant.

John M. Scanlon, Binghamton, for Defendant–Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS AND WHALEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

On appeal from an order granting that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.10(2)(b), the People contend that County Court erred in determining that the statute of limitations had expired. We agree. Defendant was charged by an indictment with grand larceny in the second degree based on the theory that he stole in excess of $50,000 in New York State retirement disability benefits to which he was not entitled. Defendant applied for those benefits in 2004 or 2005, and received payments from February 17, 2005 through February 28, 2012.

It is well settled that the People may aggregate “a series of single larcenies governed by a common fraudulent scheme or plan even though the successive takings extended over a long period of time” ( People v. Rosich, 170 A.D.2d 703, 703, 567 N.Y.S.2d 749,lv. denied77 N.Y.2d 1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d 926, 575 N.E.2d 412;see People v. Cox, 286 N.Y. 137, 142–143, 36 N.E.2d 84,rearg. denied286 N.Y. 706, 37 N.E.2d 146;People v. Tighe, 2 A.D.3d 1364, 1365, 768 N.Y.S.2d 871,lv. denied2 N.Y.3d 747, 778 N.Y.S.2d 472, 810 N.E.2d 925). The offense of grand larceny as alleged in this case is therefore properly characterized as a continuing crime ( see People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 608, 615–616, 635 N.Y.S.2d 144, 658 N.E.2d 1017), and “the [s]tatute of [l]imitations of a continuous crime is governed by the termination and not the starting date of the offense” ( People v. Eastern Ambulance Serv., 106 A.D.2d 867, 868, 483 N.Y.S.2d 508;see People v. DeBeer, 35 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 826 N.Y.S.2d 537,lv. denied8 N.Y.3d 921, 834 N.Y.S.2d 511, 866 N.E.2d 457). The statute of limitations in this case did not begin to run until the final taking in February 2012 ( see generally People v. Randall–Whitaker, 55 A.D.3d 931, 931, 869 N.Y.S.2d 555,lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 787, 879 N.Y.S.2d 63, 906 N.E.2d 1097), and the prosecution commenced shortly thereafter in March 2012 was thus timely pursuant to CPL 30.10(2)(b).

Defendant contends that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the allegedly fraudulent filing, relying on People v. O'Boyle, 136 Misc.2d 1010, 1012–1013, 519 N.Y.S.2d 524. That case, however, is inapposite inasmuch as the defendant in that case was...